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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relevance of social class in relation to 
general support for the Labour Party both within a national and localised context, with 
a specific focus placed upon the area of North-West Cumbria.  This is achieved by 
following the research hypothesis that states that the party since the emergence of 
New Labour, is with their classless brand, more effective on a political level than their 
collectivist Old Labour predecessor.  Such analysis, using a mixture of primary and 
secondary methods, is framed within a three-themed research phenomenon.  The 
phenomenon begins via the first theme ‘Class/Identity’ which defined the extensive 
atomised shift in perceived class categorisation in contemporary Britain.  The analysis 
of the latter then links to the second theme ‘(Labour) Party’ which evaluates such 
shifts to that of Labour support, ranging from the historic ‘Old’ and ‘New’ eras to the 
present ‘Post New’ incarnation.  This primarily states how the rise of the New Right 
inspired New Labour to modernise their core political message to accommodate the 
new atomised class culture, so as to gain broader levels of support.  The research 
phenomenon concludes with the third theme ‘Geography (North-West Cumbria)’ 
which explores how such class atomisation affected Labour support on a broad 
locational basis, particularly within North-West Cumbria.  The thesis findings 
generally concur with the research hypothesis since the New Labour brand was 
somewhat successful in rural areas which hitherto had been deemed unattainable by 
Old Labour.  Such findings, be it nationally and/or locally, are a symptom of 
contemporary class times where political allegiance has become less ideologically 
centred, and more brand-orientated and homogeneous.  This thesis structure also 
makes a contribution to qualitative methods research as it provides a template of how 
such a research hypothesis and phenomenon can be theoretically and practically 
integrated. 
 
 
Kieran J. Steuart, M.A., M.Sc./M.Res.; ‘Ph.D., Applied Social Sciences’; April 2018; The 
relevance of social class, communications, and general location, in contemporary British 
Labour Party politics, with a focus on North-West Cumbria. 
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RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY 
 
 
This thesis analyses the relevance of the shift in class discourse from a broad 
‘communal’ perspective towards a more complex, atomised ethos in regards support 
for the British Labour Party, with a specific localised focus on North-West Cumbria.  
The two types of socio-political categorisation that are commonly referred to in this 
study, be it ‘traditional’ ‘communal’ or ‘classless’ ‘atomised’, are defined at the 
outset, so as to emphasise the appropriate context in which such terms are commonly 
referred to during the thesis.  Both respective terms are for the purposes of this study 
naturally connected and therefore are generally interchangeable.  There is still though 
a clear distinctive meaning for each word in its respective term, as ‘traditional’ and 
‘atomised’ describes the general class structure of their respective historical time-
periods, whilst, ‘communal’ and ‘classless’ state the relevance of such a class 
structure in relation to support for the Labour Party.  The prominence of each term in 
relation to the thesis’ three-themed phenomenon is outlined in the table below. 
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Table I: Relevant Terminology 
 
Theme Traditional/Communal Atomised/Classless 
 
 
Class/Identity 
 
pp.21-36 (Chapter II) 
pp.120-128 (Chapter V) 
pp.172-174 (Chapter VI) 
pp.246-248 (Appendix II) 
 
The term refers to the 
works of Karl Marx and his 
two-tier class categorisation 
theory – the proletariat and 
bourgeoisie, and Max 
Weber and his three-tier 
categorisation theory - 
workers, managers, and 
owners. 
 
 
The term refers to the 
modern consumer-driven 
atomised class ethos 
purported by Edward 
Bernays and latterly 
through a more refined 
cultural perspective stated 
by Pierre Bourdieu, and 
Mike Savage. 
 
 
(Labour) Party 
 
pp.37-66 (Chapter III) 
pp.128-149 (Chapter V) 
pp.175-179 (Chapter VI) 
pp.248-253 (Appendix II) 
 
The term refers to Old 
Labour’s class perspective, 
that being promoting the 
interests of the working-
classes over the middle-
classes.  It consequently 
represents the collectivised 
class outlook where the 
party branded itself to 
please their broad working-
class electoral supporter 
base. 
 
The term refers to how the 
atomised perspective was 
developed by Anthony 
Giddens into a classless 
Third Way political ethos, 
which enabled the 
promotion of the New 
Labour brand.  It 
consequently evaluates 
how such a brand culture 
has affected class 
discourse both in general 
political terms, and 
specifically in regards 
contemporary affinity for 
the Labour Party since the 
rise of the New Right. 
 
 
Geography (North-West 
Cumbria) 
 
pp.66-71 (Chapter III) 
pp.149-171 (Chapter V) 
pp.179-185 (Chapter VI) 
pp.253-256 (Appendix II) 
 
The term refers to the 
Marxist ‘spatial’ ethos 
promoted in the works of 
Louis Althusser, Henri 
Lefebvre, and David 
Harvey which emphasises 
that class and political 
perception are defined via 
Marxist interpretations of 
social space and specific 
locale. 
 
 
The term refers to the 
network theory advanced 
by Manuel Castells which 
states that traditional class 
groupings, where political 
affinity was defined by 
geographic space and 
locale, have been replaced 
by atomised networks that 
have homogenised such 
variables. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter offers a brief introduction of this thesis as it will contextualise the content 
and explain the analytical approach to be found in the succeeding chapters.  The aim 
of this thesis is to investigate the relevance that social class has played in regards 
affinity for the Labour Party in Britain, since the development of the New Labour 
brand, with an explicit localised focus on North-West Cumbria, analysing the districts 
of Allerdale and Carlisle.  The study will focus on Britain (England, Scotland, and 
Wales) and not the United Kingdom (which also includes Northern Ireland), as 
Labour traditionally consider themselves in electoral terms at least, to be a British, and 
not a United Kingdom, based party. 
 
The chapter is structured in five parts, the first is to state a broad overview of the aims 
and objectives of the study.  The second is to outline the significance of, and 
motivations for undertaking this type of research.  The third is to outline why the 
subject of the Labour Party in North-West Cumbria at this time was particularly 
conducive for such research.  The fourth focusses on the theoretical structure which 
links to the fifth which gives a brief description of the impending chapters, and how 
they relate to each other so as to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the research 
phenomenon being explored. 
 
Overview 
On a theoretical level, the thesis endeavours to determine, what effect shifts in 
sociological and political outlooks within modern British society, have had on 
Labour’s contemporary support.  Such analysis is framed from a range of socio-
political theorists holding a variety of broad left-of-centre perspectives.  On a practical 
level, this thesis through the adoption of secondary Conceptual Analysis research and 
primary Interview research, makes a contribution to the development of qualitative 
methods research by providing a template of how such approaches can be integrated 
and connected to explore a pertinent research hypothesis.  The analytical structure, 
devised through both descriptive and evaluative dialogue, from a range of relevant 
class theorists and Labour political representatives in North-West Cumbria, largely 
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questions the relevance of class and location in regards political party affiliation for 
the Labour Party and its respective Old, New, and Post New brands. 
 
The study though more explicitly is designed to address the following aims: the first 
being to create a wide range of Conceptual Analysis output, the intention of which is 
to strongly identify relationships between the contemporary complex social class 
structure and its relevance with modern-day support for the Labour Party.  In addition 
to such inquiry, the role of such affiliation will be dissected through an understanding 
of the relevance of the rise to prominence of the New Labour brand which came into 
being in the mid-1990s with the election of Tony Blair as party leader in 1994.  This 
coincided with the sentiments promoted by the atomised, consumerist class revolution 
undertaken by the New Right who were themselves influenced through revolutionary 
propaganda practices denoted by Edward Bernays, two decades earlier, which brought 
into sharp focus the role of political marketing, branding, and advertising in modern 
British politics.  By focussing upon the relevance of such a class shift within the 
context of the Labour Party and correlating it to a particular localised setting like 
North-West Cumbria is a distinctive research void which this study aims to fill.  
Finally, the third general aim of the research is to produce a rich description of the 
subject in question through the Conceptual Analysis and the Interview method 
techniques.  This chapter will thus give a brief outline of the broad methodological 
frameworks which will be drawn upon.  Discussion here, as noted below, will also 
concentrate on the structural basis of the research study, which includes a brief precis 
of the research question, objective, scope, theoretical motivations, and relevant literary 
contributions. 
 
The aim is to identify the relevance of social class both in a conventional British sense 
and within the confines of the Labour Party from both an historical and contemporary 
perspective.  This leads secondly on to an examination of how such a relationship has 
been affected since the emergence of the atomised class-political culture in the late 
1970s.  This stimulated the rise to prominence of the classless New Labour brand 
twenty years later under the guidance of Tony Blair, which delivered the party an 
unprecedented three consecutive general election victories.  There will then be an 
investigation in relation to the extent to which these norms and practices are 
implicated to North-West Cumbria, specifically within geographically contrasting 
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rural and urban landscapes in both Allerdale and Carlisle, the concise definition of 
which is outlined (see Appendix I).  The research in conclusion offers a way of 
developing a means of using the findings to inform possible future Class-Labour Party 
relations in other counties, areas and/or districts within the rest of Britain. 
 
A theoretical framework of this kind is evaluated through three stages, all of which are 
interlinked.  The first is to probe into the typical patterns of discourse and literature 
that are used by a range of theorists and participants taking part within the study.  
Following on from this, the second element endeavours to define how such content 
and discourse contributes to the participants’ construction and understanding of the 
subject in question.  This research analysis concludes by using the knowledge 
garnered from such findings to suggest appropriate ways that the findings can be used 
to improve any similar future research for the subject in question.  It would appear that 
to answer these three elements, it is necessary first to have a core thematic focus 
which in the main, ties such research objectives to relevant primary and secondary 
research content.  The three core research themes of ‘Class/Identity’, ‘(Labour) Party’, 
and ‘Geography (North-West Cumbria)’, which make-up the research phenomenon, 
are three distinct constituents whose analytical connection is complex and intricate.  
The clear purpose of this study is accordingly to compare, contrast, and evaluate such 
themes. 
 
Significance of, and motivations for this Research Study 
Over the last four decades the connection between the issue of social class and 
political ideological attachment has become a mainstream issue in the field of political 
science (Giddens (1991); Scase (1992)).  Such a research structure has been used 
extensively to examine the theoretical relationships between a wide-range of political 
perspectives to both historical and contemporary sociological class categorisations.  
After reviewing related literature, problems or gaps were observed (see Chapters II, 
III, IV, V, and VI) which provided motivation to undertake a thesis of this kind.  
Although accepting that more qualitative research is always needed to provide an 
evaluation of the relationship among different thematic components, it must be stated 
that this study attempts to build a fluent dialogue between the three core themes which 
inform each other, be it either obviously or subtly, in a multitude of ways. 
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The atomisation of class in Britain since the rise of the New Right in the late 1970s, 
that is the shift from the broad collectivised class groupings espoused by Marx and 
Weber towards the more fragmented and cultured ethos of Bernays and Bourdieu, has 
had notable political effects.  In regards Labour, it has in a general sense led to the 
party adapting its class focus away from communal structures towards the individual 
as consumer.  This has encouraged a merging in political party ideology and with it a 
greater level of flexibility in regards contemporary political party affinity.  This thesis, 
accepting such modern shifts, can contribute to the existing literature and knowledge 
by outlining both an historical and contemporary outlook.  The former will be 
achieved by stating how both Old and New Labour support was shaped by the shift 
towards such atomised brand politics, the latter by offering ways as to how the party 
could possibly develop its Post New brand to continue to adapt such an evolving 
consumerist structure.  This will also give a practical example of how primary and 
secondary qualitative approaches can be combined and integrated to investigate both 
the said historical and contemporary relevance that such a research phenomenon plays 
in a localised setting of North-West Cumbria.  This thesis will accordingly be a fully 
integrated study, in which the qualitative findings, be they primary or secondary, will 
be mutually informative both from a national and localised Labour Party perspective. 
 
Why Labour?, Why North-West Cumbria?, and Why Now? 
The Labour Party was seen as most appropriate for this study, because being a study 
that investigates the relevance of contemporary class structure, and its subsequent 
changes to political party affinity, Labour are the party which has most altered their 
perspective in relation to such sociological movements.  This is symbolically 
demonstrated with the adoption of the Old and New brands, both constructs defined 
not just by the relationship with each other, but via the different class connotations 
which each were deemed to promote and represent. 
 
North-West Cumbria and the two districts which comprise it, Allerdale and Carlisle, 
were chosen for two pragmatic reasons, the first being in practical terms, that they are 
two districts which have been starved of any such research in this academic field.  The 
second is that the two districts in general, are largely geographically and politically 
similar.  They are geographically similar as they are both comprised of a mixture of 
urban and rural areas, thus meaning that any major differences that might arise be it 
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through the meaning of class and its effect on Labour’s image both on a national and 
localised context will arise from an intra-district divide, rather than a comparison 
between the two.  This dichotomy is vital as it inevitably places focus on the 
rural/urban split and the specific effect it has on both districts as complex geographic 
entities in their own right, which by emphasising both district as well as locale, 
provides a greater degree of research focus to the research phenomenon being 
undertaken.  The two districts are also politically similar, that being that they 
traditionally are both Labour supporting districts, with a sizable amount of non-
Labour voters as well, who potentially could have been attracted to the New Labour’s 
classless agenda.  Such distinctive geographic and political characteristics therein 
make the area ideal for social science research of this kind. 
 
This is a particularly propitious time to be studying the relevance of class, particularly 
in relation to Labour politics, as both the Old and New Labour eras are finished, they 
are now historical constructs which thus enables them and their relationship with 
class, communications, and locale, to be fully analysed, evaluated, and compared from 
a retrospective context.  This analysis is further supplemented with the party in its 
current guise, that being termed Post New Labour, which is still in the process of 
defining its distinctive class outlook.  This position became particularly relevant in 
2015 and 2016, the time when the interview research was being undertaken, with the 
surprise election of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn as leader, and the subsequent internal 
turmoil, and general interest which the party generated, particularly over its class 
objectives both within a broad national and specific localised context. 
 
Theoretical Structure 
The thesis thus through a linked thematic structure, endeavours to use a range of 
primary and secondary theorists’ perspectives to inform the interview participant 
research, with the aim being to give a distinctive evaluation.  Anything else would 
substantially weaken the analytical framework and accordingly any subsequent 
conclusions.  This research study for that reason is centred through the first and 
second-hand perspectives of representatives and theorists who typically are associated 
with socialistic political outlooks.  Such discourse though encompasses a wide-
ranging ideological left-of-centre standpoint, spanning from radical left-wing Marxist 
to moderate left-wing social democracy.  This allows for the use of such key content 
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to be dissected from a broad theoretical perspective, hence the general content is not 
based on any kind of theological supposition but on the core arguments of the stated 
primary and secondary theorists themselves. 
 
The thesis structure in view of that, is consequently framed and examined through a 
wide-ranging ‘left-of-centre’ exploration of the New Right atomisation ethos 
developed by Bernaysian theory and its ensuing effects on Labour support and its 
brand perception, both nationally and locally.  Despite their ideological differences, 
the entirety of the theorists being ideologically left-of-centre have an affinity for 
socialistic Labour values if not the Labour Party itself.  This ranges from Ralph 
Miliband the Marxist to Anthony Giddens the Social Democrat, both of whom were, 
and are, Labour supporters.  This correlates with the content stated by the research 
participants, who by the fact of being Labour representatives, all gave such 
comprehensive ‘left-of-centre’ perspectives to the interview questions.  It could be 
argued that it could have been structured in an opposite fashion, i.e. initially set the 
clear theoretical framework (e.g. Marxist) and then outline the required theorists (who 
would logically have had to have been almost entirely Marxist) to justify such a 
framework.  At first glance that appears logical, but in the long-term the opposite is 
true, because then the researcher would be constraining him or herself to a narrow 
theoretical perspective which would inevitably weaken the overall thesis argument. 
 
Thesis Chapter Outline 
The context of the study has been outlined in this opening chapter; below is a brief 
table of the ‘Theoretical Framework’ and then a summary of the role and relevance of 
the remaining six chapters. 
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Table II: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Introduction (Chapter I) 
 
Conceptual Analysis (of key themes and theorists):  
(Chapters II & III) 
Theme I: Class/Identity 
Aim: Define the Meaning of Class - Communal to the Atomised 
Main Theorists: Communal: Marx, Weber; Atomised: Bourdieu, Savage 
Theme II: (Labour) Party 
Aim: Define the Relevance of the Atomised Class Shift on Labour Politics 
Main Theorists: Old Labour: Miliband, Thompson; New Labour: Bernays, Giddens 
Theme III: Geography (North-West Cumbria) 
Aim: Define the meaning of class to Labour support on a locational basis 
Main Theorists: Spatial: Althusser, Lefebvre, Harvey; Network: Castells 
 
Interviews (of 15 North-West Cumbria Labour research participants):  
(Chapter IV) 
Aim: Define the general relevance of the Interviews to the Conceptual Analysis 
research via its broad structures and reflexivity 
Theme I: Class/Identity - Interview Question 1;  
Theme II: (Labour) Party - Interview Questions 2-5;  
Theme III: Geography (North-West Cumbria) - Interview Questions 6-8 
 
Conceptual Analysis (themes/theorists) of the Interviews (research participants): 
(Chapters V & VI) 
Theme I: Class/Identity 
Analyse: Class Perceptions in Contemporary Britain 
Theme II: (Labour) Party 
Analyse: Old Labour & Class; The Impact of Thatcher/New Right; New Labour & 
Class 
Theme III: Geography (North-West Cumbria) 
Analyse: Urban/Rural Dynamic; The New Labour Effect on Locale (North-West 
Cumbria) 
 
Conclusions (Chapter VII) 
 
Appendices (I & II) 
 
Postscript: Post New Labour - The Corbyn Effect 
 
 
 
Chapter II entitled ‘Theoretical Background: Class – The Producer/Consumer’, and 
Chapter III entitled ‘Theoretical Background: The Labour Party’ both provide a 
comprehensive review of related literature on the three-themed phenomenon at the 
heart of the research.  The former though, discusses the relevance of class in British 
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politics, how it became more complex, atomised, and harder to discern, and the effect 
that had on political allegiance.  The latter, following on from such discourse, 
questions how such political atomisation, has affected the specific class perspective of 
the Labour Party.  The intent behind these two chapters is not to provide an exhaustive 
summary of every item of recent, or for that matter, distant opinion, on the three-
themed subjects as entities within themselves.  It is rather, to provide an overview of 
the relevant literature relating to such themes within the specialised research context 
of this particular study.  This strategy needs to be followed for basic practical reasons 
if nothing else, as given the voluminous amounts of literature related to these core 
themes, it is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all available literature.  
The review instead, has been arranged to form a logical flow which by this means will 
address the key points pertinent to the areas of inquiry.  It accordingly presents an 
extensive evaluation of literature on the research topic being studied. 
 
Chapter IV presents a detailed breakdown of the methodological structure of the 
thesis.  The positioning of the ‘Methodology’ chapter, that being directly inserted 
between the earlier literature review-styled chapters (II, and III) and the later analysis-
styled chapters (V, and VI), offers a clear strategic outlook of how the previous 
secondary research is methodologically connected to the forthcoming primary data.  
Chapters V, and VI, entitled ‘Hypothesis & Findings’ and ‘Discussion’, as being 
analysis focussed, primarily present the results and findings of the study.  Continuing 
the structure identified in the previous ‘Methodology’ chapter, Chapter V asserts how 
the study’s research themes, supported by relevant quotes, determine the relevance of 
the research hypothesis to the eventual findings. 
 
Finally, to conclude the analysis section is Chapter VI, which comprehensively 
evaluates through a reasoned perspective the findings in conjunction with relevant 
prior research, so as to outline a clear focus to the research question being 
investigated.  The Interview content via headings summarised from such findings 
offers the broad contours to the general Discussion chapter, but the analysis is 
primarily structured through correlating such headings to relevant theoretical 
perspectives.  The ‘Hypothesis & Findings’, and ‘Discussion’ chapters, correlate the 
general research phenomenon to the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour brands, and also to a 
lesser extent, the contemporary ‘Post New’ Labour brand.  Such a structure is thus for 
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the most part, designed from an historical perspective as the Old and New Labour 
brands are now figures from the past.  This is compared to the latter brand being 
contemporary, which is naturally studied from an element of primary and secondary 
research supposition in relation to possible future perspectives.  The theoretical 
framework has thus been extended and reviewed, in accordance with the qualitative 
data, which is intended to encourage a greater understanding of the relevance of class 
and communications to Labour politics, especially within the localised setting of 
North-West Cumbria.  The agenda on a broad perspective is informed by a growing 
sense of the emergence of a more reﬂexive, more modest, and more consciously 
theory-informed political analysis.  The study then comes to a completion in Chapter 
VII entitled ‘Conclusions’, which in accordance with the knowledge of the research 
findings and subsequent analysis provided, summarises in detail the many potential 
implications of the evaluative purpose of the study. 
 
All of these directions have been considered and are outlined in the next chapter 
which is the first of two that review relevant literature which are broadly associated to 
this research field.  The review in general terms, consolidates and evaluates relevant 
literature pertinent to the three research themes and analyses how such themes and the 
literary content within them, link with each other so as to define a clear research 
phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CLASS – THE PRODUCER/CONSUMER 
 
 
This chapter explores the general theoretical literary scope of the study, which largely 
is achieved via a comprehensive analysis of the relevant themes and theorists which 
support and direct such a detailed review of literature.  The chapter is divided into 
three broad sections, the first outlining the once predominant collectivised class ethos, 
and the simplistic political allegiances which were associated with them.  This 
narrative leads on to the next two sections which illustrate how with the rise of the 
New Right in the late 1970s and the enactment of the political philosophies of Reagan 
in the United States, and Thatcher in Britain, the old communal class certainties were 
replaced with a ruthless corporate culture that promoted the theory of class 
atomisation, that being prioritising the interests of the individual citizen.  Following 
such a structure, an initial understanding of the role of social class from a traditional 
communal perspective needs to be assessed, chiefly through the writings of various 
notable theorists such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Pierre Bourdieu. 
 
Marx, Weber, and Bourdieu 
Social class, as documented by McLellan (1995), and Wheen (2000), is defined by 
Marxists in relation to the means of production.  This ‘though does not explain how 
classes are constituted as classes, nor how the complex status hierarchies of capitalist 
societies are articulated and internalised by individuals or how other systems of status 
subordination are integrated within a class system of domination’ (Blunden (2004)).  
On closer inspection, as Cannadine (1999) states, ‘the best that could be said of 
Marx’s two class-conscious classes was that they were ideal types, historical 
abstractions that grossly oversimplified the way in which the social structure of 
modern Britain had evolved and developed’.  The make-up, identity, and structure of 
class have changed throughout time, Marx and Engels’ famed text, The German 
Ideology (1932), examined the concept that the societal class structure was divided 
into two distinct groupings, the ‘bourgeoisie’ and the ‘proletariat’.  The power 
divisions, as remarked by Miliband (1989), and Barnett (2009), between those 
respective groups were equally as distinct, for the proletariat to economically survive 
had to sell their labour power to the bourgeoisie class who controlled the means of 
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production.  A social class structure of this ilk encouraged a continuous class 
subjugation of the proletariat, for they were recurrently forced to follow a productive 
cycle which persistently solidified the economic power in the hands of the bourgeoisie 
(Poulantzas (1975); Gardiner (1992)).  The solitary viable way that such a dictatorial 
elitist class system could be overturned is only by the ‘proletariat’ class realising their 
subjugation status and consequently uniting as one to overthrow their ‘bourgeoisie’ 
oppressors (Marx & Engels (1975); Grossberg (2010)).  There ‘are those Marxist 
followers’, as remarked by Wright (1985), and quoted by Carchedi (1975), ‘who 
regard the inherent antagonisms of class relationships to be the vehicles of social 
change, for them, it is necessary to identify the determinants of class membership’. 
 
One difficulty, as Cannadine (1999) notes with this view, ‘was that the shared class 
characteristics and clear-cut class boundaries that Marx and his followers had posited 
had rarely, if ever, existed in fact’.  A further problem, as discerned by Dahrendorf 
(1959), and Newby et al. (1988), and is further quoted by Cannadine (1999), ‘was that 
within Marx’s two supposedly inclusive class categories, there were many internal 
divisions.  This occurred on numerous levels, between aristocrats and landed gentry, 
between bankers and businessmen, between industrialists competing for the same 
markets, and between the many different gradations of skilled and unskilled labour.  A 
third qualification was that during and since Marx’s time, old occupational groups 
have expanded, and new occupational groups have come into being that do not easily 
fit into his two-tier model: managers, professionals, and the whole of the lower 
middle-classes’.  Cannadine (1999) continues, that ‘before getting to the historical 
substance of the matter, it might be helpful to state the conventional post communal 
class orthodoxy that held sway in Britain from the end of World War II until the late 
1970s, and to describe the ways in which it has since then been replaced by a new 
individualistic consumerist ethos’.  This is also the appropriate place to reaffirm the 
unfashionable belief ‘that social class is still central to a proper understanding of 
British history and Britain today, provided it is appropriately defined.  This 
categorisation inspired by the works of German sociologist Max Weber, was 
introduced in the Victorian age as a simplistic way to differentiate people into clear 
class positions during the Industrial Revolution’.  Weberian accounts, as noted by 
Holton & Turner (2011), and Kalberg (2016), and quoted by Cochrane & Anderson 
(1989), ‘define people’s class stratification primarily via their occupation.  Different 
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occupations are rated by a society via varying degrees of statuses, and these ratings 
can be uncovered by survey research and various other measures.  Once a hierarchy of 
diverse occupational rankings has been constructed, similarly ranked occupations can 
be progressively collapsed into smaller numbers of categories.  “Occupational 
Classes” are just categories boiled down by analysts from the myriads of relative 
rankings of occupations in the society as a whole’ (Cochrane & Anderson, 1989, 
p.175). 
 
A further important difference between Marx and Weber over their individual class 
perspectives is that the role of ‘class’ played a meaningfully smaller part in Weber’s 
overall sociological workings (Bendix (1978); Anter (2014)).  In contrast to Marx, 
despite clear practical limitations, Weber’s systematic discussion of the concept of 
class, as noted by Ringer (2004), and Camic (2005), is far more relevant on a 
contemporary sociological level than Marx.  Weber, by approving the rationality of 
capitalism today and through opposing Marxist socialism, was effectively able to 
espouse a more realistic theory of contemporary social class thinking.  They were, as 
stated by Stedman Jones (1983, and 2016), and Pakulski & Waters (1996), nothing 
more than rhetorical constructions, the inner-imagination of every individual citizen, 
seeking as best they can to explain the broad societal structure to themselves.  In short, 
as Cannadine (1999) states, ‘even though social perception was clearly the product of 
language, it was not though the only social indicator over such matters, for there were 
and are, many other factors in which people envision the construct of such social 
order’. 
 
It was thus a broadly historical approach ‘to the topic of social class, similar to that 
found in the work of Marx, and Weber, that has been a constant theme in the work of 
sociologists’ (Crompton, 2008, p.38).  In Britain, the work of Bauman (1972), and 
Webb & Schirato (2002), might be cited as examples.  This approach though is 
originally derived ‘from the 1960s, where there was a continuing dialogue between 
sociology and history, much of which has been concerned with the concept of “class”’ 
(Stedman Jones (1976)).  Bourdieu, as alluded to by Grenfell (2010), and Gartman 
(2015), and quoted by Bryant (2015), ‘refers to possession of the dominant culture as 
cultural capital because with the education system it can be translated into wealth and 
power.  Cultural capital is not evenly distributed throughout the class structure, and 
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this predominantly accounts for class differences in educational attainment.  Bourdieu 
asserts that people’s taste is related both to upbringing and to education.  The taste 
could include art, films, music, food, and hobbies.  He shows that there is a very close 
relationship linking cultural practices primarily to educational capital and secondly, to 
social origin’.  According to Bourdieu, ‘the education system attaches the highest 
value to legitimate taste’, and people find it easier in these post-Thatcherite times to 
succeed in the education system and are likely to stay in it for longer than those 
brought up in the previous communal centred society. 
 
The old class system in British society differentiated clearly between the collar 
boundary between middle and working-class, white and blue-collar.  In the old model 
of class, as noted by Symonds (2015), and Browne (2016), people knew their place as 
they were born into a particular class and consequently the standard individual mind-
set would be based on knowing their specific position within that class structure.  The 
upper-classes in such a structure were comprised of a small group of landed 
aristocrats, and the middle-classes be it the managers and white-collar workers, were 
well aware of their privileged place within this conventional class paradigm.  The 
same is true for a person who was born into a working-class coal mining family, as 
they would inevitably be socialised into thinking that this is the class to which they 
naturally belonged.  In the same way, as Savage & Devine claim in The Great British 
Class Survey (2013), that whilst people still managed to move between social classes, 
there was a much clearer and stronger sense that a person’s class perception during 
such a time period had been clearly defined through broader, and for that matter, 
simpler class categories.  In regards the contemporary class structure, people are much 
less likely to feel very proudly working-class because their parents were working-
class or at the other extreme, people promoting their ancestral elite class values.  
People in today’s Britain are looking for atomised social markers which depict that 
they may be privileged or not, markers which can be acquired through a variety of 
ways such as going to university, obtaining a certain occupation, and buying certain 
brand products.  These are common indicators which people use to demonstrate to 
both themselves and others the type of social class grouping they currently are 
categorised towards (Savage (2015)). 
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Such a structure has changed quite radically; for what is occurring ‘today is that there 
is an ever-increasing gap between the top and the bottom of the class spectrum.  At the 
top there is a small elite class which encompasses about 6 per cent of the population, 
who are characterised by having very large salaries, excessive savings, and expensive 
house values, rewards which have allowed them to pull away from the rest of the 
“traditional” middle-classes.  At the bottom, there is a class called the “Precariat” 
which is a class characterised by poor income and savings and deprived of social 
capital, be it friendships, and cultural engagement’ (Savage & Devine (2013)).  
Between those two aforementioned extremes there is a greater blurring of class 
groupings as the traditional clear class boundaries have fragmented (Standing (2016); 
Thatcher (2016)).  The result of this is that there are now clusters of people who 
Savage & Define (2013) brand, ‘as the “Established Middle Class” or the “Technical 
Middle Class” which is characterised by people with high incomes but not much 
social capital’.  There are strong generational divides in British society now where 
young people are excluded from moving in to the more middle-class position which 
leads to questions as to whether there is a link between generational divisions and 
class divisions.  On one level, there is clearly an emergence of a globalised middle-
class and yet these classes are also very fixed in place, specifically in particular areas 
of Britain.  The Elite class is disproportionately found within the affluent areas of the 
South-East, is what Savage & Devine (2013), call the ‘Elite Vortex’.  The message 
which it promotes is that the contemporary class system prevalent in 21st Century 
Britain is very dynamic, mobile, and fluid.  People are no longer attached to a broad 
communal class group, but such a structure is actually still consistent with the 
formation of distinctive spatial clusters both socially and economically, of wealth and 
power (Savage & Devine (2013)). 
 
This structure outlines a more complex class system than the more traditional versions 
of Marx and later Weber, and as a consequence provides a contemporary perspective 
in regards to ‘moderating the myriad of struggles between classes in modern capitalist 
society’ (Blunden (2004)).  The Great British Class Survey (2013), founded both on 
the works of Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990, and 1992), and Savage (2000), as Savage & 
Devine (2013) notes, ‘provided valuable data to help leading sociological experts to 
understand the key feature behind the contemporary British class structure’.  It above 
all suggests that class perception, and ‘its social relevance has not been diluted from 
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the British population, in fact the subject of class matters more’ in Britain today ‘than 
it did’ four decades ago, prior to the atomised revolution.  The broad Marxist and 
Weberian class divisions have, as stated by Holton & Turner (2011), and Murphy & 
Costa (2015), been usurped by the more refined Bourdieuan cultural ethos.  Such 
accustomed class divisions may not in spite of this, as asserted by Dahrendorf (1959), 
be relevant in contemporary 21st Century society, although the concept of class may 
still dominate public affairs and shape political opinion.  It used ‘to be generally 
perceived that class was defined by occupational status.  In basic industrial 
compositional class terms, “White-Collar” workers had more prosperous and 
sophisticated lifestyles than “Blue-Collar” workers’ (Savage & Devine (2013)).  Rigid 
Weberian class categories of this sort, as expressed by Schroeder (1998), and 
Whimster & Lash (2008), are not, according to Savage & Devine (2013), ‘deemed 
appropriate barometers to analyse class stratifications’ in present-day society, where 
class perspectives and categorisations are greatly more complex and atomised.  The 
old communal class categorisations are now, as Cannadine (1999) notes, ‘widely 
dismissed as being deeply and fatally flawed: too teleological, anachronistic, all-
encompassing, and simplistic’. 
 
Bernays’ Classless Consumerism and the rise of the New Right 
This classless virtue, as principally noted by Adam Curtis in his BBC documentary 
The Century of the Self (2002), was founded as a concept in 1939 by Edward Bernays, 
who was Sigmund Freud’s nephew, and also the founder of contemporary Public 
Relations (PR), where he devised the concept of the ‘brand’ to promote a new 
atomised social structure.  Freud, as customarily stated by Harre et al. (1985), and 
Thurschwell (2009), began to write about group interaction, and about how 
straightforwardly the unconscious aggressive forces in human beings could be 
activated when they were in crowds.  In his work on crowd psychology, Freud 
described how the startling irrationality inside human beings could appear in such 
groups, where, what he called ‘libidinal forces of desire’ which occur and are 
promoted through the individual identity ethos and not through traditional, communal 
class categories (Curtis (2002)). 
 
Freud, as commented by Harre & Secord (1972), and Henriques et al. (1984), alleged 
that he had undervalued the general aggressive nature of human beings, as they were 
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much more threatening than he had formerly believed.  Freud had concocted a 
technique that he called ‘Psychoanalysis’, which explored the concept of free 
association, by doing so, he had extracted potent and sensual forces which were the 
residues of human kind’s animalistic history (Curtis (2002)).  This theory, as broadly 
noted by prominent theorists like Beck et al. (1994), and Thurschwell (2009), goes 
back to the early part of the 20th Century, to Freud and his notions of the unconscious.  
He articulated the assumptions that humans are, in terms of our rational minds, 
constantly endeavouring to satisfy their individualistic hopes, fears, and desires of 
which, the role of somebody selling something, including a politician, is to appeal to 
this great swamp of unconscious desire.  These contemporary atomised groups were 
hard to categorise and define as they cut across a range of traditional class groupings 
and had a range of social interests, employment positions, and past educational 
attainment.  They all though broadly emphasised the importance of the happiness, and 
wellbeing of the individual, over that of the wider society at large (Curtis (2002)). 
 
At the core of the narrative is not just Freud himself but other members of his family, 
by and large focusing attention on Bernays, for like his famous uncle, Bernays was 
assured that human beings, similar to that outlined by Harre & Secord (1972), and 
Gabay (2015), were motivated by greedy forces.  The only way thus to deal with the 
public was to connect with their unconscious desires and fears.  Bernays took Freud’s 
concepts about human behaviour and used them to control the masses.  This was 
demonstrated on a practical level in the early 1920s when the big New York banks 
financed firms across America, with the object being to spread such a consumerist 
message.  They were to be the conduits of the mass-produced goods and Bernays’ role 
was to construct the new type of atomised consumer.  By the end of the decade 
President Hoover was elected president, this was the first shift in the influence of 
Bernays’ ideas on a political level, as Hoover was the first politician to enunciate the 
vision that such atomised consumerism had become the indispensable vehicle of 
American life (De Vaus (2002); Biressi & Nunn (2013)).  After his election, he told a 
group of advertisers and public relations consultants that they had taken over the 
function of generating desire and had converted people into endlessly moving 
happiness constructs, constructs which Bernays would later term as ‘brands’ (Curtis 
(2002)).  Above all, what was starting to occur during this time was a new idea of how 
to run mass democracy.  As, argued by Clark et al. (1993), and Marlin (2013), at its 
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heart was the docile consuming self which not only made the economy progress but 
also powered a social structure thus creating a stable society.  Bernays now became 
one of the central figures in a business elite which dominated American society and 
politics in the 1920s. 
 
Bernays began to create many of the techniques of mass consumer persuasion that are 
now common place in contemporary society.  He hired consultants to promote specific 
brands by outlining that they were good for people’s self-worth as they were intrinsic 
to their natural consumer-driven desires.  He uniquely showed American corporations 
how they could make people want brands that they did not need by linking mass-
produced merchandises to their unconscious selfish desires (Curtis (2002)); out of this 
would come a new individualistic political perspective of how to control the masses 
(Bernays (1965)).  By gratifying such inner-selfish desires, as noted by Qualter 
(1991), and Curtis (2002), people were made to feel contented and thus obedient; it 
was the start of the all-consuming atomised self which has come to dominate modern 
culture.  By stimulating people’s inner-desires and then connecting them with 
consumer products, he was creating a new way to manage the irrational force of the 
masses.  Bernays had manipulated the American people because he, like many others 
at the time, assumed that the corporate interests of business and the selfish desires of 
the population at large, were undividable (Ewen (1976); Tedlow (1979)).  Bernays 
though was certain that to justify this rationally to the people was not feasible because 
they were not rational, instead one had to touch upon their inner-desires which would 
control them and enhance his atomised ethos; this was known as ‘The Engineering of 
Consent’ (Bernays (1955); Curtis (2002)). 
 
Since the end of the 19th Century, America had developed into a mass industrial 
society with millions clustered together in the cities.  Bernays was determined to find 
a way to manage and alter the way that these new crowds thought and felt, so he 
turned to the writings of Freud, via his General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 
(1920).  The depiction of secreted atomised and consumer-driven influences inside 
human beings captivated Bernays and would inspire his philosophy.  He was about to 
craft a vision of the paradise that free-market atomised capitalism would build in 
America if it were unleashed.  In 1939, New York held ‘The World’s Fair’, Bernays 
was a key mentor and he stipulated that the theme be the link between democracy and 
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the concept of the brand.  The Fair, that Bernays named ‘Democracity’ was a 
remarkable sensation and seized America’s imagination for this new consumerist 
culture (Curtis (2002)). 
 
In the process, the communal ethos had been transformed, Bernays had become the 
engineer of a new kind of freedom, by responding to the needs and desires of 
individuals.  The image it rendered was of a new form of atomised democracy in 
which commerce reacted to people’s inner-desires in a way that the traditional, 
communal social order could not do.  It was a practice of democracy, as generally 
alluded to by Curtis (2002), which rested on treating people not as dynamic citizens as 
Roosevelt did, but as impassive consumers because this, Bernays believed, was the 
key to power in a mass democracy.  Bernays (1955) in this manner, used the power of 
PR within a political context, by crafting a concept of a future age in which the 
atomised consumer as an entity in itself was to the forefront, replacing the previously 
prevalent communal class groupings (Ewen (1976); Trentmann (2006)).  He was 
interpreting the atomised will of the people in a way that politicians of the time could 
not, for they were still entrenched in the outdated all-encompassing style of class 
discourse which was becoming ever more obsolete for the increasingly complex 
relationship between social class and political party support within the modern world 
(Curtis (2002)). 
 
The foundations of such a political, social class, categorisation shift arose in the late 
1970s.  It was instigated when a group of economists and psychologists at the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) decided to find a way to examine, assess and satisfy 
the aspirations of the phenomenon of new changeable consumers, who place the needs 
of the individual as an entity in itself over that of a specific, communal social class 
group.  SRI aimed to realise this by turning for help to those who had initiated the 
emancipation of the power of the concept of the individual, in particular one of the 
trailblazers of the ‘Human Potential Movement’ was the prominent psychologist, 
Abraham Maslow.  Maslow through this high-minded locality observation method had 
devised a new classification of psychological classes which he termed the ‘Hierarchy 
of Needs’ and it labelled the distinctive emotional phases that individuals went 
through as they stated their desires (Curtis (2002)).  This was part of the self-
actualisation process, this was the point where individuals became wholly self-
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directed and unrestricted by society as a social construct.  The team at SRI believed 
that Maslow’s (1987) pecking order, might form the foundation for a new way to 
classify society, away from traditional, broad collectivist social class groupings 
towards political classification dominated by the needs and ambitions of the individual 
citizen. 
 
This new model for the purposes of political party classification, was trialled through 
a mammoth survey which comprised hundreds of questions about how people saw 
themselves through their inner-ideals.  The questions were proposed to see whether 
people fitted into Maslow’s (1987) groupings.  The responses were dissected by 
computer and the data uncovered that there were triggering patterns in the way 
individuals felt about themselves which matched Maslow’s (1987) classifications.  
The most prominent group at the top of the pyramid was sizeable and growing; and 
cut through all social classes.  The SRI team defined them as atomised individuals, 
these were citizens who comprehended that they were not characterised by their 
traditional class grouping but by the specific actions which they determined 
themselves (Ewen (1976); Tedlow (1979)).  What SRI revealed was that these 
individuals could be demarcated by the different patterns of behaviour, through 
atomised, consumerist categories or following Bernaysian parlance, ‘brands’.  It was 
through the concept of the brand which they wished to convey themselves not just 
through a new more flexible approach, but to attract new audiences in areas and 
locales which until then had been stereotypically unrealistic in electoral terms (Curtis 
(2002)). 
 
Atomised Democracy: Reagan and Thatcher 
In addition, there have been major changes in the past forty years, regards class and 
the relevance it plays in society at large.  There, as stated by Park (2014), and Ibrahim 
(2015), has been a gradual rise of such modern sectionalism with its more intense 
focus on culture-driven individualism at the expense of dogmatic class-based divisions.  
This contemporary class dissection illustrated through The Great British Class Survey 
(2013), was not only orchestrated under, as hitherto noted, the theoretical workings of 
Savage & Devine (2013); but was also supplemented through the highly refined and 
widely respected British population consumer classification database ‘Acorn’ (Acorn 
(2013)).  Acorn was structurally propitious as it illustrated the gradual ‘cultural’ class 
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complexities allied to the refinement of social class in modern-day Britain, as social 
class categories were divided into seven different cultural groups, which were then 
divided into fifty-nine atomised sub-groups.  Meaningful class dissection of this kind 
has demonstrated that social class perception in late 20th Century and early 21st 
Century Britain has become far more complex than the traditional two or three-tier 
class models (Webb & Schirato (2002); Jones (2013)).  The issue of social class 
accordingly became an abstract construct and in practical terms, the idea of 
classlessness, as asserted by Giddens (2000), and Prideaux (2005), has prevailed 
where individuals have gone beyond any such traditional structures and developed as 
atomised individuals free of such traditional, sociological constraints.  This has 
subsequently considerably affected the way that political parties brand themselves to 
the public, a public which has become almost like a consumer rather than a loyal 
supporter. 
 
This idea of political democracy, like that described by Benoit (2006), and Aronczyk 
& Powers (2010), was being taken over by a simplified marketing model of human 
beings and in the process; freedom was redefined to mean nothing more than the 
ability of atomised individuals to get whatever they wanted.  The idea of self-
expression was not restricted to traditional class categorisations.  This atomised 
perspective became categorised into discernible ‘types’ by the SRI team.  They had 
succeeded in categorising the new atomised individualism, they called their new 
classification, ‘Values and Lifestyles’ (Curtis (2002)).  Such an atomised theory 
followed the atomised economic outlook purported by a range of New Right scholars 
like Hayek (1944, and 1960), Friedman (1962), and post-modernists such as 
Baudrillard (1970).  It laid the rudiments for the revolution of the New Right in the 
late 1970s both in the United States through Ronald Reagan promoted by his pollster 
Richard Wirthlin, and his free-market centred, monetarist ethos, and also in Britain 
with Margaret Thatcher via the communications guidance of ‘Saatchi & Saatchi’ 
(Wirthlin & Hall (2004)).  They depicted a consumerist democracy which at its core 
was a society where the wishes and wants of individuals were controlled and satisfied 
by business within the fiscal framework of the free-market (Lawson (1980)). 
 
This extensive span of new desires fitted seamlessly with wide-ranging shifts, as noted 
by Bernays (1955), in industrial production; the astronomic rise of the process of 
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digitalisation now allowed manufacturers to tailor consumer stocks to the atomised 
individual.  The central vision had been that the freeing of the previous held 
communal restrictions of the concept of the individual would fashion a new kind of 
atomised individualism.  Such philosophical transformations, as noted in general 
terms by Qualter (1991), and Curtis (2002), have occurred.  The corporations had 
understood that it was in their interests to inspire these new consumers to believe that 
they were distinctive individuals, and then propose to them novel ways to 
communicate that individuality.  This new world consequently, as broadly remarked 
by Warner et al. (1949), and Bernays (1965), in which people thought that they were 
defying orthodoxy, was not a risk to the corporate sector, but instead provided it with 
greater opportunities for expansion. 
 
It allowed businesses to identify which groups were buying their products and from 
that, how the goods, as noted by Rutherford (2000), and Jhally (2016), could be 
marketed so that they became powerful emblems of those groups’ inner-values and 
lifestyles, it was the beginning of lifestyle marketing.  If a new product expressed a 
particular group’s values, then it would be bought by them, as it was seen as an 
essential part of their individual personality and with it their individual happiness.  
This is what made the values and lifestyles systems so powerful, its ability to predict 
what new products the atomised consumers would choose, and thus broadly outline 
that person’s individual desires (Curtis (2002)).  This power was about to be 
demonstrated dramatically, as this system would show that they could predict not just 
what product a person would buy but also the politicians they were going to choose to 
elect (Berger & Chaffee (1987)).  Following such a consumerised perspective, on a 
political level, when Reagan and Thatcher ran for office in their respective countries, 
their advisors were convinced that they could win on a programme of a new atomised 
individualism (Truman (2007); Lees-Marshment et al. (2014)).  It would be an attack 
on thirty years of government interference in people’s lives, where through the 
promotion of the concept of individual liberty, a new form of atomised consumer-
driven democracy would dominate social and political discourse for the next 
generation (Curtis (2002)). 
 
The reason why such an atomised class shift occurred unnoticed was that it was 
genuinely radical on both a theoretical and practical level, but those who had 
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constructed the ‘Values and Lifestyles’ system understood why that was.  The 
conventional wisdom, as observed by Lilleker (2005, and 2016), and Pattie & 
Johnston (2012), is that strong partisans will be less likely to change their political 
affinity consequent to exposure to a party’s campaign than weaker partisans and 
nonaligned voters.  Such political campaigns similarly, are likely to have a larger 
impact on those relatively uninterested in politics than on the more interested, since 
the former are not constrained with the natural traditional social class-political party 
affinity connection (Tedlow (1979); Trentmann (2006)).  The SRI team by testing 
their system in both the United States and in Britain, were convinced that both Reagan 
and Thatcher’s atomised class mantra about individual liberty would appeal to a broad 
swathe of the electorate as it tallied with the way they looked at themselves within the 
ever-more atomised class structure (Curtis (2002); Wirthlin & Hall (2004)). 
 
An interpretation thus came to prevail that, as maintained by Panebianco (1988), and 
Stewart (2013), although not always explicitly Thatcherite, certainly shares her 
assumption that communal class structures, be it ideologically ‘left’ or ‘right’, should 
be downplayed, disregarded, and denied.  The process though of grouping people in 
confrontational categories is a subversive rhetorical and political device rather than an 
expression or description of a more complex, integrated, and individualist social 
reality.  The generation who, as noted by Bauman (1998), and Crompton (1998), had 
once dissented against the conventionality foisted by consumerism, instead now 
welcomed it. 
 
The conventional pollsters, as broadly alluded to by Heath et al. (1985, and 1991), 
could see no coherent pattern across class, age, or gender, but those who had designed 
the ‘Values and Lifestyles’ system believed that they knew why.  They were testing 
their system in both America and Britain because they were convinced that both 
Reagan’s and Thatcher’s message about individual freedom and class atomisation 
following the theories largely ascertained by Bernays, would appeal to a wide scope of 
the electorate (Curtis (2002)).  This is because it fitted with the atomised way they saw 
themselves.  The idea that the new self-actualising individuals, of modest financial 
means, brought up within a communal social and political ethos, would choose a 
political figure from the ideological right instead of the left, seemed extraordinary 
(Truman (2007); Skinner et al. (2008)).  It was in a sense the triumph of the self, a 
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notion that all political judgements were primarily viewed through the lens, not of 
selfless communal collectivism, but instead of personal satisfaction, where a person’s 
atomised desires were seen as paramount (Curtis (2002)).  The central climax of such 
logic, as detailed by Lees-Marshment et al. (2014), and Brands (2015), is indeed that 
there is no communal-based societal ethos, or certainly not one that is seen as relevant 
in modern society; the structure is designed through a clear principle that there is only 
a group of atomised, individual consumers who are making individual choices to 
facilitate the promotion of their own specific well-being. 
 
Such theory, as a range of theorists like for instance Minkin (1991), and Lane (2012) 
noted, was a more radical version of Bourdieu’s cultural capital thesis.  This coincided 
with such an atomised prospectus, still, both were promoting at its core, a more 
complex class structure to that stated by the standard Marxist or even the more refined 
Weberian class theory.  Bourdieu’s (1984) ideas also contribute to understanding how 
other deep-seated societal relations, especially age and gender, merge with economic 
and cultural relations of class in sublimated forms.  This outlines how multiple forms 
of class interpretations can articulate with one another, but more importantly 
demonstrates how changing social factors interrelate with an atomised ethos enacted a 
generation earlier.  Bernays did not have confidence that any kind of true democracy 
could ever succeed because individuals were not motivated by judicious habitual 
class-based collectivised planning, but instead by unsophisticated unconscious desires 
and thoughts.  The temptation of such unadulterated consumerism was a way of giving 
people the impression of self-control while letting a dependable elite continue to 
control and foster an atomised political philosophy (Bernays (1955); Curtis (2002)). 
 
By comparison with modern political marketing, the eras of mass propaganda and 
media campaigning like that stated by Bernays (1955, and 1965), were characterised 
by a more flexible, diffuse, and consumerist approach to political communication.  
The advent of television in Britain coincided with a proliferation of advertising 
communications, both of which had a substantial electoral effect.  In his model, 
‘Wring (1996a) identified the emergence of a marketing management approach to 
electioneering comparable to the development of what British commentators have 
termed the “media campaign”’.  What Wring (1996a) argued, in broad parlance, 
similar to Bernays, was that all politicians followed their self-interest because the idea 
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that they could construe and deduce the marked consciousness of the people was 
logically impracticable.  In view of that, both Labour and the Conservatives began to 
invest in advertising and marketing so as to cultivate and better target their message or 
‘brand’. 
 
This is above all highlighted with the electoral successes of both Reagan and Thatcher 
in the 1980s, but such brand politics that proved so successful for the New Right was 
far from being such a radical departure on a basic marketing level, for such 
professional campaigning was primarily a logical extension of earlier practice.  This 
perspective is supported by the leading marketing theorist Philip Kotler who argues 
(Kotler (1982), cited in Wring (1996a)), ‘that political party campaigning has always 
had a marketing character, the new “methodology” is not the insertion of promotional 
methods into politics’, but an intensified refinement and acceleration in their use.  It is 
expedient to see such a process, as noted by Wernick (1992), and Bussey (2011), in a 
similar vein to that of a strategic change comparable to the development of a company 
or a brand engaged in conventional business activities, endeavouring to sell its 
corporate message to the general public.  The organisation of party campaigning can 
be seen to develop greater intricacy ‘through three stages – production, selling, and 
marketing – orientations’ (Wring (1996a)).  In electoral terms, these are the equivalent 
of what have been labelled the propaganda of marketing in regards contemporary 
political party affinity. 
 
Bernays likens the conventional model of commercial marketing development, as 
quoted by Rallings (1996), in a ‘firm to the stages in the evolution of a campaigning 
political party where three distinctive phases of electioneering can be identified, each 
directly comparable with the product, sales, and market stages of orientation in 
business marketing’ (Rallings, 1996, p.106).  Wring’s model involved the realisation 
of the relevance of advertising, branding, and marketing to electioneering practices.  
In implementing this new approach, as stated in generic terms by Johnson-Cartee & 
Copeland (2000), and Cosgrove (2007), it is possible to identify moves toward the 
‘electoral-professional’ ideal type of party organisation.  In this mode, parties became 
focused on appealing to the atomised consumer rather than their own formerly, 
communal class, political predilections. 
 
36 | P a g e  
 
The promoters of this idea of ‘consumerist market democracy’ brought the historic, 
atomised, free-market ethos of the previous two centuries and merged it with the 20th 
Century branding ethos, with the aim of revitalising an atomised, consumerist 
capitalism which would dominate the political mainstream (Kaid & Holtz (2006); Earl 
& Waddington (2012)).  It was hence portrayed as a glorious return to a golden age, a 
time in the 18th, and 19th centuries when unfettered laissez-faire capitalism and not 
communal politics, had chiefly ordered society (De Grazia (1981); Trentmann 
(2006)).  This outlook though was a myth as the political philosophers of that time had 
made a distinction between the atomised self-interest of the market place and other 
collectivist areas of social and political life, which were just as imperative in the 
classifying of society (Curtis (2002)). 
 
The next chapter entitled ‘Theoretical Background: The Labour Party’, explores how 
this atomised political ethos began to dominate class perspectives specifically within 
the Labour Party, and as a consequence replaced the traditional communal narrative 
which hitherto had dominated the Party’s perspective.  This will be achieved in three 
parts, firstly by defining the meaning of social class from a communal perspective, 
and then secondly how such meanings defined Old Labour’s traditional discourse, and 
finally how with the emergence of the atomisation ethos, New Labour was born and 
adapted to such changes both nationally and also within a locational or network basis. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: THE LABOUR PARTY 
 
 
Analysis in this chapter will centre on how the concept of class in contemporary 
British society can be comprehended within the context of support for the Labour 
Party.  It will, in this manner, question how the relevance of class-based support for 
the party may have altered since the rise of the atomised class culture forty years ago, 
a culture which two decades later, laid the foundations of the New Labour classless 
brand.  This will be achieved via six distinct stages, the first being to state the 
relevance of the communal class structure to Old Labour, the second illustrates how 
with its decline in the late 1970s the party had to modernise itself within a more 
refined atomised framework.  The third and fourth states how such an atomised 
framework came into being with the emergence of Thatcher and her New Right ethos 
in the 1980s and the subsequent effect it had on Labour politics, particularly notably 
with the development of the Classless New Labour brand.  The analysis concludes 
with the final two stages, which question the relevance that such an atomisation ethos 
has played in regards Labour support in specific locales, with a particular focus on 
North-West Cumbria, and how such factors may provide a broad basis as to the 
direction such a research phenomenon is heading towards in future. 
 
Old Labour, the Marxist Influence, and the decline of Communal politics 
Although Labour’s historical core class dynamic is not one of revolutionary 
radicalism but instead of gradualist socialism, they are in broad theoretical terms, 
communally Marxist, as the party aimed to defend the interests of the communal 
working-classes over their exploitative middle-class capitalist employers.  This 
perspective is best noted by the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson (1963), and quoted 
by McNall & McNall (1991), ‘whose deep-rooted interpretation of history allied to a 
less determinist notion of social class has been adopted by orthodox Marxists, 
resulting in his work becoming a key influence on the development of the discipline.  
On an historical basis, Thompson with his social stratification theory is credited with 
developing Marx’s theory of class in the wider context.  Thompson’s (1963) argument 
remains crucial as it is a supreme example of the dialectical method in historical 
analysis of social change and class mobilisations’ (McNall & McNall, 1991, p.5).  The 
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British working-class were somewhat effective in evolving as a unique mass entity 
and defending its communal class interests because it comprised the preponderance of 
the work force. 
 
Thompson (1963) believed that the ‘prime importance in distinguishing working-class 
character was through the workers themselves, striving to influence the conditions of 
their own lives’ (McNally (1993)).  It, unlike Giddens (2002), who emphasised that 
the concept of class in regards future Labour support is erroneous in these more 
complex atomised class times, and thus persisted not out of sentiment or feelings of 
historic conventional class solidarity, ‘but only from an expectation that these 
organisations could deliver better living standards and conditions of work’ (Hamilton 
& Hirszowicz, 1993, p.184).  Thompson (1968) defines ‘class in the manner of an 
abstract force which nevertheless has real consequences: By class I understand a 
historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected 
events…I emphasise that it is a “historical” phenomenon.  I do not see class as a 
“structure”, nor even as a “category”, but as something which in fact happens 
(Thompson, 1968, p.9).  Like Marx, and contrary to Giddens, Thompson sees class as 
embedded in relations of production, but he is emphatic that social classes cannot be 
discussed or identified independently of class “consciousness”: Class experience is 
largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born – or enter 
involuntarily.  Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled 
in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms’ 
(Thompson, 1968, p.10). 
 
Thompson’s ‘emphasis on the importance of experience and consciousness has led to 
criticisms from other historians that his work is excessively culturalist – that is, it 
represents a shift away from the investigation of economic structures and relations 
which, it may be argued, should occupy a central place in any Marxist historical 
investigation.  Thompson has reformulated class analysis as class-struggle analysis’ 
(Kaye (1984)), ‘but Thompson does not claim that there are no “objective” class 
relations.  Such is explicit that the productive relations which determine class 
experience have an existence apart from the individual, but he “does” insist that class 
is a relationship, and not a thing…It does not exist, either to have an ideal interest or 
consciousness, or to lie as a patient on the Adjustor’s table’ (Thompson, 1968, p.11).  
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He is stating the ‘Pre-Blair Labour’ or Old Labour political perspective over the issue 
by illustrating how the working masses were not just worked upon by historical class 
traditions, but able, by their own political endeavours, to structure themselves as a 
viable electoral class group (Thompson (1963)).  This includes, as Ball (1990), and 
Woodfin & Zarate (2004) broadly note, the possibility that the Labour Party and its 
political representatives and/or workers may to some extent in social class terms be 
immersed by the bourgeoisie benefits of governing; or desiring to govern the capitalist 
state. 
 
Following on from such theoretical discourse, the thesis aims to investigate to what 
extent the Labour Party is a communal class political party.  It further questions 
whether the New Labour classless brand, inspired by the Thatcherite atomised 
revolution, provided a concrete shift in regards the party’s broad relationship with the 
more refined contemporary class structure.  This perspective though is noted by 
Prideaux (2005), who asked whether it was just the latest version of the continual 
‘class’ political divisions of the ideological left of the party, who are more associated 
with the collectivised ethos, and the ideological right, who promote the merits of the 
individualistic consumer.  This debate, as noted by Goes (2016), and Seymour (2016), 
is still evident in the Post New Labour era, firstly under the moderate stewardship of 
Ed Miliband and then under his more radical successor Jeremy Corbyn. 
 
The Labour Party, ‘Old, ‘New’, and ‘Post New’ has had to appeal beyond its core 
working-class vote.  The party in this way has struggled to balance its loyalty to its 
core communal class support with its eagerness to stretch itself beyond such 
traditional class parameters so as to achieve electoral success, this was evidently 
shown during the general election campaign in 2015 under the leadership of Ed 
Miliband.  Post New Labour, as widely referred to by Hasan & Macintyre (2011), and 
Bale (2015), was with Miliband, and is now with Corbyn, a reaction against Old 
Labour with their attachment to an obsolete communal class struggle, but it also tries 
to distance itself from New Labour’s classless vision on a policy level, as this was 
deemed unpopular in the populist age of anti-austerity politics. 
 
The notion that the class perspective of the Post New Labour brand is thus far not 
clear and hence is yet to be clarified is a problem which still needs to be solved.  Ed 
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Miliband, the party leader at the beginning of the Post New Labour era in 2010 until 
the electoral demise five years later, was stuck in a transitional time.  Miliband 
privately, ‘had little sympathy for Blairism and New Labour’s reverence for markets 
as he felt he was still a man of the centre-left and that he had to retain a healthy 
scepticism for the private-sector, non-state solutions so beloved of Blair and his 
acolytes’ (Hasan & Macintyre, 2011, pp.73-74).  Post New Labour though is an 
existing brand in ever complex class structures.  This is because even with the relative 
recent electoral success of Corbyn in June 2017 (see Postscript), the brand is still in its 
early stages, endeavoring to establish a clear class position, which thus makes it still 
too early to define in tangible terms, hence any views would be based on first-hand 
supposition as outlined by the research participants in Chapter V. 
 
A ‘strong explanation for the absence of radical class consciousness’ in a 
contemporary capitalist society is obsolete because it, as noted by Miliband (1961), 
and quoted by Hamilton & Hirszowicz (1993), ‘is articulated in terms of an alleged 
ideological domination on the part of capital and its representatives and devotees.  The 
alibi of contemporary Marxists is to account, for the failure of a radical class 
consciousness to progress in the industrialised democracies, and the failure of a 
revolutionary political practice to arise’ (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, p.190).  This 
has led in broad terms, to the contemporary atomised concept of the political party as 
a brand in itself.  The limits, as a consequence of what can be considered to be 
legitimate, realistic, and sensible, are defined.  In this manner, the concept of the 
political party as a brand has arisen out of an atomisation of traditional class 
categories.  In response, it is clear that for parties like Labour to stay electorally 
relevant, they must reflect complex class patterns of interest by catering for a range of 
policies which go beyond strict traditional Marxist class divisions. 
 
In ‘its post-war heyday, class was the grandest and most masterly narrative available.  
The only master account’, as alluded to by Kress (1989), and Savage (2015), and 
quoted by Cannadine (1999), ‘left today, is that there is no master narrative of any 
kind, only the “chaotic authenticity” of indiscriminate happenings and unforeseeable 
events.  This is a consistent theme in regards the writing and interpretation of 
contemporary British history, as these recent scholarly developments have coincided 
with, and have undoubtedly been influenced by wider changes in public affairs in 
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Britain and elsewhere’.  In view of that, for there to be a clearer investigation of 
Labour’s class perspective, particularly in the traditional Old Labour era, an 
understanding of the relevance of the issue, ranging from the party’s foundations at 
the start of the 20th Century up to, and including the development of the New Labour 
brand a century later, is required. 
 
Labour ‘has been in a state of change and renewal since it was founded at the start of 
the 20th Century.  Labour was always loose in ideology, but its relationship with 
Marxist thinking is a complicated one and is best elucidated through a brief summary 
of the party’s ideological roots’ (Seldon, 2001, p.587).  It must be stated that despite 
Labour being founded in 1900 by Keir Hardie to defend the interests of the communal 
working-classes, its early political strategy was primarily centred in the traditions of 
19th Century Christian radicalism and democracy, that being to promote socialism and 
collectivised class interests through gaining electoral support instead of via a Marxist 
revolution.  This broad perspective set the foundations for which the party has 
continually advanced; that being for the most part, a moderate gradualist approach 
towards any form of societal change on a class level.  This position has led to the party 
being influenced generally by such quintessentially middle-class gradualists, 
particularly those associated with the Fabian Society, like for instance Sidney Webb, 
the author of Clause IV (Dell (2000); Rosen (2005)). 
 
The consequence of this predominance of moderate influence in regards Labour’s 
broad class direction was the main factor that encouraged convinced Marxists such as 
Ralph Miliband in his germinal text, Parliamentary Socialism – A Study in The 
Politics of Labour (1961), to critique the ideological relevance of the party.  
Following the Marxist works of the Italian theorist, Antonio Gramsci, Miliband 
decided to examine a real class situation in a real historical context that being the 
Labour Party in its Old Labour guise and its historical social class position.  He 
‘condemned the “Sickness of Labourism”, as he professed that the party had no 
interest in any form of class revolution as the party by its historically rooted nature 
was conservative.  This was because they not only accepted but believed in the 
capitalist system, a system that he believed led to mass concentrations of inequality of 
wealth resulting in the continuation of a strict class system that suppresses any kind of 
general working-class development or progress’ (Hasan & Macintyre, 2011, p.12). 
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Miliband (1961) accepted, despite his noted criticisms of the party, that there was no 
real alternative to Labour as the most likely major political party in Britain, to defend 
the interests of the communal working-class.  Such optimism conversely was short-
lived as Miliband became even more sceptical about the prospect of Labour becoming 
a vehicle for social change (McKibbin (1991); Blackledge (2011)).  In the postscript 
to the second edition, as Blackledge (2011) notes, ‘Miliband (1972) appealed for a 
new working-class alternative to Labour, which he mocked as a party who did not 
want to overthrow the oppressive capitalist system as it was irrevocably rooted within 
it’.  This was demonstrated on a practical level where not many, of the many Old 
Labour political figures really stood for the social class-war against big corporate 
business.  The Labour Party have historically been an ideological combination of 
social democracy and democratic socialism (Hay (1999)).  This ‘position is 
emphasised by their dogged commitment to democracy and the parliamentary system’, 
virtues which are at the heart of ‘British political establishment thinking’ (Hasan & 
Macintyre, 2011, p.12).  In response, Miliband (1961) stated that the party needed to 
extricate itself from such a hegemonic capitalist mind-set, and by this means, adopt a 
strictly radical Marxist class perspective in future if it were to remain ideologically 
relevant (Balibar (1994); Buttigieg (2007)). 
 
Miliband (1961) following on from the hegemonic theory devised by Gramsci, 
subsequently inferred that the idea of radical class politics had been defeated by a 
party elite who, moderates by nature, had hegemonised the future policy direction of 
the party.  On a theoretical level, ‘this is valid, but he also made assumptions that the 
leaders in all Labour governments covering all periods that the party had been in 
office were on balance, submerged and ideologically manipulated by establishment 
power.  This, by its nature is unreceptive to any form of working-class progression 
markedly on a political level’ (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, p.190).  There are, as 
noted by Resnick & Wolff (1989), and Blackledge (2011), and quoted by Hamilton & 
Hirszowicz (1993), ‘a number of issues with Miliband’s dominant hegemony thesis, 
the prime limitation being, the ideas prevalent in a capitalist society are inevitably 
biased in such a fashion, as a society where the prevalent ideas are greatly critical of 
its central institutions would not be stable and would hardly be likely to survive’.  
Even ‘the most perfect, just, and undivided society’, as declared by Hamilton & 
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Hirszowicz (1993), ‘will develop views about itself which are supportive and will tend 
to make it difficult to promote alternative ideas which, for example, might seek to 
challenge prevailing conceptions of justice.  The ideas which tend to be promoted in 
any society inexorably reflect underlying assumptions and are the result of a process 
of selection of elements thought to be relevant and important’ (Hamilton & 
Hirszowicz, 1993, p.191). 
 
An egalitarian society, as Hamilton & Hirszowicz (1993) continues, ‘will not be well 
disposed towards, nor will it systematically promote, elitist beliefs and ideas.  The 
contrast should not, then, be between a fair, objective, unbiased system of 
dissemination of ideas and one which is the reverse, but between different sets of 
ideas’.  Those, ‘who desire change may disagree with and deplore the values and ideas 
which are prevalent in a society but if they were to succeed in changing society they 
would simply be producing a situation in which the predominant ideas were those they 
do support and agree with’.  Hamilton & Hirszowicz (1993) maintain, ‘it is misleading 
according to Gramsci to argue the way Miliband (1961) does, that radical class 
consciousness would automatically exist but for the ideological bias in the prevailing 
system of ideas because this assumes that it is possible for a society to operate without 
such bias.  The second criticism that might be made of Miliband (1961) comes from 
contemporary Gramscian perspectives, which is that it overstates the extent of popular 
acceptance of the allegedly dominant ideology’.  Similar to Miliband (1961), 
Hamilton & Hirszowicz (1993) emphasises, in Gramscian fashion, ‘that the value 
system dominant in the working-classes of most of the industrialised democracies is 
the subordinate type characterised by such accommodative attitudes’ (Hamilton & 
Hirszowicz, 1993, p.191).  This, as Hamilton & Hirszowicz (1993) concludes, ‘led to 
the gradual and continual destruction and breakdown of any revolutionary leftist 
political alternatives, which Miliband (1961) proposed should be enhanced.  Radical 
thinking like that championed by Miliband (1961), was commonly drowned out by 
ideological and class hegemony, particularly within the Labour movement, of the 
revisionist’ ‘Labourist’ Weberian-styled agenda (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, 
p.190). 
 
This Weberian class stance - Upper (Owners), Middle (Managers), and Working 
(Workers) - categorised post-war social relations in Britain prior to the rise of the New 
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Right.  Old Labour, following such a structure, as noted by Forrester (1976), and 
Leonard (1999), believed that the communal working-classes should have their own 
say, through peaceful democratic discourse.  This idea of communal collectivism was 
the bedrock of the traditional class-conscious nature of Old Labour because they 
instinctively believed that working together as a collectivised class group would be 
more productive than acting as atomised individuals, which only weakened the major 
class interests of the working masses through inflaming such cosmetic divisions 
(Parkin (1983); Favretto (2003)). 
 
In the early 1960s, as noted by Sampson (2004), ‘Labour was still a “movement” as 
much as a party, with ideals of socialism which attracted intellectuals as well as 
workers.  Harold Wilson said in opposition in 1962, “this party is a moral crusade or it 
is nothing,”’.  ‘It had’, as Sampson (2004) continues, and broadly supported by 
Morgan (1997), and Pimlott & Hennessy (2016), ‘experienced only brief periods in 
government, in awkward coalitions; and it was still reliant on its finance and much of 
its membership on the trades unions, which had established it in 1900 as their 
parliamentary wing’.  The contradictions between its traditional working-class base 
and ‘its intellectual leaders were becoming more obvious.  It was, as its leading 
thinker Anthony Crosland noted in 1956, “furiously searching for its lost soul”’ 
(Sampson, 2004, p.56).  Labour ‘could still appear as the “people’s party” when they 
all gathered at seaside resorts in Blackpool and Scarborough and mingled in the bars 
and funfairs.  In the conference halls, the intellectuals had to justify themselves to the 
workers in fierce and intimate debates, watched by only a few television cameras at 
the back of the hall.  They meant quite different things when they talked about 
socialism – from mere tinkering with the economy to comprehensive state ownership, 
but at the end of the conferences they joined to sing the Red Flag’ (Sampson, 2004, 
p.57). 
 
Labour in truth, as the New Labour pollster Philip Gould stated, ‘were very far from 
revolutionary and were more reluctant than their Conservative opponents to adapt to a 
changing Britain.  Labour was born a conservative party.  Harold Wilson talked the 
language’, as Gould (1998) continued, ‘of the “white-hot technological revolution”, 
and he assured me in 1965 that he had produced ‘the biggest revolution in Whitehall 
since Lloyd George… The motto of this government is that there are no sacred cows, 
45 | P a g e  
 
unless they’ve been examined and found to deserve that status.’  As Gould remarked, 
he ‘appeared modern, but was in no sense a moderniser, which made him a frustrating 
and ultimately unsuccessful politician’ (Gould, 1998, p.24).  This view though is a 
glib and inaccurate account of Old Labour leaders such as Wilson, who by winning 
four general elections out of five that he contested as party leader; and implementing 
in the late 1960s a range of progressive social policies, demonstrated that he was a 
successful, modernising politician in the Old Labour tradition (Ziegler (1995); Shaw 
(1996)). 
 
Labour leaders, as cited by Foote (1997), and Seldon & Hickson (2004), played the 
notable function of traversing between the requirements of the masses and the desires 
of the capitalist system, endeavouring to use the state as the mediator of social 
advancement and consent.  In the 1950s and 1960s, Old Labour could not ignore the 
concept of the communal working-classes, which had founded their party through an 
accepted class structure and on which they still depended on trade union finance.  
Harold Wilson and his Old Labour prime ministerial successor James Callaghan 
(Sandbrook (2005, 2006, 2010, and 2012)) consistently conferred with union leaders, 
while defending the traditions of the traditional class system so prevalent at the time.  
This communal structure collapsed in the 1978-1979 Winter of Discontent, when the 
trade unions protested against the Labour government’s policies of public sector cuts.  
Such a revolt indicated the end of communal ‘Labourist’ hegemony and shepherded in 
Margaret Thatcher’s revolutionary Conservative government (Sayer (2004)).  The 
union barons, the great power in the conventional class landscape ‘were losing their 
influence over their members’ (Sampson, 2004, p.58).  Many members of the 
traditional working-classes were now changing their political allegiance, attracted to 
Thatcher’s populist British nationalism and her promises of the opportunities 
generated through the principle of individualised aspiration (Green (2006); Jackson & 
Saunders (2012)). 
 
The Conservatives, following the atomised philosophy, extensively elucidated by 
Hayek (1944), and Bernays (1955, and 1965), reduced the power of the trade unions 
during the Thatcherite 1980s.  Behind this atomised transformation lay the unions loss 
of societal relevance which heralded a clear and lasting decline in union membership.  
In 1979 when Thatcher came to power, union membership ‘reached a peak: 63 per 
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cent of men eligible for membership, and 39 per cent of women’ (Sampson, 2004, 
p.61).  After 1979, this led to the situation where the unions and their communal 
outlook were being increasingly threatened against the Thatcherite neoliberal 
philosophy, which restricted income tax and passed more draconian union and 
employment laws to restrict such organisations at the behest of the atomised consumer 
(Shaw (1994); Dutton (1999)). 
 
Advocates to this classless movement, such as Pakulski & Waters (1996) in their The 
Death of Class thesis, where they claim that such an outcome is the logical end point 
of the New Right revolution, often express their atomised philosophy in simplistic, 
broad terms.  The core premise of this being the promotion of the liberation of the 
individual atomised citizen in this free consumerised society, where individual choice 
takes precedence over outdated socialistic ideas of communal class collectivism.  This 
outlook though has been notably critiqued by theorists such as Klein (2007), who state 
that such contemporary classless promotions of individual liberty is primarily the 
promotion of a new elite, that being the corporate sector, who use the fragmentation of 
traditional class ties to ruthlessly exploit for profit, the consumer-driven desires 
ingrained in such an atomised class hierarchy. 
 
By 1997, such an atomised class hierarchy had prevailed because as Sampson (2004) 
notes, ‘only 32 per cent of working people eligible for membership belonged to trade 
unions, while the manufacturing industries which had been bastions of militant class 
collectivism had considerably waned’ (Sampson, 2004, p.62).  The strikes which had 
once dominated political discourse were now hardly a relevant factor and with it came 
the gradual transformation between the historical, collectivised class ethos promoted 
by Old Labour towards a more contemporary, individualistic culture on which New 
Labour would thrive (Ludlam & Smith (2000); Daniels & McIlroy (2010)).  This 
occurred because they accepted the pragmatic realism of such a changing class 
dynamic, that the standard collectivised class categories were erroneous in these new 
atomised class-conscious times (Green (2006); Geary & Pabst (2015)).  It was thus the 
crushing of traditional Labourism that enabled the classless New Labour brand to be 
born. 
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Such a development was so seismic that there can be no reverting to traditional Old 
Labour politics because the political and social environments that shaped and 
maintained it, no longer exist.  Labourism has in the post-Thatcherite age, become 
both socially and politically redundant (Dell (2000); Heffernan (2000)).  It could be 
argued that Marx was wrong to assert that the capitalist system would inevitably 
succumb under the sizeable strains developed through its oppressive structure.  Every 
society, as noted by Lane (2012), and Atkinson (2016), through the process of 
capitalist institutionalisation could withstand any potential ‘new leftist’ communal 
structures or conflicts which may arise out of its foundations.  This atomised class 
adaptability for the most part defeated the communal class conflict structure, for as 
opined by Ruben (1988), and Crompton (1993), it managed to make both capital and 
labour believe that the capitalist system was generally benefiting their individualistic, 
atomised cause, which enabled both groups to protect their class interests 
cooperatively.  On a structural level, the power behind such class atomisation was the 
concept of individual liberty.  This concept thus in broad terms, promoted the view 
that each individual was encouraged to believe in the capitalist system of which they 
were part.  This inexorably gave the system a sense of constancy and solidity and with 
it shattered any threat of a communal resurgence.  Industrial conflict, as Baronian 
(2015), and Geras (2016) concluded, continued to occur to some extent, even with this 
fragmented political-class structure.  Such a class structure though has continued to 
demonstrate firstly through the Thatcher and later during the New Labour era that it 
could control any industrial conflicts and with that showed that numerous ideological 
interest groups could function within industrial society (Dahrendorf (1959)). 
 
Old to New Labour: The shift from the Communal to the Atomised 
The stereotypical proletarian citizen, as professed by Hamilton & Hirszowicz (1993), 
and supported later by Worley (2008), and Heppell & Theakston (2013), during the 
Old Labour era, ‘supported trade unions.  They were part of a collectivised class 
culture that strongly identified with his fellow workers, adopting an “us” and “them” 
attitude; workers like this were to be found in principally working-class communities 
where heavy industry predominated’ (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, p.183).  A 
decade before the election of Thatcher, the signs of the decline of traditional 
Labourism were though becoming evident.  Such decline - which is primarily shaped 
by the sociologist Stefan Zweig who greatly inspired Abrams & Rose’s highly 
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influential text, Must Labour Lose? (1960) - started in Britain in the late 1950s, as the 
country was coming out of the immediate post-war economic slump, under the 
Conservative government led by Harold Macmillan.  The consequence of this was that 
the electorate, particularly the stereotypical working-class Labour voter, were 
beginning to some extent, to move away from such hitherto communal class loyalties 
and as a consequence, were more likely than ever before to switch to supporting the 
Conservatives on a regular basis.  This potential shift in political allegiance based on 
individual aspiration, was known as ‘embourgeoisement theory’ and would set the 
tone for the atomised perspective later promoted by the New Right and the New 
Labour classless adaptation stated by both Giddens and Gould. 
 
There clearly was an embourgeoisement process of policy and image renewal and thus 
a disavowal of the preceding party heritage; a shift from Old to New Labour.  New 
Labour, particularly through its communications advisors such as Gould, emphasised 
the core differentials between such constructs, primarily that Old Labour broadly 
promoted an out-dated, archaic communal class-consciousness of advancing the needs 
of the collectivised working-classes via the development of democratic socialism.  
This outlook in the post-Thatcher era was made redundant, as society had become 
both on a political and class level far more atomised, and New Labour was a 
pragmatic response to cater to a broad number of the electorate, who embraced such 
class individualism.  This perspective though has been challenged by Shaw (2007), as 
an over-simplification of the party’s complex past prior to the assent of Tony Blair as 
leader in 1994, where any policy or image shift took place on a gradual basis in the 
1980s, and thus the historical interpretation of Labour’s relationship with class is 
much more organic than is outlined in the broad contours of Old and New Labour. 
 
This gradual embourgeoisement theory, as alluded to by Devine (1994), ushered in a 
new type of worker which was becoming increasingly common in contemporary 
industrialised society, namely the atomised, or as it was then known, the privatised 
worker (Lockwood (1966); Giddens (1984)).  The privatised worker, as generally 
noted by Goldthorpe et al. (1969), and Rose (2001), and quoted by Hamilton & 
Hirszowicz (1993), ‘tended to be more mobile and to have a highly instrumental 
attitude to work, to the unions and to the Labour Party.  These workers on the whole, 
were becoming middle-class in their attitudes, values, and behaviour.  Support for the 
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unions and the Labour Party, while it remained as strong as ever, was not 
unconditional’ among such atomised workers, ‘it persisted not out of sentiment or 
feelings of social class solidarity but only from an expectation that these organisations 
could deliver better living standards and conditions of work’.  Their attitudes ‘were 
largely pecuniary and they were orientated towards the home, the family and private 
consumption within this new individualised context’ (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, 
p.184), but such a status is hard to generalise on a broad national level as Hamilton & 
Hirszowicz (1993) further state, ‘such communities are relatively insulated from the 
wider society and its influences.  In other areas, and in different rural occupations, 
such as agriculture and small-scale industry, a deferential attitude tends to prevail.  
Workers here are more often in a relationship of personal dependence upon their 
community’ (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, p.183).  This is small scale in the sense 
that most individuals are known to most others and seen and judged as atomised 
individuals. 
 
This shift from Miliband’s 1960s communal radicalism to Blair’s 1990s conventional 
class atomisation, was theoretically enhanced through the workings of the renowned 
intellectual Eric Hobsbawm.  Hobsbawm, according to Seymour (2011), ‘known 
widely as Britain’s pre-eminent Marxist historian’, became especially influential in 
regards providing a future framework for the left to adapt to the new atomised class 
culture, ‘for as a former Communist Party intellectual, he provided an ideological 
rationale and direction for left practice that has been influential well beyond the party 
itself’.  His work in the 1980s, enlightened by a Gramscian perspective, provided the 
justification for Labour to move to an ideological ‘classless’ position, with a view to 
winning over middle-class and affluent working-class voters, and construct a popular 
front against the dominant atomised, Thatcherite agenda. 
 
This traditional social class position and its inevitable decline within the Labour Party 
at the start of the Thatcherite hegemony was highlighted by Hobsbawm in his essay, 
The Forward March of Labour Halted (1981).  In it, he principally stated that for 
Labour to realistically progress as a viable political alternative in the future they had 
to come to terms with the realities that the old communal class divisions were dead 
and never going to return (Radice (1992)).  The old manufacturing industries which 
supplemented such a class structure were in terminal decline, being replaced by a new 
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individualism, where the rights of the individual became the new prevalent societal 
ethos.  A year later, such a position was supported by fellow Marxist academic Bob 
Rowthorn in his paper, Britain and Western Europe (1982); both texts ironically being 
published in the Marxism Today journal. 
 
Following on from such contemporary discourse, through his constant requests of 
‘being realistic,’ Hobsbawm (1981) was able to present the traditional class critics as 
‘unrealistic.’  By dismissing them as extremist class Marxists, he managed to gain 
‘support for such views across the Left spectrum be it in Marxism Today, as well as 
with the mainstream daily press, which enabled the more tempered language of 
“realistic Marxism” to dominate debates over the future of the Labour Party’ 
(Giddens, 2000, p.43).  Callaghan et al. (2003), in a similar manner to Hobsbawm 
(1981), located Old Labour’s problems in its anachronistic Marxist image as a 
traditional ‘working-class party that was unattractive to upwardly mobile families, 
particularly those in the South of England’.  The non-manual workforce also had 
increased, ‘which led to a haemorrhage of Labour supporters among the new skilled 
working-class.  If Labour were ever again to form a secure majority government, they 
had to pitch camp on the prosperous classless centre-ground’ (Callaghan et al., 2003, 
p.18).  After Labour’s second general election ‘defeat at the hands of Thatcher in 1983 
the party elected Neil Kinnock to lead it’ (Sampson, 2004, p.58).  Kinnock, as Minkin 
(1991), and Bower (2016), imply, patiently began reconstructing the party’s 
machinery as the identity of the communal Old Labour Party was disintegrating. 
 
The Kinnock leadership began the gradual process of shifting the party away from its 
traditional communal values, and by this means accepting the atomised Thatcherite 
agenda.  This was achieved through two symbolic gestures, the first was the 
eradication through the expulsion of the Trotskyite ‘Militant Tendency’ which had 
infiltrated the party in the late 1970s and were threatening to move the party towards a 
hard-left Marxist ideology.  Kinnock, similar to Hobsbawm, realising in this new 
consumerist age which prioritised the role of the individual, that such collectivised 
class politics would in the short-term at least, make Labour seem out of touch with the 
mainstream electorate, and more importantly could potentially in the long-term, 
destroy the party as being ever seen as any kind of electoral alternative to Thatcherism 
(Drower (1994)).  The removal of Militant in the mid to late 1980s allowed the party 
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to then conduct a seismic ‘Policy Review’ in the Spring of 1989 which allowed 
Kinnock and his fellow ‘moderates’ like Roy Hattersley and John Smith to start the 
modernisation process.  This occurred both on policy where they promoted the 
Thatcherite doctrine of lower taxes, and higher defence spending at the expense of the 
traditional tax-and-spend ethos, and large-scale nationalisation.  In regards their 
image, with the rise in prominence of sharp communications advisors like the hitherto 
noted Philip Gould, they softened their political symbolism, replacing the Red Flag 
logo with that of the patriotic English Red Rose.  The party was by undertaking such 
actions, providing a visible demonstration that they were connecting to the more 
classless political culture of the 1980s by shedding any vestiges of socialistic class-
war symbolism, which were deemed, to some extent, necessary to promote during the 
Old Labour era (Hughes & Wintour (1990)). 
 
In due course, it laid the ground for Anthony Giddens’ Third Way classless policies of 
Tony Blair and New Labour.  Stuart Hall (1996), the renowned contemporary Marxist 
theorist, whose work is connected to the methodological bent of this study, speaks 
facetiously of New Labour’s class hypocrisy as they attempted through their modern 
classless outlook to reach and connect to the electoral support of ‘Middle England’.  
This shift which prioritised the recognised middle-classes though did not happen at the 
expense of Labour’s long-established working-class heartland constituencies, as Hall 
implies, because its majorities in those locales increased (Davis (2004b)).  Hall (1996), 
though made one of his most important contributions to British politics when he 
evaluated the escalation of such fragmented class dissection in these terms (Cleaver 
(1999)).  He saw Thatcherism, similar to that of sentiments outlined by contemporary 
theorists (Green (2006); Goodlad (2015)), as a new hegemonic socio-political project, 
which intervened in the civil strife of the 1970s.  This was a time when the post-war 
communal structures were on the decline, and for a while no government appeared to 
be able to solve Britain’s problems.  Thatcherism redefined the political terrain and 
redefined a set of pragmatic ideas about Britain’s political future.  This balance of 
forces, ‘which some studies of advanced capitalism (e.g. Habermas (1973)) have 
interpreted in terms of a “class compromise” being neither socialist nor capitalist, 
reached during the period of very rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, 
found expression in a kind of “consensus politics” which was the hallmark of the Old 
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Labour era which came to an abrupt end with the emergence of power of Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979’ (Bottomore, 1991, p.108). 
 
Giddens’ Third Way ideological perspective, despite its above illustrated core 
ideological class differences with Thatcher, does relate to an extent to a theoretical 
perspective which is central to this study, that being the gradual atomisation of 
contemporary political, class discourse initiated during the 1980s.  One element, 
according to Crompton (2008), ‘of the sociological critique of positivism developed 
during the 1960s and 1970s’, as expressed, for example, in Giddens theory of 
‘Structuralisation’, was the assertion that the subject of class be it communal or 
atomised, ‘should be regarded as having explanatory primacy.  These arguments 
meshed with those already developed by some Marxist theoreticians – particularly 
historians such as Thompson – regarding the indivisibility of “class” from the notion 
of consciousness on a social and political level’ (Crompton, 2008, p.24).  ‘A number 
of different factors served to push class analysts in the direction of identifying a 
“priori”, a “class structure”’ (Giddens, 2002, p.4), which questioned whether class as a 
concept still played any material role in contemporary societal discourse.  A key 
element was the established influence of the revival of sociological interest in the 
concept of a genuine classless society which was purported by Blair and the Third 
Way ethos.  After continual rejection at the polls, Labour or New Labour, as detailed 
by Giddens (2002), and Brivati & Bale (2005), felt the need to shed itself from 
traditional outdated class values.  This was a view institutionalised by the overbearing 
class influence of the Trade Unions and Clause IV, which followed communal class 
principles, that being that the workers should control the means of labour production. 
 
The ideological changes associated with the invention of the term New Labour were a 
large part of the reason for their electoral success.  There were though however, other 
crucial factors as well, such as the decline of the economic competence of the 
incumbent Conservative government, most aptly demonstrated by the ERM ‘Black 
Wednesday’ crisis of September 1992.  New Labour, as generally alluded to by 
Cannadine (1998), and Atkins (2011), and quoted by Giddens (2010), ‘was not an 
empty soundbite designed to disguise a vacuum where policies should have been’.  
This diagnosis that the communal values of Old Labour such as solidarity, a 
commitment to reducing inequality and a belief in the role of active government, 
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remained intact.  The policies designed to pursue these ends though had to shift 
radically because of the acute changes taking place in the wider world where class and 
its relationship to political party affinity had become more fragmented and atomised, 
and accordingly less fixed within historic, collectivised blocks.  ‘Such changes 
included intensifying globalisation, the development of a post-industrial or service 
economy and, in an information age, the emergence of a more voluble and combative 
citizenry’ (Giddens (2010)), where the role of the atomised individual surpassed that 
of traditional class groups. 
 
Beyond these structural matters, the policies of New Labour are harder to classify.  
Tony Blair preferred to speak of broad ‘values’ with some emphasis on Christian 
individualism.  ‘“Class struggle” was a phrase eradicated from the New Labour 
lexicon, most famously by Blair in his speech to the 1996 Labour conference when he 
insisted that there are no longer bosses and workers: them and us’ in the modern, 
classless post-Thatcherite Britain.  Before the 1997 election John Prescott, then 
Labour’s deputy leader, supported such sentiments when he said in classless terms 
that: ‘we are all middle-class now’ (Rees (1997)).  In ‘1999 whilst in government, just 
like in 1996 in opposition, Tony Blair told the Labour Party conference: “The class-
war is over”’ (Kirkup & Pierce (2008)).  The ‘election result itself was further proof of 
the centrality of class in British politics and a standing refutation of Blair’s belief that 
victory was only possible by appealing to middle-class voters’ (Rees (1997)).  
Labour’s lead, as Rees (1997) continues, ‘cut through a range of class demographics’, 
it was still greatest among unskilled workers, but they more importantly gained 
support within skilled workers, and skilled professional employees, two groups which 
Old Labour in previous communal class times, struggled to attract.  The only social 
group, as remarked by Gould (1998), and Geary & Pabst (2015), who consistently 
gave the Conservatives a lead during the classless New Labour era, was that which 
included the wealthiest income earners.  This is a position which is long-established 
under any political class framework, yet, even they, to some extent, albeit slightly, 
moved towards New Labour. 
 
This view, as noted by Kirkup & Pierce (2008), was rebuked in Marxian terms at the 
time by a senior cabinet minister Harriet Harman.  She appealed to the more 
traditional, collectivised class instincts of the party prevalent during the Old Labour 
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era when she said, ‘we have made great progress on tackling inequality but we know 
that inequality doesn’t just come from your gender, race, sexual orientation, or 
disability, what overarches all of these is where you live, your family background, 
your wealth and social class’.  Crucially, as outlining a potential glimpse into future 
class relations of present times, ‘Jeremy Corbyn, then a member of the left-wing 
Campaign Group, welcomed Harman’s concentration on social class and called on 
ministers to follow it with more spending on social housing and education in poor 
areas.  He said: “It sounds like at long last they’ve started to read the runes and realise 
that the biggest fall in support for Labour is among the traditional working-class.  
We’ve been losing the core Labour vote and we can’t win without them.  Maybe this 
is an attempt to reconnect with them.”’  Theresa May, now Prime Minister, then the 
Conservative shadow leader of the Commons, strikingly accused Harman and Corbyn 
of promoting Marxist ‘class-war’ rhetoric (Kirkup & Pierce (2008)).  Such classless 
sentiments were in keeping with the New Labour refined class perspective; May’s 
views of class were more aligned to the New Labour ethos, than that of Corbyn, the 
current Labour leader. 
 
The era of the communal Keynesian style of economic demand management, linked to 
state direction of economic enterprise, was over and never likely to return.  A different 
relationship of government to business and its atomised, consumer-driven ethos hence 
had to be established, which recognised the vital role of enterprise in wealth creation 
and the limits of state power (Bernays (1965); Veldman (2015)).  The ‘expansion of 
the service economy went hand in hand with the shrinking of the traditional working-
class, once the bastion of Old Labour support.  Labour could no longer represent 
sectional class interests alone’ (Giddens (2010)).  In future, as acknowledged by 
Prideaux (2005), and Coulter (2014), to win elections, a left-of-centre party like 
Labour or New Labour had to reach a much wider set of voters, including those who 
had never endorsed its communal strategy in the past.  In Tony Blair, as broadly 
argued by Seyd & Whiteley (2002), and Russell (2005), and quoted by Giddens 
(2010), ‘the party seemed to have found the perfect leader to help it further this aim’.  
A move to the political classless centre since Thatcher and the success of her 
atomisation ethos was accordingly required for the party to have any chance of 
reclaiming power again.  A more refined class perspective, as generally alluded to by 
White (2001), and Bevir (2005), like that stated by Giddens and his Third Way 
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mantra, subsequently became a central path for the party to follow.  Following such 
discourse, to fully comprehend the value of the classless ethos in relation to 
contemporary Labour support, an understanding of the emergence of the consumerist 
brand culture in its generality and specifically its relationship to modern political 
culture, is required. 
 
The concept of a political brand, as numerous political scientists, such as Martineau 
(1957), and McCarthy (1978) state, and that of political party branding at its core is 
about how a political party is identified by the public in general terms.  The perception 
of the brand is more far-reaching than the specific product; while a product has 
distinct purposeful parts such as a politician and policy, a brand is subtle and 
emotional.  A political party brand, as articulated by Denton (1991), and Schill et al. 
(2016), is the all-embracing attitude, impression, fraternity, or persona that the public 
has concerning a particular politician, political party, or even that of a nation state.  
Political party branding, as enunciated by Davis (2013), and Kotler (2016), helps the 
party to modify, vary or conserve status and support, as well as establishing a sense of 
distinctiveness with the party and its representatives, subsequently building an 
association of trust between political party leaders and the electorate.  It assists such 
political consumers to recognise more speedily what a party’s values are, and thus 
differentiate it from its competitors. 
 
Thatcher and New Labour 
The rise and growing importance of professionalised communication is self-evident in 
many of the major western democracies.  The ‘innovative Conservative Party 
campaign effort of 1979’ (Wring (1996a)), and what is broadly referred to by Wring 
(2002, and 2003), is sometimes referred to as a watershed in the development of the 
phenomenon in Britain.  Victory, as Wring (1996a) further notes, ‘heralded the 
beginning of the three Thatcher governments’ and her atomised philosophy, as well as 
the start of a period of commercial success for the party’s brand consultants, ‘Saatchi 
and Saatchi’, as they became the most sought-after advertising agency in the world.  
‘The execution of the 1983 and 1987 general elections consolidated the idea that 
professional consultants were becoming an indispensable’ part of the modern 
atomised and ever-complex class process (Wring (1996a)).  This left the Labour Party 
massively exposed, being so naïve over adapting to such communication procedures 
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(Wring (2002, and 2003)).  An ‘example of such “leftist” thinking was highlighted 
during the 1987 general election, when despite running a slick and vibrant campaign, 
ultimately on policy’ (Junor, 1993, p.129), the party were deemed untrustworthy by 
the mainstream electorate over a number of key issues such as the economy where 
they still prioritised tax increases, thus being seen as attacking the aspiration culture 
which had hitherto been solidified during the Thatcher years. 
 
The party was also vulnerable in regards their unilateral defence policy, where the 
notion of giving up the nation’s nuclear capability during the Cold War where the 
Soviet Union was still generally acknowledged as a potential threat to Britain’s 
security, made Labour open to being criticised by the Conservatives as weak and 
unsuitable for government office (Hughes & Wintour (1990); Drower (1994)).  ‘In an 
interview with David Frost, Neil Kinnock said that if the Russians invaded a non-
nuclear Britain they would be resisted by guerrilla bands who had taken to the hills’ 
(Junor, 1993, p.129).  The Conservatives immediately capitalised on the image with 
posters in traditional urban Labour areas which were populated with the communal, 
manual working-classes.  This was achieved by showing a soldier with his hands up in 
surrender, with the simple slogan ‘Labour’s Policy on Arms’ (Junor, 1993, p.130), 
knowing that it would show Labour even to their own stereotypical supporter base as 
being out of touch and unpatriotic (see Figure I). 
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Figure I: Conservative Party General Election Poster 1987 - (Saatchi & Saatchi) 
LinkedIn, (2017). ‘Labour’s Policy on Arms’, 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/street-fighting-101-corbyn-v-cameron-bradley-godolphin. 
 
 
This was the continuation of the big political trend that was the onward march of 
Thatcherism, which would inevitably deliver her a one-hundred seat majority in 1987; 
her third consecutive electoral triumph.  In addition, Thatcher’s success, as identified 
by Butler & Kavanagh (1988), and Griffiths & Hickson (2009), helped to reactivate 
interest in this style of political promotion amongst a previously suspicious traditional 
Labour leadership.  Partly due to the proliferation of such media interest in the 
concept of the political party as an atomised brand, the subject of political marketing 
is sometimes accordingly equated with modern, sophisticated advertising.  A good 
deal of election coverage has become increasingly preoccupied with the perceived 
domination of style over substance and image over issue.  Marketing though, as 
avowed by Delaney (2008), and O’Shaughnessy et al. (2012), following its core ethos, 
is more than just presentational devices and advertising, for it also is related to product 
management.  The process represented not only a set of techniques, but also an 
approach to promoting relationships with their target audience (Bernays (1955)). 
 
Out of this market research, the advertisers began to expose a new individualism, in 
particular among those who prior to the 1979 general election had never voted 
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Conservative.  They no longer desired to be perceived as being part of a traditional 
social class structure, but rather wished to voice themselves as individual consumers 
and crucial to this persona were the products which they chose to buy.  Individuals, as 
expressed by Fletcher (1994), and Cleaver (1999), generally were classified because 
they might drift towards such a Thatcherite mind-set, where people sought to still be 
part of a social group, although not as a collectivised class, but instead as part of a 
more atomised set of clusters.  They by doing so, still feel they have the freedom to 
articulate themselves as distinctive individuals, an individualism which places greater 
importance on their atomised sense of themselves over that of hitherto dominant 
communal class allegiances.  Business, especially advertising agencies, reacted 
fervently to this powerful new sense of individualism and it rapidly became one of the 
main influences propelling the new consumerist culture in Britain in the 1980s.  Using 
the data from the focus groups conducted by the SRI team to test the validity of the 
new consumer, manufacturers produced a new range of products that by and large 
gave people the opportunity to state their individuality over such a process (Curtis 
(2002)).  Business also, according to Clark et al. (1993), and Hoyland & Wolburg 
(2010), re-classified people through more complex and intricate clusters, as they were 
no longer divided by social class, but by their individualistic psychological desires. 
 
This new atomised class culture led to Labour, who were Thatcher’s only realistic 
domestic political opponents, to come to the pragmatic conclusion that for them to 
ever achieve electoral success, the party had to embrace this new reality (Curtis 
(2002)).  The result was that the brand of New Labour and with it their classless 
virtues, following the effective social class dealignment ethos of the Thatcherite era, 
was developed.  Relative social class dealignment remained relatively strong 
throughout the 1980s, taking the form of trendless fluctuations, for that reason 
Labour’s subsequent electoral failures should largely be explained both by political as 
well as sociological limitations (Joyce (1995); Butler & Kavanagh (1997)).  It cannot 
be denied though, as declared by Crewe et al. (2000), and Seldon (2007), that the 
decline of the traditional working-class electorate through this notable class 
dealignment played a part in Labour’s electoral decline in the 1980s mainly because 
they comprised a sizable portion of the party’s support.  The party, as noted by Crewe 
(1995), and Heath et al. (2001), also performed poorly not just with the traditional 
working-classes but with the entire electorate because their policies, particularly on 
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economic and defence matters were contrary to the opinions of the crucial new 
consumer-driven swing-voters, who following the ethos promoted by the New Right, 
in the main, wished to pay lower taxes allied to having a strong defence policy. 
 
Neither of these factors though have emphasised the political cohesiveness or identity 
of working-class or class interests in general in regards the British political process.  
There ‘has been no transition in the post-industrial society where class divisions have 
been eroded as they still exist but just under different, more diverse social conditions’ 
(Joyce, 1995, p.63).  The Labour Party simply, as professed by Kavanagh (1990), and 
further cited by Joyce (1995), ‘had to find a new modern image which would allow 
them to be seen as a relevant alternative to the Conservatives.  The party had to reach 
a delicate balance of transcending its long-established class base, as well as staying 
attractable to its previous loyal support’ (Joyce, 1995, p.64).  Such class structured 
individualisation and fragmentation have been associated with a weakening of overtly 
expressed strong class identities.  The ‘institutions that once articulated traditional 
working-class interests at the macro-level (e.g. trade unions and the Labour Party) 
have themselves been weakened or transformed into New Labour type’ atomised 
constructs as ‘the political marketisation of British society has played its part in 
increasing fragmentation and social polarisation’ (Crompton, 2008, p.229).  There are 
a range of political considerations, as pronounced by Lee & Turner (1996), and Cohen 
(2009), which can be dissected to demonstrate the reasons for Labour’s social class 
dealignment.  A prominent reason for instance was ‘their desperation for power, 
which resulted in moving the party towards a more rightwards conservative policy 
direction’ (Butler & Savage, 1995, p.324).  Giddens’ Third Way contemporary 
classless dealignment policy of the Labour Party seems far more prevalent today than 
that of the rigid class-based collectivism purported by Miliband and Thompson. 
 
Despite the eventual, possibly inevitable, cynicism with consumer politics, it must be 
stated that the generic perception derived from the research data is that such a shift 
naturally developed with a clear fragmented movement in class structure on a practical 
societal basis.  Since the late 1970s, as commonly referred to by Pearce & Stewart 
(1992), and Griffiths (2007), and quoted by Cannadine (1999), ‘one of the most 
conspicuous domestic developments has been the defeat of organised labour, in both 
its professional and its political guises.  The final precipitous collapse of the great 
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Victorian staple industries and of the traditional working-class means that as a 
consequence their political influence is much diminished’.  Support for the Labour 
Party declined gradually in the twenty years from the mid-1970s, and faced the 
prospect of permanent opposition, until it re-invented itself, the beginnings of which 
occurred during the Kinnock years of the 1980s and taken on with the formation of the 
New Labour brand in the mid-1990s (Hughes & Wintour (1990); Hay (1999)). 
 
The New Right effect on New Labour 
This was the model of democracy that both New Labour and the American 
Democratic Party had bought in to with the intention to regain power.  They, as 
asserted by Heffernan (2000), and Sheingate (2016), in regards the concept of the 
brand itself, had used practices fostered by the commercial world to interpret the 
desires of consumers and by doing that they had consented to Bernays’ assertion that 
this was a superior form of democracy.  The rise of Tony Blair and New Labour in 
promoting such an atomised framework in one sense, marked its denouement, with the 
party setting aside even the aspiration to civilise capitalism, and for the most part 
accepting not just its general permanence and desirability, but the permanence and 
desirability of the radical neoliberal form which it took in the 1980s and 1990s (Curtis 
(2002)).  The general strategy of this right-wing administration, as recorded by Wring 
(1996a, and b), and Atkins (2011), was that by increasing home-ownership it would 
give the working-classes something to conserve and consequently turn them into 
Conservatives.  New Labour was inspired by such class dealignment as those same 
weapons that the Conservative administration used in the 1980s and 1990s were 
continued by them in an attempt to reach out beyond their traditional support.  ‘Tony 
Blair was dedicated to the New Labour project of abandoning the politics of the 
manufacturing age and making Labour attractive to those individualistic, home-
owning aspirational voters who had abandoned Labour for Thatcher in the 1980s’ 
(McWhirter, 2013, p.196).  They though did not embark on this project with the 
intention of removing class boundaries, be it communal or atomised.  They instead 
endeavoured to enable individuals to crave aspiration and wealth for themselves as an 
alternative to promoting the interests of the wider community.  This emphatic embrace 
of Thatcherite free-market capitalism in a much greater sense though marked a 
decisive break with Old Labour’s collectivist, socialistic outlook as their communal 
values were evidently being superseded by those of the individual (Heffernan (2000)).   
61 | P a g e  
 
 
New Labour was consequently borne out of the traditional Left’s response on both 
sides of the Atlantic, to the rise of this new more atomised class culture.  The party 
endeavoured to abandon their customary held belief that the way to create a better 
society was not to treat people as emotional, isolated, atomised individuals but to 
persuade them to realise that they had common interests with others, to help them rise 
above their individualistic feelings and fears.  They, tired of losing elections, instead 
embraced the new culture through promoting a more atomised agenda, appealing to 
the lower middle-classes such as public-sector managers, and the skilled working-
class, so as to persuade these vital once traditional class supporters back.  This 
occurred firstly though with the American Democrats who successfully promoted Bill 
Clinton, their presidential candidate in 1992 and 1996, and his atomised New 
Democrat brand (Curtis (2002)).  This was followed by Labour in Britain or as they 
became branded New Labour, under Philip Gould’s effective marketing guidance, 
who had shifted from advising Kinnock to now counselling Blair. 
 
Gould’s campaign, as established by Gould (1998), and Geary & Pabst (2015), 
convinced New Labour strategists that by presenting a modern presidential-styled 
communication agenda, they would inevitably entice back the crucial Thatcherite 
voters lost in the 1980s as well as generally keeping the old traditional centre-left 
supporter base.  As soon as Blair became Labour leader, Gould then conducted focus 
groups which pinpointed key swing-voters in the suburbs (Curtis (2002)).  This time 
though, unlike in previous electoral reverses, their individual requests were listened to 
and acted upon.  The needs and the concerns of the new Thatcherite materialistic 
classes, as noted by Heffernan (2000), and Minkin (2014), became the predominant 
force for moulding Labour Party policies and with it the New Labour brand. 
 
The participants were encouraged not to communicate lucidly about policies but rather 
to voice their true underlying sentiments and what Gould ascertained was that there 
was a vital change in people’s traditional correlation to class and politics.  They no 
longer saw themselves as part of any predetermined collectivised social class group 
but conversely as specific desire fuelled individuals who could command material 
benefits from politicians (Gould (1998)).  Such benefits were seen as a deserved 
reward for diligently paying taxes, just as the commercial world had schooled them to 
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do as atomised consumers.  The Gould approach, as generally stated by Curtis (2002), 
and Hinman (2006), at heart considered the voters as purely a collection of individual 
desires that must be satisfied and pandered to.  Labour in Britain like the Democrats in 
the United States for that reason, were required to shelve any potential programmes or 
principles like the historic nationalisation ethos outlined in Clause IV for instance, that 
would not unequivocally be of value to those precious swing-voters, even if it entailed 
foregoing some long-held deep-seated beliefs (Seldon (1997); Driver & Martell 
(1998)). 
 
The objective of Clause IV had been to wield together the collective muscle of the 
working masses to defy the unconstrained greed of the bosses and the corporate 
sector.  Blair though was faced with decisive swing-voters who no longer saw 
themselves as being oppressed by the free-market capitalist system in the individualist 
form promoted through Hayek (1944, and 1960), Joseph (1975), and Smith (1982, and 
1999).  They, ‘in its place, viewed themselves as independent consumers who were 
designed and satisfied by what business supplied them.  At the 1994 Labour 
Conference, Tony Blair delivered his first, highly praised, speech as Leader.  In it, he 
foreshadowed far-reaching change to the party’s constitution, in so doing ending 
Labour’s commitment to nationalisation, and further bringing the party into the 
political centre-ground’ (Seldon, 1997, p.496).  The new amended Clause IV vowed 
not to curb but to accept and if deemed propitious, even encourage the free-market.  
Gould, who engineered Labour’s landslide election victory in 1997, saw it as a 
massive promotion of a new style of atomised consumer-driven democracy, following 
in the footsteps of Bernays and Maslow by grasping and eventually satisfying people’s 
individual desires through data garnered through modern market research techniques.  
They were imparting power to the individual as a valued commodity and not 
regarding them as cogs within impersonal, communal social class groups whose 
outdated collective needs and desires were dictated to by outdated politicians (Gould 
(1998); Curtis (2002)). 
 
From the outset, the architects of the New Labour brand consequently offered a 
compelling diagnosis of why innovation in modern social democratic politics was 
required, coupled with a clear policy programme that dealt with the needs of the 
individual citizen.  In future to gain political power, the party had to reach a much 
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wider set of voters, including those who had never endorsed it in the past.  Labour 
could no longer represent in this new complex, atomised structure post-Thatcher, a 
broad sectional class interest alone, as such a grouping did not for all intense and 
purposes, any longer exist (Gould (1998, and 2010)).  Gould, as hitherto noted, being 
one of the prominent advocates of pursuing this strategy, thought that Labour’s 
leadership had come to be tainted by an integral denigration and disapproving attitude 
towards the new more selfish consumer focussed desires of a substantial element of 
the outmoded working-class electorate.  Gould and his New Labour modernisers it 
appears, aimed to create a packaged classless atomised brand in the image of Bernays, 
which could reconnect Labour with their lost Thatcherite voters, by shaking off their 
out-of-date communal perceptions (Halsey & Webb (2000); Curtis (2002)). 
 
Tony Blair and New Labour smarting from such past failures, occupied such a middle-
ground that Thatcher had made her own in the 1980s, and consequently received the 
electoral rewards.  He embraced the values of progressive atomised, classless politics 
while discarding the accumulation of sacred traditional socialist perspectives that had 
locked his party out of government for nearly two decades.  Most politicians of the 
Old Labour tradition started from a set of traditional political positions; Tony Blair, in 
contrast being the great classless moderniser, ‘started from the values he had 
imbedded with his Christian faith.  His political heroes were the Liberal leaders of 19th 
Century Britain, rather than the giants of the Labour movement that he now led.  The 
product of a privileged public-school education and the son of a Conservative lawyer, 
he was always at a distance from his own party; to the discomfort of many of his 
colleagues he saw himself as a national, rather than a party leader’ (Stephens, 2004, 
p.3).  The Conservatives, who were ‘the dominant political force in Britain for most of 
the 20th Century, were exiled to the frozen margins of politics’ (Stephens, 2004, p.4). 
 
Within ‘the Conservative Party’, as Seldon (1997) notes, ‘the main creative input 
during the 1997 general election came from Norman Blackwell, Danny Finkelstein, 
and Tim Collins’, who were well aware that Labour, with their adoption of the New 
Labour brand image, had changed.  Such a shift occurred from the party’s four 
consecutive election defeats (1979, 1983, 1987, and 1992) and the collapse of class 
collectivism which had convinced Labour that winning the general election must be 
the priority over hitherto held communal class ideological beliefs.  This is where 
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‘Blair had a single-minded purpose, which was to get rid of the Tories, luckily for 
him, it was a purpose that was not merely good for him politically, but one the public 
shared’.  His idea ‘was reinforced by the findings of Conservative Central Office 
polling which showed that Tory supporters thought Labour had indeed changed since 
the days of Kinnock and Smith’ (Seldon, 1997, p.626).  The underlying strategy was 
spelled out by the then Conservative Party Chairman, Brian Mawhinney: ‘The issue is 
not whether Labour has changed.  It is now clear that it has.  The issue is whether 
Labour is fit to govern’ (Seldon, 1997, p.659).  In electoral terms, the Conservatives 
suffered from the emergence of New Labour, which stole their true secret weapon, not 
rigid communal centred class loyalty, but flexible classless adaptability.  ‘We’ve 
stolen lots of Labour’s clothes in the past,’ said the former senior Conservative 
minister James Prior, ‘but now they’ve stolen all our clothes, and as they searched for 
a new role they saw their ideal leader on the opposite side: Tony Blair’ (Sampson, 
2004, p.49).  In place of the Labour Party of old, for whom ideological purity 
supporting the interests of the traditional working-classes, ‘often meant difficulties in 
adapting to changing voter preference’, the Conservatives ‘faced New Labour, the 
supreme “flexi-party”’.  They ‘were willing to adopt almost any policy and position to 
appeal to’ post-Thatcherite, atomised voters; Labour ‘was no longer frightening to 
many Conservative voters’ (Seldon, 1997, p.741), as they had shed the Old Labour 
traditional class discourse. 
 
This emphasis of difference from the past or re-creation, is nothing new for political 
parties.  For example, as Coates (2005) notes, ‘Harold Wilson’s Old Labour 
government coined the slogan “The New Britain: Labour’s Plan Outlined”, 
similarly, one of Tony Blair’s New Labour slogans was; “New Britain: My Vision of 
a Young Country”’.  The party via the scrapping of Clause IV, were recreating 
themselves as they were adopting and proposing a new set of aims within the ever-
changing atomised class, political framework, a position which as a rule was justified 
as crucial if they were to be seen as electorally relevant.  Coates (2005) continues, 
‘reinvention of this sort is vitally important to all political parties because it allows 
them to distance themselves from past mistakes and unpopular policies and gives the 
electorate hope that they have a new solution which is better than the opposition’s and 
can fix age-old problems’ (Coates, 2005, p.30).  This led them to question core, long-
term policy beliefs like the redistribution of wealth and their support for organised 
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labour (Mumby (1988); Butler & Savage (1995)).  New Labour’s success was 
twofold, as it not only shifted ‘the party away from not just social democratic political 
values’, but also discarded ‘the party’s old-fashioned leftist image’ (Paxman, 2002, 
p.62).  This provided a strong substantiation for the robust power particularly in 
regards the post-Thatcherite atomisation era that the traditional conservative service 
class has had on contemporary British politics in general. 
 
This theory was consistently illustrated during the 1980s when the Labour Party in 
opposition to the Thatcher government, was commonly seen as a working-class party, 
fighting solely for traditional working-class interests.  It, as Joyce (1995), and Dale 
(2000) noted, did not appeal to the growing number of white-collar employees.  They 
in the long-term failed to adapt their policy or image to cater for the more atomised 
social class stratification, which saw people on an economic level gradually move 
away from outdated historic class loyalties and concerns; a position which it appears 
took root during the Thatcher era.  A powerful subtext in these debates is that the 
collapse of the Left is also a breakdown of contemporary socialist theory; that Labour 
supporters have remained burdened by the growing irrelevance of communal-styled 
class politics, which in the atomised Thatcherite era, needed revision and modernising, 
so as to stay electorally viable (Baker & Luke (1991); Bennett & Entman (2000)).  
This is for the most part defined by the decline of mass production, and with it a mass 
labour force, which has led to the declining relevance of the working-class and of 
‘class politics’ networks as the modern, atomised consumer does not feel such an 
affinity to such a communal background. 
 
It was, as largely pronounced by Curtis (2002), in a sense, the victory of the atomised 
political-class ethos over that of once prevalent rigid structures; of a particular self-
indulgence, a notion that all moral feelings were fittingly scrutinised through the lens 
of personal, individualistic fulfilment.  In reality, the final culmination of such 
rationality is that there is no society; there is only a group of desire-fuelled atomised 
entities who are making individual choices so as to stimulate their own individual 
good fortune (Bernays (1965)).  This thesis in part, outlines how politicians on the 
traditional centre-left in Britain turned to the atomised methods advanced by business 
in an attempt to recapture government office; but what they did not grasp was that 
what had thrived for their conservative opponents, would demoralise the very core of 
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their political values.  They would find themselves imprisoned by the avaricious 
aspirations of the new individualistic society, which was contradictory to their 
ideological, communal traditions (Curtis (2002)). 
 
This study along these lines highlights how that concept took over party politics as it 
states how Labour within their atomised, consumerist new reality of the New Labour 
brand, turned to these techniques to regain power.  They, as identified by King (1997), 
and Sheingate (2016), imagined that they were coining a more contemporary and 
effective form of democracy, one that sincerely answered to the inner-desires of the 
new individualised voter.  On the contrary, what the politicians did not comprehend 
was that the intention of those who had formerly shaped such techniques had not been 
to release people from the burdens of intrusive governments but actually to advance a 
new mode of manipulating them in an era of mass democracy (Curtis (2002)).  Even 
so, though, like every political party project, such a vision was motivated by 
promoting a clear political message through a well-defined image; a message, and an 
image that gave its brand validity and legitimacy that people could recognise and 
know what it was, and what it stood for.  It is too simple to conclude though that New 
Labour actually succeeded in creating that classless perspective, although the Old 
Labour’s working-class persona was doubtless being eroded in the more diverse 
contemporary atomised or possibly even classless class-based society.  In regards 
class pragmatism, New Labour, as observed by Seldon (2001), and Griffiths & 
Hickson (2009), were ruthless in understanding the ever-complex atomised class 
complexities and with that its relationship with modern communications culture and 
specific geographic locales. 
 
Class, Labour, and Communications, within a Localised Context 
The old, ostensibly communal class-based politics, ‘which gave it coherence and 
purpose, that being to improve the lives of industrial workers’ within urban locales ‘by 
nationalising the means of production, were an inadequate basis on which to build a 
successful party of the ideological centre-left in the closing decades of the 20th 
Century’ (Cannadine, 1998, p.12).  ‘Today’s Labour politicians’, as alluded to by 
Paxman (2002), and Carr (2014), and further described by Cannadine (1999), ‘are less 
interested than their predecessors were in the history of class consciousness and class 
conflict, a history which was once such an important prop to the party’s ideological 
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and geographic collective identity and purpose’.  They, in accordance with the post-
Thatcherite atomised class culture, instead stress a less traditional class perspective of 
‘brand politics’, which aims to sell a message to a greater homogenised group or 
network, which will relate to all classes in all locales. 
 
The technique of connecting social class and communication networks in specific 
locations was as hitherto noted, originally developed in the 1920s by Marxist theorists 
like Gramsci, who articulated such complex nuance ideological theories of class and 
political affiliation.  Althusser’s (1970) rethinking of this concept of ideology, as 
Stewart (2000), and Crang & Thrift (2002) state, and its relationship to the concept of 
space, though sparked a revival of interest in Marxist theory in western literal and 
cultural scholarship.  Althusser, as Therborn (1999), and Ferretter (2005) note, places 
emphasis on the core Marxian ethos that communal class distinctions are defined 
through the social space in which they are geographically positioned, and the 
occupations of the inhabitants who reside in such spaces.  It also has to restructure 
itself; it has to enforce its position continuously in the face of continually developing 
new historical environments. 
 
This Althusserian perspective which the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre advances 
in his text La production de l’espace (1974), that urban and rural spaces are cultural 
entities in their own right, and in this manner notably influence a person’s perspective 
not just over their perceived communal class interests, but also that of their communal 
political interests, seems therefore influential (Davis (2004a); Pflieger et al. (2008)).  
Lefebvre (1974), like Althusser (1970), defined this urban-rural political, class 
structural divide as the ‘spatial’.  It is, as Dear (2000), and Olsen (2014), broadly 
allude, the promotion of such a theory which theoretically set the tone for the 
traditional Old Labour electoral strategy of focussing their priorities towards 
perceived ‘working-class’ urban areas so as to satisfy their hitherto simplistic political, 
class stereotypes. 
 
David Harvey, from a modern-day perspective, similar to the spatial works of 
Althusser and Lefebvre, places consideration around urban and rural social life in both 
its traditional economic and symbolic dimensions.  This work, as documented by 
Castree & Gregory (2006), and Whybrow (2010), is imbued with a keen awareness of 
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the temporality of urban life in the sense of long-term consumerist accumulation.  This 
is where that palpable class structure that being the conception of communal, spatial 
class struggle which derives out of Marxist theory, comes back into relative 
perspective.  On a political level, Harvey, in his revolutionary text, A Companion to 
Marx’s Capital (2010), argued that one of the limitations which has begun to become 
widespread in contemporary class discourse is the myth that people are now not 
divided by communal, ‘spatial’ lines.  This has led to a mistaken belief that the 
communal class struggle is seen as irrelevant in the 21st Century, as it has been 
replaced by the broad perception that modern class categorisation is structured via an 
atomised, and possibly even classless, network society.  Marx’s teachings state that 
the collectivised working-class masses have to have the strength to circumvent the 
attractions offered by any form of class atomisation and instead, engage in the core 
structures of the class system which govern the economic structures and consequent 
power disparities of such a classification (Harvey (2007)). 
 
Althusser, Lefebvre, and Harvey’s spatial class analysis, is argued contemporarily by 
Manuel Castells’ three monumental texts, End of the Millennium (1998), The Rise of 
the Network Society (2000), and Networks of Outrage and Hope (2012).  Each text 
traces the major global changes initiated by the information technology revolution of 
the late 1970s which arose out of the atomised class, political ethos developed through 
that period.  It appears that to disengage from these international networks is to return 
to a communal economic and social structure which is redundant in the post-
Thatcherite era.  Castells (1998, 2000, and 2012) stated that this information 
propagates instantaneously through atomised computer networks that run the models 
upon which corporate decisions, so crucial post-Thatcher, are made, and accordingly 
where social structures are defined.  These interwoven atomised networks, like those 
remarked on by Henderson & Castells (1987), affect social characteristics, as they 
being generally borne out of the post-Thatcherite ethos, naturally influence political 
affinity within a pronounced geographic space. 
 
In this new atomised, consumerist structure, the economic framework highlights the 
traditional great urban-rural spatial divide like that purported by Althusser (1970), 
Lefebvre (1974), and Harvey (2010), but then takes it on to a greater cultivated degree 
by correlating it to such atomised and complex contemporary class gradations.  This 
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view, asserted by Susser (2001), and Haffner (2013), that one of the central tensions 
explored by Castells’ text, is that the urban and the rural inhabitants, between their 
networked flows and individualistic atomised perspectives, have as a rule, separate 
social objectives which commonly define their political outlook.  The urban is a 
densely populated social space, where, as noted by Middleton (2013), and Butler 
(2014), the general social structure is condensed through the traditional, spatial group 
ethos or network, where the working and middle-classes live and work within a 
confined space.  This is in contrast to the sparsely populated rural areas, which on a 
political parallel are less socially collectivised, and hence are more malleable to such 
atomised class influences and networks. 
 
In regards such individuals, as noted by Inglehart (1990), and James (2006), the 
increased complexity of their work and lives has reduced such potential social 
alienation.  In any case, there will forever be some mundane work in any type of 
industrialised society, be it pre-Thatcherite socialist or post-Thatcherite capitalist.  The 
lesson here appears to be that there is little suggestion of the advancement of radical 
class consciousness among the traditional working-classes.  According to some 
postmodernists, such as Beech & Lee (2008), and Wallace (2010), for example, class 
has become an entity in itself, immaterial in many people’s lives.  New Labour was an 
attempt to find a new form of political solidarity centred through the idea of 
Communitarianism within the framework of the classless Third Way.  New Labour 
originally started with a breaking down of that social status via the promotion of the 
localism agenda.  Community empowerment became the core class concept where 
they broke local authorities down into smaller units with which people could identify.  
What the party was trying to achieve was to rebuild the social solidarity of traditional 
working-class communities around a specific locality; the politics of place and 
community came to the fore (De Chernatony (2001); Geary & Pabst (2015)). 
 
Geographical research into the relevance of political party affinity has been split into 
two distinct functions.  The first, as Scott & Willis (2017) state, being a focus ‘on 
political deliberation and the extent to which citizens are engaged in discussions about 
shared concerns’.  The second explores ‘the structures and practices that underpin the 
operation of representative democracy’.  The relevance of locale and geographical 
territory (constituencies or districts) can determine the framework of electoral 
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outcomes, and by this means the success or lack of, of specific political parties (Scott 
& Willis (2017)).  In addition, there is a long-standing number of academic studies 
that focus upon the linkage of social class, political party support, and its relationship 
with specific locales.  It primarily concentrates upon how such factors affect electoral 
outcomes via the correlation between the votes across a range of areas, be it urban or 
rural (Agnew (1987, and 1996); Johnston & Pattie (2006, and 2008)). 
 
The relevance of locale to political, class relations though in general terms is dictated 
via both a communal, and atomised perspective.  There is no doubt, particularly 
demonstrated with the rise of New Labour, and their classless political brand, that they 
transcended to some extent the relevance of the ‘spatial’ ethos.  This shift though was 
limited as on an historical level, the trend to such movement of political party affinity 
and class perception to that of locale and territory, is one which by its nature has been 
fairly modest (Pelling (1967); Dorling & Henning (2015)).  This perspective is 
supported by Johnston & Pattie (2008), who state that ‘a party and its belief systems 
become part of the local culture … and those areas of strengths become core to its 
continued quest for votes’ (Johnston & Pattie, 2008, p.365).  They argue ‘that 
neighbours shape each other’s voting preferences through “conversion by 
conversation” such that people are more likely to support the largest party as it is most 
likely be associated with the class category in which they consider themselves to be 
part of’.  This research suggests that local ‘social networks, many of which are 
spatially clustered within households, families and neighbourhoods, are the locales 
within which there is much discussion of political and related issues and through 
which, intentionally or serendipitously, some people may be convinced to change their 
views and the party that they support’ (Johnston & Pattie, 2008, p.366).  Any party 
‘interested in winning general elections needs to think about ways to: (1) shore up its 
political heartlands and build from its geo-historical base; (2) appeal more widely in 
order to win additional seats (targeting marginal seats); and (3) link the work of the 
local party with developments in the national arena, ensuring that the balance of 
power within the party works in the interests of winning campaigns’ (Scott & Willis 
(2017)).  A successful political party needs to retain its traditional class base, as well 
as being flexible enough to be realistically attractive to classes, and by implication, 
areas, that they would not naturally associate with, being rooted in their core values 
and beliefs (Taylor (1985); Page & Dittmer (2015)). 
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The big question is how such a strategy should be implemented, that if there are class 
struggles based around primitive atomised divisions, those have to be integrated with 
traditional class struggles in the workplace which the spatial ethos pronounces.  This 
is a difficult course to follow, especially under the current atomised, capitalist 
financial network structure where there is a great deal of class struggles defined 
through a range of once immaterial characteristics such as culture, aspiration, and 
locale.  The traditional working-class movement in the post-Thatcherite age is 
struggling to adapt to this new atomised network discourse (Goonewardena et al. 
(2008); Diefenbach et al. (2013)).  This limitation which Marx emphasises, is that the 
masses have to confront the centre piece of the problem, which in regards 
contemporary class structure, is the elite bourgeoisie network downplaying the 
relevance of the communal interests of the masses, so as to distract them from a social 
and political structure which fails to serve their communal interests (Harvey (1989, 
and 2010)).   This atomised network system leads to the bourgeoisie elite shrinking in 
size, but growing in wealth, at the cost of the proletariat class, who are increasing in 
size, but decreasing in wealth (Savage & Devine (2013)).  In regards that point, Marx 
states that politically the masses are not going to press forward in-dealing with the 
existing atomised network class system, if they are not spatially organised to engage 
in some mode of class resistance (Thacker (2009); Eagleton (2012)). 
 
Despite the differing interpretations of the individualistic, atomised class networks, be 
it in a spatial sense, national or regional, rural or urban, this is at root a social class 
structure which is related to this study.  This occurs through a range of localised class 
networks in both urban and rural North-West Cumbria, where an analysis can be 
evaluated on a specific political network, that being the Labour Party.  It appears for 
this connection of class, political affinity, consumerism, and locale to be fully 
understood, an understanding of such themes through a wider academic context, is 
necessary. 
 
Review of Contemporary Research Streams 
There have been numerous studies which have focussed attention to some extent on 
the ever changing, more complex contemporary social class structure and how it 
sequentially affects political party affiliation.  This application, as Wring (2002) 
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states, ‘and usage of marketing from the mid-1980s onwards has led to important 
structural changes within the party which collectively combined to afford the leader 
and his aides greater power’.  What was happening at the end of the 20th Century was 
something that had never been tried before; the idea of democracy was being taking 
over by a simplified economic model of human beings advancing their desire-fuelled 
consumerism, and in the process, freedom was redefined to mean nothing more than 
the ability of individuals to get whatever they coveted (Curtis (2002); Raphael 
(2017)).  A desirable and democratic consequence of modern, atomised political 
marketing is to make parties more responsive to the widest section of the electorate, 
the implementation of this approach though can result in having the opposite effect in 
that some voters appear to become more relevant than others.  This adoption of a 
political marketing approach to the electorate has been an important precursor to the 
development of the electorally successful New Labour brand, so skilfully fostered 
under the Blair leadership.  Set in such an historical context, this shift, as recorded by 
McQuail (2010), and Geary & Pabst (2015), has enabled the current Labour leadership 
to exercise a greater amount of control over electoral strategy than was afforded their 
Old Labour predecessors. 
 
In seeking to adopt the marketing concept, political organisations such as Labour use 
opinion research to develop long-term plans and strategic goals rather than just 
presentational ideas for the last few weeks of an election campaign.  Sophisticated 
demographic and psychographic market research, as observed by Curtis (2002), and 
Marlin (2013), started to be fed into the design of the product, be it in relation to the 
image of a candidate, party or policy platform on which they stood.  Marketing 
techniques, as noted by Rallings et al. (1996), ‘such as positioning, segmentation, and 
product development also began to be more fully integrated into electoral strategy.  
This phase of political marketing development contrasts with its predecessors in that 
targets other than just the general electorate become the focus of activity.  The efforts 
become partly preoccupied with influencing opinion in the party itself, amongst 
interest groups and, crucially, the mass media’ (Rallings et al., 1996, p.107).  What, as 
noted in generic terms by Joyce (1995), and Curtis (2002), had begun as a system of 
liberation was turning into a powerful system of control. 
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This marketing approach naturally correlated to New Labour’s classless vision of a 
freer and more open Britain as they were in communication terms, promoting an 
atomised, consumer-driven society.  In addition, with the benefit of prior review, the 
debate over the weakening of the standard class, political party, communication, and 
locale relationship is still open, especially with respect to support for the Labour Party 
particularly in the contemporary Post New Labour era.  It is also commonly suggested 
that a decline in traditional political-class affinity in Britain, as remarked by Agger 
(1998), is a function of fluctuating party programmes rather than a weakening in the 
relevance of social class to the public at large.  Social class issues though are still very 
influential in regards specific issues such as poverty, employment, and immigration, 
but less so in defining broader political party brands who need to cater to a much 
wider electorate. 
 
The impression though, as professed by Mattelart (1992), and Wallace (2010), that 
social backgrounds and localities in particular, could modify political party affinity 
freely of individual socio-demographic characteristics has existed in some form for 
some time.  These ‘early attempts’, as Andersen et al. (2006) states, ‘to test for this 
type of contextual effect though were limited in that they relied on aggregate data’.  
Although ‘their findings clearly showed compositional effects’, such as for instance, 
the more traditional working-class a local area, the more likely it elected a candidate 
from a traditional working-class party (Andersen et al. (2006)).  They did not, unlike 
Bernays (1955, and 1965), explicitly examine atomised and/or classless individual 
behaviours, and consequently their findings were limited as the spread of the 
population explored were too narrow.  Such data also contained information about the 
parliamentary constituencies in which respondents live, permitting related data from 
the British census or other legitimate government sources to be assimilated as 
explanatory relevant themes.  This outlook led to a solidity of electoral patterns, which 
meant that there was a clear conventional relationship between class assessment and 
political support, with the traditional working-classes chiefly voting Labour, and those 
who considered themselves to be from the collectivised middle-classes being more 
inclined to support the Conservatives (Joyce (1995); Seldon & Hickson (2004)). 
 
Marx and Weber’s communal categorisations were important in understanding the 
power structure in society as such formations enabled Bernays and his political apostle 
74 | P a g e  
 
Thatcher to overturn the dominant communal class ethos, replacing it with a more 
atomised perspective (Henry (1983); Breen & Rottman (1995)).  They believed that 
such previous collectivised structures were irrelevant and had to be fragmented and 
atomised to suit the needs of the individual as an entity in itself.  Following such clear 
contrasting divisions, the last four decades have witnessed a major rethinking of the 
relevance of the subject which prior to this seemed set within clearly defined broad 
guidelines, be it Marxist or Weberian (Runciman (2002); Parkin (2013)).  An 
alternative atomised interpretation instead has come to prevail, that although not 
always explicitly Thatcherite, certainly, as affirmed by Jackson & Saunders (2012), 
and Evans (2013), shared her assumption that traditional class groupings are erroneous 
in a modern world where the power of the individual as a distinctive class in their own 
right has taken root. 
 
Marx believed, as observed by Elster (1985), and Wood (2004), and quoted by 
Cannadine (1999), ‘that such deeply rooted and momentous struggles among socially-
conscious classes, arise directly and predictably out of the conflicts inherent in the 
productive activities of the economy’, which give society its basic class focus.  This 
would, as Cannadine (1999) continues, ‘lead to the socialist utopia, in which both the 
state and class would wither away.  It is an intriguing irony that’, long before Tony 
Blair and New Labour made the phrase fashionable during the late 1990s, with his 
relentless advancement of the ‘Cool Britannia’ ethos, ‘Marx had predicted that a 
“classless society” would one day come into being’.  This is because such a classless 
revolution which he famously predicted, would be that of the working-class 
overcoming their capitalist oppressors.  In its place, what occurred was the rise of a 
class atomisation ethos which destroyed any such notions of working-class communal 
solidarity (Apple (1996); Foote (1997)).  This was achieved by emphasising the role 
of the individual, through correlating their political values within the boundaries of a 
desire-fuelled consumerism, which allowed for the reactionary forces of the New 
Right to gain political power which as a consequence, enhanced their atomised 
philosophy even further. 
 
The postmodern era, as noted by Giddens (2002), and Savage & Devine (2013), is 
defined by decentred and deconstructed discourse in which grand, traditional master 
communal, sociological, and political narratives no longer appear relevant.  Cannadine 
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(1999) states, that ‘among the prime casualties of this new mode of thinking, have 
been those broad, all-encompassing, deterministic, ancient communal Marxist 
histories built around class formation, class conflict, and political revolution.  The 
simple and direct connections between economic change which were the making of a 
communal class ethos for which large sections of the population can subscribe to and 
feel part of’, have by in large surrendered to the atomised perspective initially 
proposed by Bernays.  It was this shift that, as noted by Goodlad (2015), initially 
provided the successful electoral framework for Margaret Thatcher and the New Right 
and more latterly, as remarked by Gould (1998), and Golding (2016), Tony Blair and 
the classless New Labour brand. 
 
This paradox is critical in understanding Giddens’ Third Way classless theory as he 
himself states, ‘was concerned that neoliberal reforms, while necessary acts of 
modernisation, pulled apart the bonds of social class cohesion’ (Giddens, 2000, p.32).  
The Third Way, although accepting the Thatcherite social and political reforms of the 
1980s, was not merely an exact continuation of the New Right atomisation agenda, 
where class power was defined by economic wealth, which in the main, lay in the 
hands of a corporate elite, but was instead, an alternative political ‘classless’ 
philosophy.  Giddens’, as Mooney & Law (2007) state, ‘form of “social 
neoliberalism” seeks to ensure an equality of opportunity to enable individuals to 
compete and to remove arbitrary outmoded political and class barriers.  In particular, 
convinced class prominent Marxists like Miliband and Thompson refused to share in 
the classless New Labour illusion that the market and social justice were compatible’ 
(Mooney & Law, 2007, p.265).  Such deviations in the compositional construct of 
class perception generally do not denote the eradication of class struggle within 
society, and so by pursuing such a class context reformation, it is not realistic to 
believe that class-based industrial quarrels are remnants of a previous communal age 
(Edgell (1993); Marwick (1996)).  Marx, while largely accurate that the bourgeoisie 
would streamline itself to control its priorities, was utterly inaccurate in regards to the 
future reformation of the proletariat class. 
 
The question inevitably has to be asked whether referring to workers as ‘working-
class’ on a homogeneous class-level still has any contemporary relevance (Turner 
(1999); Beer (2013)).  ‘Class though is a central concept within the Marxist theoretical 
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framework; it has therefore always had a central place in the political discourse of 
socialists and Marxists’ (Crompton, 2008, p.86).  Marx ‘would have thus accepted that 
class is a force that unites into groups people who differ from one another, by 
overriding the differences between them’ (Marshall, 1950, p.114).  He though, could 
not have foreseen such a variety of atomised class groupings both within Capital and 
Labour.  This atomised structure, as outlined both by Bernays (1955), and Dahrendorf 
(1959), is so strong and ingrained that it has upheld the capitalist labour structure and 
the natural acceptance of such a structure by Labour representatives both within a 
localised perspective or a national context (Lowith (2004); Schmidt (2013)). 
 
Classes ‘never actually existed as recognisable historical phenomena, still less as the 
prime motor of historical change’ (Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, p.190), which has 
led to the rise of a less rigidly class-conscious voter which would have lasting effects 
on Labour politics.  Thatcher was merely embracing a natural economic philosophy 
which, as articulated by Clarke (1991), and Berger (2007), stated that society is best 
served by principally promoting the ideal of the individual’s personal satisfaction 
centred through the individual’s own distinctive gratification.  It was in a sense the 
triumph of considering individuals, on a political party and social class level, as purely 
emotional beings who have unconscious wants and desires that need to be satisfied 
before the advancement of any generically designed communal social class group. 
 
Such credibility lessons would be inspired by the success of their main political rivals.  
The Conservative Party, as Rawnsley (2000) notes, ‘had come to power in 1979, 
replacing a weak and failing Old Labour government.  It was to remain in power until 
1997, through elections in 1983, 1987, and 1992’ in no small fashion by using very 
skilful marketing techniques (see Chapter III).  New Labour, ‘was the product of 
traumatic and multiple failures’ (Rawnsley, 2000, pp.8-9), of promoting an out-dated 
Old Labour brand during such a time.  Recognition of such failures emerged 
principally from the consistent electoral reverses during the Thatcher era, this 
generated a belief that the party had to modernise so as to reconnect with the wider 
electorate (Smith & Smith (1995); Beck (1997)).  The process of modernisation hence 
began and the term and the New Labour brand was adopted at the hitherto noted 1994 
Party Conference, which had the theme, ‘New Labour, New Britain’ (Fairclough 
(2003); Geary & Pabst (2015)).  Reflections like those emphasising the emergence, 
77 | P a g e  
 
development, and evolution of the New Labour brand suggest that the concept of the 
classless brand, as noted by Hombach (2000), and Bennion (2002), was a necessary 
element in the modernisation of the party, and a device to suggest and promise 
change. 
 
Underlying this acceptance of such a modern convoluted class mantra on the 
ideological Centre-left in Britain is a broader change in the ‘conventional vocabulary 
of political discussion and social perception.  This occurred namely through the shift 
from the traditional preoccupation with people as collective producers to the 
alternative notion of people as individual consumers.  This was partly Thatcher’s 
achievement’ (Cannadine (1999)).  She was very perceptive in promoting such an 
atomised political structure through the aspirational temptations of consumerism.  In 
relation to the former, by confronting and defeating the trades unions who symbolised 
the communal working-class ethos, the Thatcherite ideology, as declared by Carter & 
Wright (1997), and Turner (2008), could stress the latter by unleashing the role of the 
market.  In relation to the latter, she promoted the concept of treating the public not as 
a collective Marxist social class group but as a corporate classless customer, thereby 
enabling the model of the atomised individual to flourish, which also consequently 
undermined the language of social solidarity based on historic, communal productive 
classes (Goodlad (2015); Veldman (2015)).  She offered, through her atomised 
political, class philosophy, hope in a way that Old Labour never had, ‘to the 
traditional working and middle-classes that they might escape from the constraints of 
impoverished expectations and irremediable subordination’ (Cannadine (1999)). 
 
Thatcher and Blair, thus had much in common, as both prioritised on an electoral level 
at least, the established middle-class grouping in Weberian parlance.  The Thatcher 
and later Blair administrations, as Cannadine (1998) states, were post-atomised 
attempts to communicate to and about what they believed to be ‘the middle-class, 
without actually using the word “class” as a collective social category’.  They wanted 
any such terms to be replaced with the emphasis on the atomised individual as an 
entity within itself.  They both ‘sought to convey an impression of concern’ for the 
atomised individual as well as promoting a natural affinity to the traditional middle-
class electorate.  This was done so as to calm such people’s ‘feelings of insecurity and 
marginalisation which had come to the fore’ during the 1960s and 1970s, where the 
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Old Labour communal class perspective was still prevalent (Cannadine, 1998, p.184).  
‘Middle England’, as Cannadine (1998) further alludes, was just an attempt by New 
Right, and New Labour politicians to try and foster an atomised, or classless agenda, 
for electoral advantage. 
 
Labour, according to Carter & Wright (1997), and King (1997), has characteristically 
seen itself as a movement, not just as a party; such a trait is demarcated because its 
association with its class history greatly relates to its future perceptions.  Although, 
historically in Britain, political parties in general and the Labour Party in particular, 
‘are conflicted on both “class” and “status” interests’.  It is very rare for a political 
party of any ideology to be fixed within such a singularly simplistic class grouping, 
like for instance the working masses or the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie class (Edgell, 
1993, p.12).  Labour historically has initiated its allure not just through a range of 
policies and principles, but via its advancement of promoting a vision of a greater 
society that can encompasses all classes within a modern structural framework 
(Crosland (1956); Ziegler (1995)). 
 
Learning from its greatest political adversary, Margaret Thatcher and her atomised 
philosophy, Labour by becoming more classless in their broad perspective stayed 
relevant in modern electoral politics.  Hobsbawm (1981) from a Marxist perspective, 
‘attributed the breakdown of class politics, and in particular the poor showing of 
Labour at the polls’ during the Old Labour era, ‘to the new sectionalism and self-
interest where the electorate had become fragmented politically along unfamiliar’ 
atomised lines (Marshall, 1997, p.32).  This theory in a contemporary British political 
context was illustrated in the image of the 1980s ‘New Tories’, who were 
predominantly traditional working-class who would naturally previously have seen to 
have benefitted from traditional Labour policies.  Even so, because of short-term 
financial benefits allied to the atomised, individualistic class orthodoxy of the age, 
they felt more affiliation with the Thatcherite ethos.  The rise of such atomisation in 
relation to the British body-politic allowed Thatcher to comfortably, consistently 
defeat Old Labour at the polls (Griffiths & Hickson (2009)). 
 
In addition, such traditional conflicts, as observed by Marshall (1997), and Black 
(2003), between workers and owners of production will not in the foreseeable future 
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pose a threat to the atomised social order.  There is also no good reason to believe that 
any such communal class structures, as those purported by Renner (1953), and 
Dahrendorf (1959), and quoted by Miliband (1989), ‘are at all likely in advanced 
capitalist countries.  In every generation, diverse voices insistently proclaim that the 
very notion of class struggle is obsolete.  It is part of a world that has irrevocably 
vanished, and that the manifestations of it which still occur’ are gradually being 
eroded in this more diverse contemporary class culture (Miliband, 1989, p.207).  The 
communal class struggle is along these lines, irrelevant in the Post-Thatcherite era 
where an atomised class dealignment has taken effect. 
 
Social class dealignment refers to the declining propensity for members of given 
social classes to vote for their allegedly ‘natural’ class party; Labour (working-class 
public-service workers), and Conservative (middle-class private-sector employees) 
(Dunleavy & Husbands (1985)).  Such class dealignment in a broad sense arises with 
the traditional working-classes, particularly those in middle-management in the public 
sector, switching away from their stereotypical natural Labour leanings and voting 
Conservative.  It must be stated that the Conservatives have since the 1950s had a 
notable minority of their support coming from all sections of the communal working-
classes in urban locales (Nordlinger (1967); McKenzie & Silver (1968)).  This though 
became particularly prevalent during the Thatcherite 1980s with the introduction of 
‘Essex Man’ and ‘Essex Woman’, a once traditional Labour voter, who now with the 
rise of the atomised consumerist culture were drawn to the Conservatives through 
their emphasis on personal aspiration and enrichment.  This created a powerful 
coalition of the skilled working-class, and a small business class electorate, which 
Thatcher was ruthlessly effective in attracting, thus strengthening her electoral base. 
 
In response, bourgeois gentrifiers often coming from professional middle-class 
backgrounds, as well as working in such occupations themselves, have traditionally 
had, to some degree, distinctly left-leaning politics.  This was expressed in their 
support for the Labour Party, both in the Old Labour era, but particularly during the 
New Labour years.  In the Post New Labour age, such class dealignment has 
remained, but its terms of reference generally have altered, for instead of the party 
losing important sections of their traditional skilled working-class support to the 
Conservatives, they now face the prospect of losing potentially large sections of their 
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traditional unskilled working-class support to the right-wing populists of UKIP.  UKIP 
are a party in the past decade who have persuaded such people that Labour, 
particularly with their support of the European Union and the open-borders policy on 
immigration which comes with the promotion of such a policy, is no longer defending 
their class interests on broad economic grounds (Ford & Goodwin (2013)). 
 
In ‘any such eventuality’, as Butler & Savage (1995) note, ‘it would be important to 
ask not only how far class dealignment has occurred, but further how far it was the 
accompaniment of party dealignment’.  This perspective must be asked in regards 
New Labour on a policy basis, specifically in relation ‘to increase its appeal among 
this growing component of the electorate by moving rightwards – especially, say, in 
regard to redistributional issues and its relations with organised labour’ (Butler & 
Savage, 1995, p.324).  The debate about the so-called decline of class politics 
provides a good illustration of the long-term ‘loosening of the class structure’.  Class 
dealignment has ‘been advanced as an explanation for the recently poor performances 
of Labour at the polls’ (Joyce, 1995, p.62).  Labour during the Thatcher era declined 
because it was seen as an antiquated communal class-based party.  It did not appeal to 
the growing numbers of white-collar workers and failed to detect a ‘sea-change’ in the 
modern atomised attitudes of manual employees away from traditional class loyalties 
and concerns.  In truth, as examined by Heath et al. (1985), such perceptions to a point 
though, contrast with the prevailing polling data over the subject, which support the 
notion that conventional class dealignment remained more or less constant throughout 
the period where the atomised, dealignment effect was meant to have taken effect. 
 
The fact according to Joyce (1995), ‘that such variations as can be found to exist in 
the association between vote and class take the form of “trendless fluctuations” 
suggests that Labour’s electoral failures have a political rather than a sociological 
source’ (Joyce, 1995, p.63).  The party by being seen to be out of touch with 
mainstream working-class opinion over issues such as defence and tax, inevitably left 
themselves vulnerable to being seen as unattractive to the new atomised mind-set 
which had taken over from the communal post-war consensus (Hughes & Wintour 
(1990); Dell (2000)).  The scale of changes in such political and social structures, as 
documented by Jones (1994), and Stuart (2005), was a big factor in relation to the 
atomised transformation of the Labour Party from the mid-1980s onwards.  New 
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Labour, as Rubinstein (2000) stated, ‘was born out of the reform process initiated at 
that time by Neil Kinnock and John Smith.  The pragmatic post-war social democratic 
arguments for a mixed economy have given way, rightly or wrongly, to the 
celebration of competitive markets and private enterprise’ (Rubenstein, 2000, p.165).  
Rubinstein’s (2000) article argues an opinion that changes in policy during the New 
Labour era have been a natural reaction to intense mass economic and social changes 
such as the move from a communal to atomised social class ethos.  These ideas and 
perceptions are not excluded by our encapsulation of New Labour as ‘post-
Thatcherite’ (Cowell & Larkin (1999); Heppell & Theakston (2013)).  He thus states 
that to blame New Labour for adapting to; and following such a structure is 
misplaced.  Any change, as Cannadine (1998) states, ‘has been a rational response to 
new circumstances’.  Rational or not, the fact that shifts from Old to New, to Post 
New, ‘are in part a response to what are perceived to be changed circumstances in no 
way diminishes the importance of those shifts’ (Cannadine, 1998, p.182).  
Thatcherism, as noted by Needham (2003), and Clarke & Newman (2004), was in part 
about the ideological right responding to ‘new times’, and as Cannadine (1998) also 
states, by accepting such an atomisation ethos along with promoting a classless strand 
within it, ‘Blair’s (and prior to that, Kinnock’s and Smith’s) Labour Party continued 
her legacy’ (Cannadine, 1998, p.182). 
 
Thatcherism, according to Driver & Martell (2001), ‘just like the “post-war 
consensus”, was for that reason never as seamless and straightforward in broad 
political terms as often portrayed, but there was at the heart of Conservatism in the 
1980s a challenge to the values and policy instruments of the left.  The reform of the 
left accordingly grew out of the challenge from the right, not only in response to some 
new social context in which politics is conveniently left out, but it was an engagement, 
not a battle fought at a distance, and the new “new left” that emerged in the early 
1990s was, in part, shaped by these engagements with the forces of Thatcherism.  This 
is why Blair’s New Labour is different in class terms to their previous Old Labour 
predecessors’ (Driver & Martell, 2001, pp.49-50).  In this manner, New Labour, 
following the new atomised Thatcherite consensus, communicated the language of 
‘individual consumers’, rather than that of ‘collectivised workers’.  When Tony Blair 
attacked ‘a class system unequal and antiquated’, and when he lamented that ‘Britain 
is still, after all these years, a place where class counts’, he like Thatcher and the New 
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Right before him, is insisting that the ‘old hierarchy of deference’ remains, and that it 
has to be ‘dismantled’ (Cannadine, 1998, p.182). 
 
These academic debates as Crompton (2008) states, ‘relating to politics, it must be 
remembered, were taking place at a time in which (particularly in Britain), left-of-
centre political parties endured successive electoral defeats (the Conservative 
government was in power from 1979 to 1997).  The election of New Labour was a 
conscious attempt to distance itself from “old politics”, in particular the major 
representatives of “class politics” such as the trade unions.  Indeed, the transformation 
of Labour politics might itself be seen as yet another instance of the increasing lack of 
relevance of “class” in contemporary political debates’ (Crompton, 2008, p.88).  The 
Blairite revolution, as recorded by Beech & Lee (2008), and Minkin (2014), voiced an 
end to the party’s dependence on traditional class division for a new atomised reality 
and now the party must accept that they are deemed unprincipled, and to some extent 
confused over the issue. 
 
This class dealignment remained effective throughout the 1980s as the Thatcherite 
atomised agenda prevailed, and hence Labour’s subsequent electoral defeats should by 
and large be explained by a combination of policies borne out of a lack of 
understanding of the ever-changing atomised class structure (Heath et al. (1985); 
Crewe et al. (2000)).  Labour ‘performed poorly across the entire electorate, both 
within their traditional working-class base and beyond, because their policies, in 
particular on the economy and defence, were contrary to the views of the majority of 
the traditional working-classes.  The party, suffering from internal ideological 
divisions, lacked the coherence required to be seen as an alternative government to 
Thatcherite realism which was being portrayed in the economic sphere’ (Joyce, 1995, 
p.63).  The Labour Party simply had to find a new policy and image framework which 
would allow them to be highlighted as a relevant alternative to the Conservatives, the 
party had to reach a balance of transcending its accepted class base, as well as staying 
attractable to its hitherto loyal support. 
 
Several conclusions can thus be drawn from the discussion in this chapter particularly 
with respect to the role which class has played in regards support for the Labour Party, 
both at a British national and a localised perspective.  Previous empirical studies have 
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had very little focus on these research themes, hence such themes, which are at the 
heart of this study’s theoretical analysis will add meaningful academic research 
originality.  The ‘last two decades’, as Cannadine (1999) notes, ‘have witnessed a 
deep-seated rethinking of the economic, social, and political history of modern 
Britain, with the result that social class analysis and social class conflict, which had 
until recently seemed so central to it, have ceased to carry the conviction which they 
once did’. 
 
An ‘alternative interpretation’, as Cannadine (1999) continues, ‘has come to prevail 
that, although not always explicitly Thatcherite, certainly shared its assumption that 
class should be downplayed, disregarded, and denied’.  This follows the Bernaysian 
outlook, ‘that grouping people in confrontational collectives is a subversive rhetorical 
and political device rather than an expression or description of a more complex, 
integrated, and individualistic social reality’.  These ‘classes had no clear identity or a 
shared sense of themselves which can be easily understood and defined.  They were 
inert, inanimate social aggregations; they did not do, feel, or achieve anything 
collectively’ as they are borne out of the atomisation ethos.  They were not locked in 
perpetual struggle with other classes’, as was the natural connotation of the communal 
structure promoted firstly by Marx and later refined by Weber; and so, they neither 
made history nor changed its course.  These classes, as Cannadine (1999) further 
states, ‘also anticipated and resembled the groups into which all individuals are placed 
in a national census, which are used to provide a comprehensive picture of society 
based on income, wealth, occupation, and location’.  They also, according to 
Cannadine (1999), ‘lie behind the work of successive generations of sociologists, who 
continue to refine and debate the number and nature of such classes to be found in 
modern Britain’.  Equally, even accepting that such class atomisation has begun to 
prevail on a contemporary basis, such a communal class structure is still deemed 
relevant for assessing and evaluating political party affinity.  By the same token, as 
suggested by Rockmore (2002), and Schmidt (2013), and quoted by Cannadine 
(1999), ‘that even if the dictatorship of the proletariat had not yet arrived, as Marx had 
predicted, his insights still seemed to offer the best way of understanding the broad 
contours of the economic, social, and political development of modern Britain’. 
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What New Labour was originally aiming for in class terms, was a bid to break away 
from traditional ‘Labourism’, and to expand the image of the Labour Party through an 
atomised, classless brand.  By following such a structure, they were inadvertently 
complying with communal class theory, admittedly whilst supporting the new 
atomised capitalist consensus.  This is because it was a way of endeavouring to build a 
mass support of working-people, despite their atomised class perceptions, against a 
new ‘Elite’ class category within the cultural (Bourdieu (1984); Savage & Devine 
(2013)), or even atomised (Bernays (1955, and 1965)), contemporary British class 
structure.  Although nobody would ever articulate it in those terms publicly, what 
New Labour was in reality trying to achieve was to promote another form of economic 
class organisation, condensed within a modern cultural and atomised class tradition, 
but with a distinct ‘Labourist’ message (Heffernan (2000); Stephens (2004)).  On an 
economic level, this outlook promoted a Third Way political ethos which was neither 
state controlled nor free-market but instead structured in a communitarian fashion 
where people came together to organise their own localised, classless communities. 
 
The relevance this new atomised reality in relation to class and political affinity has 
led to a different focus on the role such a structure has played within the specific 
context of geographic locale, be it spatial or network.  Social class is a central tenant 
of social constructivism, leading to people being categorised along a range of class 
groupings.  Such categorisations, as expressed by Merrifield (2014), and Ford (2016), 
could lead to social stigmatisation where people are assessed because of the social 
class label they carry, which coincides with the specific geographic locality in which 
they reside, and potentially the political party they support. 
 
This chapter thus has outlined the broad relevance to Labour support that the rise of 
the Thatcherite New Right ethos has had in regards class perception and political 
affinity, where new atomised constructs clearly replaced previous communal 
certainties, both nationally and locally.  The next chapter, entitled ‘Methodology’ will 
discuss and endeavour to answer in greater detail how such themes thus far noted in 
this thesis will be tied together within a clear and suitable methodological structure. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter is arranged into six components, the first outlines the broad contours of 
the research design, that being purely qualitative research where the data collection is 
a combination of primary and secondary research.  This leads on to how such a 
framework is both ethically viable, as well as providing data that is distinctive and can 
be appropriately integrated to the phenomenon being investigated.  The relevance of 
the role of qualitative research is then ascertained, particularly that of the two types 
used in this study, Conceptual Analysis and Interviews, and through that the 
credibility of the data analysis procedures are evaluated, and the methodological 
reflexivity, and potential limitations and improvements are outlined. 
 
Research Design 
This thesis adopts a mixture of secondary and primary qualitative research techniques, 
the former being Conceptual Analysis of relevant sources, the latter being fifteen 
interviews with Labour Party, political representatives in North-West Cumbria.  This 
research is an empirical study which derives knowledge mainly from second-hand 
literary perspectives.  This is centred, as said by Warren & Karner (2009), and 
Sullivan (2011), within a classical phenomenological tradition, which correlates such 
empirical theory to the first-hand research analysis undertaken in the interviews.  This 
thesis then is an empirical study that pragmatically investigates the relevance of the 
research phenomena of class-based support for the Labour Party since the emergence 
of the New Labour brand, and the possible effects that such a brand may have had in 
regards the party’s support within a generalised locational basis, with a specific focus 
placed upon North-West Cumbria. 
 
No data, as Ferraris (1996), and Merleau-Ponty (2012) principally refer, speaks for 
itself; it is always dependant on having a particular kind of perspective stated through 
a devised research hypothesis.  This study thus analyses primary and secondary 
content, and similar to the works of Corbetta (2003), and Gallacher & Zahavi (2012), 
it correlates pertinent empirical theories and subsequent research themes to practical 
experience encountered by relevant research participants to evaluate a specific 
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research phenomenon.  Pragmatic structures such as this, as noted by Schoenbach 
(2015), and Bryant (2017), can be pivotal to the conduct of empirical research of a 
specific research phenomenon as it places focus upon the logical link between the two 
(primary and secondary) models of inquiry in regards this study.  The methodological 
choice in this thesis is determined by the research objective and influenced by 
practical constraints as well; such issues had to follow clear research ethical guidelines 
as noted below. 
 
Research Ethics 
Since this research involved formal interaction with human participants, clear ethical 
issues were raised due to the sensitive nature of the topic of social class and political 
party support.  Both the Conceptual Analysis and Interview research methods format 
accordingly followed the officially set-out ethical procedure of Lancaster University 
along with, on a wider academic scale, the ethical research guidelines outlined by the 
British Sociological Association on their website. 
 
The research ethics nucleus was set within the broad conditions connected to social 
science qualitative research, the analysis of which is outlined below: 
 
Social benefits versus the harm of research 
The social benefits of this research greatly outweigh the negatives.  Convenience 
sampling was employed in this stage, whereby only participants who were 
conveniently available and willing to participate in the study were recruited.  The 
Interview questions asked participants in a very light, polite, and open manner, their 
opinions over one of the most widely regarded socio-political topics of contemporary 
times, that of the connection between social class, voting behaviour, and the role and 
changing nature of political party marketing within a localised context. 
 
The research methods highlighted a range of views from representatives within the 
Labour Party in North-West Cumbria, which may or may not affect their own, or the 
party’s future perspective over the issue.  The harm caused by this type of research is 
minimal, for even if the participants felt uncomfortable discussing certain questions or 
subjects, they could have elected, if they so wished, to by-pass any such areas. 
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Veracity 
The Interview questions and the Conceptual Analysis themes were clear and concise, 
and not misleading in any way.  All of the themes were outlined in an ethical sheet, 
which also stated my personal details, academic involvement, and the overall purpose 
of both the primary and secondary qualitative research conducted. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
The topic of social class and voting behaviour can be very sensitive, especially if the 
questions are concentrated within the party in which the participants have an active 
involvement.  The participants’ privacy and confidentiality were preserved to a great 
extent as they did not have to state any of their personal details, consequently their 
personal profile remained completely confidential. 
 
Informed Consent 
Participation in the research study was optional; whether the participants gave 
informed consent was determined on whether or not they chose to partake in the 
Interview process. 
 
Instrument Development 
The scripts for the interviews were developed on information gleaned from the 
literature review (see Chapters II, and III).  The scripts, after consultation with the 
academic supervisory team, were reviewed; similarly, a script for introducing 
individual interviews and interview protocol were developed and reviewed by the 
same peer group.  These reviewers evaluated whether the questions were 
understandable, likely to elicit relevant responses, and logically flowed from one 
theme to another.  During the theoretical research for instance, notes were taken of 
how smoothly words flowed during questioning and whether participants appeared 
confused when asked certain questions.  Based on such research, some questions were 
rephrased to be more conversational before conducting the interview process.  In 
addition, to elicit explanations from the participants, the questions, like those noted by 
Kvale (2008), and Teddlie & Tashakkori (2009), were structured to be open-ended.  
They progressed from simple (opening questions) towards complex (transition and 
key questions) and back towards simple (ending questions). 
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Study Setting  
The interviews were conducted either in a room located in the University Library or 
inside interviewees’ offices, venues that had minimal distractions and were convenient 
to the interviewees.  The conference room was furnished with comfortable chairs and 
a table that enabled the moderator to see the participant who was being interviewed.  
Following ethical guidelines, the interview sessions lasted between forty minutes to 
two hours.  Immediately after each session, a reflective exercise was undertaken 
which primarily involved re-writing the notes to ensure that the information collected 
were accurate representations of the recorded responses.  Each interview was then 
transcribed word-for-word. 
 
Moderator and Note-Taking  
Following on from the notion that ‘subjects [participants] tend to disclose more about 
themselves to people who resemble them in various ways than people who differ from 
them’ (Jourard, 1964, p.15), efforts were made to ensure that the moderator was an 
individual with whom the participants were likely to feel comfortable.  During each 
interview session, there was a brief explanation of the main purpose of the study, as 
well as an emphasis on the importance for participation through stating that no 
anticipated risks were associated with participation in the study.  It was important on a 
practical basis, to have eye-contact with a shy respondent and occasionally call this 
person by their pre-determined interview pseudonym (e.g. participant 1), so as to 
encourage the person’s contribution to the discussion.  Whenever a participant 
provided a spontaneous response before a question was asked, the response was 
accepted as presented so long as it covered the topic sufficiently. 
 
The interview structure, as articulated by Guest & Namey (2012), and Harding (2013), 
in staying ethically consistent, adhered to the questioning route as far as possible.  
This meant, for instance, not asking leading questions but allowing for situational 
variations depending on the needs of each participant who were probed reasonably 
whenever it was believed that they had additional information to offer.  By the same 
token, when a vague comment was given, the interviewee would be asked, ‘please, 
would you explain what you mean’ or if a participant nodded in agreement with a 
statement or question which was presented to them, then they would be encouraged to 
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tell more as the non-verbal behaviours were noted as a supplement to the verbal 
responses provided. 
 
Further Ethical Considerations  
The participants were forewarned as to the nature of the study, but only in broad 
terms, that being the core themes and how they link with each other.  This was 
outlined in the ethics sheet which was sent out to every participant prior to the 
interview taking place.  There was no specific indication given in such 
correspondence to any potential theorist which may have arisen, therefore any 
mentioning of any theorists in relation to any theme (e.g. Mike Savage – The Great 
British Class Survey (2013)), was done solely by the participants themselves.  There 
though naturally arises that by agreeing to undertake such a process, that it could be 
assumed that the participant’s knowledge of the subject in question would be to of a 
reasonably high standard.  Their responses thus would potentially be interpreted to 
some extent, to be of a more informed nature, than that of a member of the general 
public, whose interest in the area being explored would most likely not be as great. 
 
Participants were also asked to sign an informed consent form, which described the 
purpose of the study and provided background information.  Also, with the consent of 
the participants, each session was digitally tape-recorded and transcribed to ensure no 
response was omitted.  Accepting that anonymity is critical for promoting honest 
disclosures, participants were assigned numerical pseudonyms and hence became 
known as Participant (and their respective number, which was decided upon by the 
date order in which their interview occurred).  On a general level, both the Conceptual 
Analysis and Interview research methods format followed the officially set-out 
aforementioned ethical procedure of Lancaster University along with, on a wider 
academic scale, the ethical research guidelines outlined by the British Sociological 
Association (2015), on their website. 
 
The Validity of the Qualitative Methods Approach  
The concept of validity is another important criterion of a good piece of ethically 
acclaimed research.  Validity serves the purpose of checking on the quality of the data 
and the results.  There are commonly two key types of validity both of which are used 
in a qualitative study of this kind.  One is external validity that, as noted by Zahavi 
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(2012), and Bednarek-Gilland (2015), referred to the extent to which the findings of a 
particular study can be generalised across populations, contexts, and time.  A further 
type of validity is internal validity, which is conceptualised in relation to the degree to 
which the researcher is confident about the conclusion/inferences of the causal 
relationship between themes and events. 
 
Such a methodological choice is also influenced by practical considerations (e.g. 
problem with data availability) as this methodological design allows the two types of 
data to integrate at all stages of the thesis, which in this manner enhanced the validity 
of the overall study.  By doing so, as advocated by Morse (1993), and Atkinson et al. 
(2003), it is possible to achieve consistency in some findings, which accordingly 
increases the external validity of the overall research.  It should be noted that, even 
though this study aimed to enhance external validity by combining primary and 
secondary qualitative methods, such generalisation, as with all research of this kind, is 
still a challenge (Gee (1995); Wiles (2012)).  Achieving high internal validity, as 
noted by Bernard & Ryan (2007), and Gallagher (2008), allowed the researcher to be 
confident that the categories, relationships, and interpretations that have been 
generated, are actually true.  The primary data was analysed in accordance with the 
secondary coding procedure (i.e. using techniques such as open coding, axial coding, 
and selective coding), and this provided proper explanations about how theory was 
built. 
 
In this study, the interviews were recorded with the participants’ permission, where 
every one of the interviews was audio-recorded and were then transcribed carefully 
with a view to provide a basis for reliable evaluation.  The accuracy of the data was 
checked by sending the transcripts or notes of the interviews back to the participants 
and getting their feedback.  Effort was then made during the data collection process to 
reduce errors and bias, for example, different types of questions, such as main 
questions, follow-up questions, and probing questions, were asked to ensure the 
consistency of answers from interviewees.  Probing questions, as Sapsford & Jupp 
(2006), and McQuail (2010), is a powerful technique to reduce threats to reliability 
and validity in terms of allowing the research to accommodate some of the problems 
caused by the complexities and limitations of the human mind.  Attempts were therein 
also made to avoid leading questions and other potential introduction of bias. 
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Theoretical and Practical Qualitative Methods Research Design - 
Intersectionality and Integration of Data 
Although there are similarities in the process, i.e. data preparation, data exploration, 
data analysis, representation, and data validation in qualitative methods research, the 
analysis, as Mohanty (1989), and Boyatzis (1998) recorded, is dependent on the 
design of the study.  This study used explanatory designs which involved two major 
phases of data collection, the purpose being to analyse the data in a clear order so that 
the first database informs the second.  Analysing data this way, as Glaser (1992), and 
Creswell (1998) observed, highlighted the importance of both study phases and both 
data sets, which as a consequence enabled the primary and secondary stages to be 
broadly supportive of each other as they are intrinsically linked to the success of the 
study.  These issues of collecting, analysing, interpreting, and reporting data are 
important to every aspect of a qualitative methods study, and hence need to be 
carefully taken into account at the research design stage (Yates (2004); Bold (2011)).  
Such issues include: the direction of the data collection and investigation, the priority 
or weight given to the primary and secondary research stages, and the phases in the 
research process at which these stages are connected and the results are integrated.  In 
this section, the decision-making process of this study will be addressed in light of 
these issues, namely, timing decision, weighting decision, and mixing decision. 
 
The mixing, timing, and weighting of this study 
The mixing (or integration) decision, as a procedural consideration for a qualitative 
methods research design, refers to how the primary and secondary data relate to each 
other.  Without explicitly relating to either of the two datasets, a study will, as 
Sapsford & Jupp (2006), and Emmel (2013) remarked, simply be a collection of 
multiple methods rather than a real, and strong qualitative methods design, even if it 
includes both primary and secondary data.  In this thesis, primary and secondary data 
are integrated not only at the stage of results reporting, but also during the processes 
of data collection and data analysis so as to maximise the integration of the two data 
sets (Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2003); Boeije (2009)).  During the data collection period, 
the data was collected through two research dimensions, the first being secondary 
research which comprised of a substantial Conceptual Analysis of a range of theorists 
whose writings were deemed to be connected to the study’s question. 
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The second was as stated, by generating primary research through interviewing the 
Allerdale and Carlisle Labour Party political representatives, who very kindly agreed 
to be interview participants.  The basic data analysis procedure in this study involved 
conducting separate data analyses for each of the primary and secondary data via 
relating one to the other with the purpose of triangulation and embedding.  The 
integration of findings, as Potter (1996), and Gubrium & Holstein (1997) state, 
enables empirical results from one approach to complement the other.  The integration 
of two datasets, as Feldman (1994), and Flick (2002) note, though achieves evidence 
triangulation in some important findings which enhanced the validity of the overall 
research.  The integration of such primary and secondary empirical results will be 
discussed in detail in Chapters V, and VI. 
 
The timing and weighting methodological elements are acutely important factors to 
consider in a study design like this which in short is intersectionality-informed 
qualitative methods research which is evaluated in concurrent sequences.  This thesis’ 
methodological design is thus termed as a ‘sequential study’, for it is, as remarked by 
Warren & Karner (2009), and Saven-Baden & Major (2010), a study where both the 
primary and secondary data are collected and explored over the period of time in two 
distinct phases.  It is noted by Alasuutari (1995), and Gair & van Luyn (2016), that the 
sequential design is more appropriate for a qualitative methods study of this kind in 
which the purpose is to take advantage of text interpretation or embedding results.  In 
such a qualitative design, the data analysis, and interpretation of results of primary and 
secondary studies also occur approximately at the same time, where they can interact 
with each other whenever there is a need (Gibson & Brown (2009); Holliday (2016)). 
 
Qualitative methods research is such a procedure that not only collects and analyses 
two types of data, but also mixes or integrates them together (Dooley (2000); 
Silverman (2001)).  The weighting or priority that is given to primary and secondary 
data in a study such as this is an important factor as it sets the broad tone of both its 
design, and its subsequent analytical framework.  The data collection and analysis 
processes might depend upon a range of considerations, including as Minichiello et al. 
(1996), and Corti (2004) assert, the researcher’s perspective, the research purposes 
and questions, and also some practical issues.  In regards this thesis, equal weighting 
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was given to both the theoretical and practical studies.  This is because each one 
positively developed the other, for the conceptual analysis needed the interviews to 
strengthen its core conclusions via practical output, whilst the interviews needed the 
conceptual analysis as it was that which would define the themes and thus generate the 
broad structure of the questions asked of the research participants. 
 
Qualitative methods also, as noted by Goodyear et al. (2014), and Blatter et al. (2016), 
in regards the concept of the case study, are said to be powerful tools when the 
phenomenon is like that which is being studied in this thesis, that being, highly 
complex, with numerous themes and theorists comprising such a research 
phenomenon.  In such a situation, both qualitative studies were important in terms of 
understanding the phenomenon as the conceptual analysis derived the core themes 
which were central to the phenomenon and the interviews then used the content of 
such analysis to derive first-hand perspectives from a localised source. 
 
In addition to timing and weighting, it is more important, as Tieszan (2005), and 
Lichtman (2013) state, to make the decision about at which stage (s) the primary and 
secondary phases are connected and the results are integrated.  Integration, as 
Mohanty (1989), and Denzin & Lincoln (2000, 2005, and 2012), emphasise, is a key 
challenge in qualitative methods research such as this.  This research did not seek to 
quantify the secondary information, but rather endeavoured to integrate such forms of 
data through the process of analysis and interpretation.  Such data was then prioritised 
into specific thematic categories which were then used as a broad guide to be 
developed into relevant and concise interview questions. 
 
This inclusion of the interviews was crucial on an evaluative level, as it gave the 
participants a voice about their experiences, this was important as the relevance of the 
subject being explored and its specific localised factors are highly subjective.  It is 
clear in the literature that although there will be similar experiences in regards a 
specific Labour Party political representative, either in Allerdale or Carlisle, be it 
because of their specific ideological and/or personal background, there is no 
‘blueprint’ for these participants to denote how they must act or not act vis-à-vis their 
specific verbal output. 
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Thematic Categories - Data Collection and Analysis 
Conceptual Analysis 
Despite such methodological dependability and credibility, the research structure 
purported in this study firstly needed a theoretical backbone.  This was achieved by 
analysing and evaluating relevant theorists whose broad works are centred via the 
three research themes at the heart of the study.  The research structure thus 
appropriately followed a three phase ‘spiral model’ of knowledge construction (De 
Laine (2000); Moran (2005)). 
 
The first part of this is conducted through a thematic explorative examination of 
appropriate texts and authors, some of which have been discussed in Chapters II, and 
III.  This is supplemented by archival electoral documentation of the Labour Party’s 
electoral performance in both Allerdale and Carlisle, which is based in the Cumbria 
Public Library.  Analysis of data of this kind was vital as it brought a statistical 
perspective on Labour’s broad support in North-West Cumbria; a perspective which if 
not explored, would have weakened the analysis. 
 
Following on from such analysis, the study examined the relevance that the issue of 
social class has historically played on the Labour Party’s general foundation and 
contemporary marketing revolution and electoral support.  If this were not 
investigated then the theoretical basis of the classless New Labour brand would not be 
necessarily understood particularly within a localised context.  On a structural basis, 
Conceptual Analysis, as said by Wolcott (1994), and Saldana (2011), is an important 
skill in historical interpretation as it is not a mere summary or description of what 
happened, but rather an exploration of the motivation, intent, and purpose of a 
document within a particular historical context. 
 
Conceptual Analysis is suited to this study as it is about trying to identify meaningful 
categories or themes in a body of data.  By looking at the text, as Carter (1993), and 
Marshall & Rossman (2015) state, the researcher asks whether specific research 
themes, the analysis of which is determined via the workings of a number of relevant 
theorists, can validate a broad research phenomenon.  Conceptual Analysis being 
purely qualitative in nature, as commented by Butler-Kisber (2010), and Berg & Lune 
(2011), does not offer quantifiable answers to issues raised within such social science 
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research, but it does offer a clear knowledge of the specific thematic categories and 
also how such categories link with each other so as to determine the general relevance 
of the research phenomenon being explored (Cook (1990); Williams (1992)).  
Conceptual Analysis, thus like the broad content in this thesis, does not afford fixed 
quantitative solutions, but instead offers an insight based on qualitative analysis and 
evaluation (Miller & Dingwall (1997); Bazeley (2013)). 
 
The legitimacy of this type of research is consequently determined on the 
interpretation of the research themes, the key theorists, and how they in the main, 
interrelate with each other.  Even the most effective academic arguments, as 
emphasised by Pierce (2008), and McNabb (2009), are reliant on such qualitative 
considerations and interpretations.   Expressed in today’s more pointed vocabulary, 
Conceptual Analysis, as Gauker (2003), and Ravitch (2015) summarised, is a 
deconstructive reading and interpretative evaluation of a text. 
 
Interviews 
In ‘qualitative research like that undertaken within this thesis, the most common 
interviews following on from such conceptual analysis of texts are the semi-structured 
and unstructured ones; and more commonly those that comply fully with the standards 
and principles of qualitative research’ (Cohen & Crabtree (2006)).  The 
methodological limitations and procedural essentials of qualitative interviewing 
associated with this type of research are briefly listed. 
 
It firstly, as noted by Sarantakos (2005), ‘provides a “reflexivity”; qualitative 
interviewing employs methods and a process of assessment in which to reflect upon 
the subjective approach to the world; and take into consideration the implications’ of 
the knowledge the participants have generated through their experience of Labour 
politics in North-West Cumbria.  This leads on to the ‘primacy of the respondent’; the 
respondents are experts who provide valuable information (Crystal (1992); Salkie 
(1995)). 
 
There is an ‘absence of standardisation; qualitative interviews are unstandardised 
interviews, allowing freedom to respondents to express their beliefs without external 
limitations.  This allows for a greater level of flexibility; as the qualitative interviews 
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ascertain aspects of personal experience as displayed in everyday life.  Finally, the 
development from this is the theory of “explication”’ (Sarantakos, 2005, p.270).  This 
is where the ‘findings emerge through the study and are interpreted during the process 
of interviewing.  These methodological and technical aspects show that qualitative 
interviews are far from being a soft methodological option or an easy form of 
research.  On the contrary, they require more competence on the part of the 
interviewer and higher ability on the part of the respondent to verbalise views, 
opinions, and ideas’ (Sarantakos, 2005, p.271). 
 
Semi-structured interviewing, is best used when going out into the research field to 
collect data.  The semi-structured interview by its simple format, in general terms, as 
noted by Olson (2011), and Aurini et al. (2016), provides a clear research framework 
for interviewers and thus provides reliable, comparable qualitative data.  Semi-
structured interviews, as stated by Schostak (2005), and Alvesson (2010), are 
frequently led by observation and unstructured interviewing.  This enables 
the researcher to advance a clear grasp of the matter being studied, necessary for 
progressing with meaningful semi-structured questions (Biesta & Burbules (2003); 
Heaton (2004)).  The insertion of such flexible questions afforded the opportunity for 
classifying distinct ways of appreciating and understanding the issue at hand 
(McCracken (1988); Roulston (2010)).  ‘Many researchers like to use semi-structured 
interviews because questions can be prepared ahead of time which allows for a greater 
level of preparation which potentially could strengthen their competence during the 
interview’ (Cohen & Crabtree (2006)). 
 
Semi-structured interviews, as identified by Holstein & Gubrium (1995), and King & 
Horrocks (2010), also allowed informants the freedom to express their opinions in 
their own terms.  In the second phase of the study, the collection of the primary data, 
as generally alluded to by Bernard (1988), and Rubin & Rubin (2011), had a clearly 
achieved aim, which was to help explain the research hypothesis and subsequent 
documentary analysis in greater depth.  The interviews compared the differing or 
similar stances held over the matter of social class and contemporary Labour support 
by Labour Party political representatives in North-West Cumbria, and in this manner 
evaluated the relevance of locational area, be it urban or rural, to such a research 
phenomenon. 
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Interview Framework 
The participants were chosen because they were local Labour representatives in 
North-West Cumbria in the districts of Allerdale and Carlisle, accordingly they would 
be acutely appropriate to offer a specific view from a localised perspective.  From a 
methodological perspective, the freedom of the qualitative interview procedure, as 
Josselson (2013), and Weising (2016) emphasise, allowed the interviewees the scope 
to outline their thoughts in a clear and substantial manner, which strengthened the 
potential of the output generated from such a process.  Persons meeting the inclusion 
criteria were invited to contact me through email and/or telephone correspondence.  
On making contact, an information package on the study was made available and 
potential participants were given an opportunity to ask questions.  Following this, if 
potential participants wished to proceed, informed consent was gained, and 
arrangements to participate in the study were negotiated. 
 
An interview framework of this kind, as noted by Galletta (2013), and Josselson 
(2013), should be numerically concise as too large a group can dilute the key findings 
central to the phenomenon being analysed, and the data must also be protected in a 
safe location.  The ideal broad structure for interviews investigating a specific 
phenomenon of this kind is that the participants should be representative of any 
potential geographic factors being studied (Moustakas (1994); Moran (2000)).  The 
interviews, to be most productive also, according to Oppenheim (1992), and Mann 
(2016), must take place in a safe and comfortable location as such conditions leads to 
the interviewees feeling more receptive to the questions being asked of them.  The 
study’s interview framework as noted below followed such guidelines. 
 
Interview Framework 
Design 
15 Semi-Structured interviews in total were undertaken and completed, the duration of 
which ranged between 30 and 120 minutes; 
The interviews were all digitally taped and transcribed, and like the Conceptual 
Analysis concept, the findings were stored, analysed, evaluated, and outlined, within 
the study’s overall concluding findings and; 
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All of the interviews took place at the University of Cumbria, Fusehill Street Campus, 
Fusehill Street, CARLISLE, CA1 2HH, or if not convenient to the interviewee then at 
a suitable location of his/her choosing. 
 
Participants 
15 Labour Party, political representatives were recruited from North-West Cumbria: 6 
from Allerdale, 9 from Carlisle; Age-Group (18-70); 
There was no numerical specificity in regards the sex, race, religion, or sexual 
orientation, of the interviewees, but there was an aim to have a similar number of 
interviewees who either represented and/or had first-hand knowledge of the two 
respective North-West Cumbrian districts and; 
The interview participants were recruited via email/phone contact from the local 
Labour Party offices in Allerdale and Carlisle. 
 
Inclusion Criteria  
The participants were all Labour Party, political representatives from North-West 
Cumbria – this was crucial as this enabled the three themes ‘Class/Identity’, ‘(Labour) 
Party’, and ‘Geography (North-West Cumbria)’, to be evaluated from a first-hand 
perspective in a specific context and; 
The participants were all over the age of 18 years, who willingly consented to the 
study, and were proficient in spoken and written English – this was crucial as it meant 
that they were all adults and could outline their views verbally in a coherent manner, 
as well as complete the relevant ethical forms, the titles of which are outlined below. 
 
As part of the ethics code of practice outlined by Lancaster University, each 
participant was sent the following three documents prior to their taking part in the 
Interview process: 
‘Research Application Form (Humans) Research Students’ (summarising the 
theoretical nature of the study); 
‘Ethics Participant Information Sheet Good Practice’ (outlining the practical nature of 
the study) and; 
‘Research Ethics Participant Consent Form Good Practice’, (asking for their 
permission to undertake such practical research of this kind – this document had to be 
completed by the individual participant before the interview could be undertaken). 
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*It was stated in such correspondence that the researcher had never been a member of 
the Labour Party or any other political party, thus supporting my personal position of 
political neutrality.  Such political neutrality was required so as to give the participants 
the assurance that the interpretation of the research data was not going to be biased 
either way, by any past or present personal political party affiliations. 
 
Exclusion Criteria 
Members of political parties and/or organisations which were not that of the Labour 
Party – this is because research of this kind solely centred upon the Labour Party, and 
so the perspectives deemed most relevant for the initial analysis and then subsequent 
evaluation were naturally most appropriate from representatives of that political party, 
and no other and; 
Individuals who had not been Labour Party, political representatives in either of the 
districts of Allerdale or Carlisle were excluded from the study – this is because this 
research as well as defining the research phenomenon from a broad generalised 
perspective, does still have a localised focus on a specific locale, that being North-
West Cumbria.  It thus seems most appropriate under such conditions that all the 
participants taking part in this study should represent Labour in that particular area. 
 
In-depth Interviews  
The reason for conducting semi structured in-depth interviews in this study was that 
they best allowed for an open approach to interviewing in relation to a subject such as 
social class or political party affinity, which can be deemed sensitive, and possibly to 
some extent, emotive.  They were a means of communicating and gathering 
information that had a focus; yet was less structured and intimidating than formal 
structured approaches of interviewing.  In this study, guided by condensed content 
derived from the secondary data, the primary interviews enabled a greater 
understanding of important issues which related to the broad topic in question.  
Equally, semi-structured interviews, generically speaking, as pronounced by Burawoy 
(2009), and Brinkmann (2013), were a simple, efficient, and practical means of 
collecting data.  This allowed for the opportunity to probe and discuss in an 
appropriate manner, areas, such as generic definition of class, and Labour’s position in 
regards the gradual atomisation of contemporary political, class discourse. 
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The validity and reliability of the interviews could be questioned, this occurs chiefly 
because semi-structured interviews, as noted by Hammersley (2008), and Galletta 
(2013), have a high validity as they allow the participant to talk in detail and can 
explain meanings behind actions with little or no input from the interviewer.  It has 
also been argued, such as for instance by Packer (2010), and Bayne & Montague 
(2011), that semi-structured interviews have low validity because the researcher has 
no way of knowing if the participant is being genuine.  The participant thus has the 
opportunity to consciously devise a response or unconsciously respond with the 
answer they feel the interviewer expects from them.  Even if accepting these standard 
limitations, the positives of undertaking this type of methodology, as detailed by 
Holstein & Gubrium (1995), and Edwards & Holland (2013), outweighed any such 
negatives.  A key strength for instance, of the semi-structured interview process in this 
study is that the participant had the opportunity to reflect and rationalise his or her 
actions on a personal level (Wengraf (2001); Bryman (2008)).  In that way, this study 
through the strong explanatory nature of the detailed first-hand interviews provided 
additional depth to the subject matter, and further explained the data collected in the 
primary phase of the study.  This allowed for the effective mixing of both primary and 
secondary data sets and ensured that a detailed exploration of the phenomenon was 
undertaken through an appropriate research criterion, the details of which are stated 
underneath. 
 
Data Analysis Procedures  
The individual interviews in this study, as alluded to earlier in the Ethics section of 
this chapter, were audio taped and transcribed.  Statements unrelated to the question 
were deleted to obtain an edited version of the transcript, which was then subjected to 
an in-depth analytical process.  This was achieved by reading the transcripts in their 
entirety and taking note of relevant statements, quotes, words, or key concepts cited. 
 
Credibility and Dependability of Qualitative Results  
The following techniques were employed to enhance credibility of the results of the 
qualitative component: method triangulation, data triangulation, and investigator 
triangulation.  These forms of triangulations, such as that broadly denoted by Churton 
& Brown (2009), and Sharpe (2013), in accordance with the qualitative theoretical 
framework, were expected to yield convergence and/or contradictions.  This thereby 
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enabled a clear and accurate construction of explanations of the research phenomenon, 
an example of this is by asking the participants the same questions, centred through 
the same themes in the same order.  This extensive documentation of records and data 
as noted in ethics, was kept which enabled one to undertake constant comparison of 
relevant statements, and emergent themes during the data analysis.  These records 
constituted authentic evidence of activities undertaken by myself and are available, 
upon request, to the Dissertation Committee, then, for the audit trail to be 
strengthened, forms of debriefings were executed.  This was achieved primarily in 
accordance with the research supervision team where frequent meetings were 
scheduled to discuss the progress of the study.  During such discourse, issues about 
research design, logistics of the interview sessions, and other critical questions related 
to preliminary findings were addressed.  Research supervisors were also given a 
chance to critique the research design, data collection procedures, data analysis 
procedures, and interpretations as feedback was provided at various points in the 
research process by the academic supervisory team. 
 
Practical Considerations 
Data for the study was collected from June 2015 until February 2016.  Initial email 
and telephone correspondence included an outline of the research being undertaken 
and why, the type and length of research being studied as well as outlining the thesis’ 
general structure.  The inclusion/exclusion criteria, as hitherto stated in the ethics 
section, that was most appropriate for the development of the philosophical approach 
within the research design were also addressed at this point to ensure participants were 
eligible to take part in such research prior to any meetings being arranged.  Accepting 
it is often difficult for professional people with a busy schedule to travel long 
distances, arrangements were then made with participants willing to participate and 
who met the criteria, to meet either at their home or an agreed upon place.  Email 
correspondence confirming these arrangements was sent to all participants prior to the 
Interview being undertaken. 
 
Procedure of qualitative data collection 
The research design for case studies can come from different sources of evidence, 
including documents, archival records, interviews, etc.  Qualitative interviews, as 
asserted by Jackson & Mazzei (2011), and Silverman (2016), provided opportunities 
102 | P a g e  
 
for exploring the core themes in depth.  It is very suitable for this study on broad 
philosophical terms, as it endeavoured to get rich and detailed information about 
intangibles from the perspectives of individuals with first-hand experience of the 
Labour Party in North-West Cumbria.  Qualitative interview questions can be either 
unstructured or semi-structured; in this study, interview questions were designed to be 
semi-structured, because with the research looking at multiple themes, such a design 
was with its greater degree of flexibility, deemed more appropriate in terms of 
ensuring ‘cross-theme comparability’ than that of the unstructured interview. 
 
The procedure of interview data collection followed interview instruments suggested 
by previous researchers and authors (e.g. Featherman & Hauser (1978); Giroux 
(1992)), which included targeting potential interviewees.  It is not easy to discern in 
advance how much useful information the interviewee can provide, so the best the 
interviewer can do is to choose a person who is most appropriate, that being they 
should be experienced and knowledgeable in the area that is being studied.  
Experienced interviewees, as acknowledged by Van Manen (2014), and Paley (2016), 
can make the interview results more convincing, and interviewees who are 
knowledgeable about the research problem have the potential to provide useful 
information that one needs.  Interviewing individuals from a variety of perspectives 
additionally provides the potential to enhance the credibility of findings and hence 
strengthen the research design undertaken (Gauld & Shotter (1977); Chirban (1996)).  
In this manner, by following the three-pronged research theme (‘Class/Identity’, 
‘(Labour) Party’, and ‘Geography (North-West Cumbria)’), and interviewing two sets 
of participants, namely, Labour Party, political representatives in both Allerdale and 
Carlisle, a comprehensive picture of relevant themes at the heart of the research study 
was provided. 
 
In a general sense, Strauss & Corbin (1998), and Smith et al. (2005), advocate, that 
samples in phenomenological theory were better to be drawn in terms of identifying as 
much variation in types as possible.  Phenomenological theory technique was 
employed as the broad philosophical approach in this study to analyse case data, 
because the study intended to examine different conditions (research themes, later 
broken down into intra-thematic constructs), under which the phenomenon occurred 
and was subsequently analysed.  Apart from reemphasising the guarantee of 
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confidentiality and privacy promised through ethics, each targeted interviewee was 
also given the promise that the confidential transcript of interview would be sent to the 
interviewee to check and any information that they did not wish to be revealed would 
be removed.  The confidential case data would be used in this thesis only with the 
interviewee’s agreement.  Previous researchers in this field suggest that it is important 
for interviewers to, as Van Manen (1990), and Miles et al. (2013) maintained, have 
some prior knowledge about interviewees and their circumstances.  Before each 
interview was conducted, a broad understanding was attained in regards the 
participant’s political history.  This was achieved by collecting relevant information 
about the interviewee in question via for instance an on-line search of their specific 
political position, role, and respective interests.  Such research led to a greater 
knowledge of their general professional profile, which enabled them to feel that their 
own perspective was being respected in advance of the interview taking place.  On a 
generic level, such a strategy can help the researcher to obtain trust from the 
interviewee. 
 
At the beginning of each interview, effort was made to build trust and provide a 
comfortable atmosphere throughout the interview.  The interviews were normally 
opened by a brief introduction of the area of study, the purpose of this research, and 
how the information would be used.  Above all, as ethical procedures ascertained, 
emphasis was placed upon the perception that there was no right or wrong answer for 
each question, as the focus of interest was for the most part focussed within the 
interviewees’ own opinions and experience.  During the interview process following 
the general ethos, as noted by Sandywell (1996), and Becker (1998), different types of 
questions were asked to enhance the research design, such as main questions, follow-
up questions, and probing questions.  An interview guide containing a list of main 
questions was used to make sure that the important issues could be thoroughly 
examined in each interview, and also to enhance consistency across all interviews.  
The questions being semi-structured were designed to be expansive enough, with the 
purpose of encouraging interviewees to talk freely and openly about their experiences, 
perceptions, and understanding.  The interview guide though was used flexibly, 
chiefly to decide the number and the sequence of the main questions asked. 
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The second type of questions frequently used were the follow-up questions.  The main 
role in the interview process was to listen and to follow what the interviewee had said 
and then to explore the relevant content.  Follow-up questions, as avowed by Smith & 
Thomasson (2005), and Sandelowski et al. (2009), were crucial for obtaining depth 
and detail, and did help in obtaining more nuanced answers.  During the process of 
each interview, follow-up questions like for instance ‘could you expand on that 
original answer’, were routinely asked to pursue new ideas and to encourage the 
interviewee to elaborate on important themes.  If this could be achieved, then this 
naturally would lead to a greater degree of thought and quality in regards their 
individual output. 
 
This strategy was used on many occasions, such as when the participant did not 
prepare the main questions particularly well or when the interviewee appeared to be 
less conversable, follow-up questions were especially important in achieving a 
successful interview.  There was an attempt as well to undertake a preliminary 
analysis of each case interview immediately after execution to understand what issues 
were important and needed to be further explored so as to embolden the customary 
research structure.  This was helpful to formulate follow-up questions in the 
subsequent interviews with other interviewees.  The research was also enhanced by 
the interviewer’s behaviour, such as listening carefully as well as showing interest and 
agreement to what the interviewee said which tended to be helpful in further probing 
the interviewee’s answers.  It was of greater interest on a personal level to talk to 
participants who showed an enthusiastic attitude towards the subject being 
investigated.  They also prioritised their discourse principally on a national British 
perspective and secondly on a localised context which was consistent with the general 
analytical structure at the heart of this thesis. 
 
Methodological Reflexivity 
Although it is clear that the combination of Conceptual Analysis and Interviews was 
the most suitable methodology, it must also be stated that two other research 
techniques, Focus Groups and Surveys, were also considered prior to the interviews 
taking place.  Focus Groups were contemplated at the beginning of the thesis process, 
mainly because they could potentially provide an in-depth discussion.  This broad 
range of information thus could open up opportunities to explore the views, 
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experiences, beliefs, and motivations of individual participants to the phenomenon 
being researched.  After consideration with my supervisory team, this method though 
was not deemed appropriate for this study as it was thought that notwithstanding such 
advantages, the content being generated from such broad perspectives would have 
been difficult to control and more importantly keep streamlined and relevant to the 
core content of the thesis’ themes and questions.  The second reason why focus groups 
were not appropriate for this type of research was the concern over the general validity 
of the content being stated.  This limitation, although broadly subjective, arises 
because individuals are more likely to feel intimidated by being surrounded by other 
people in a confined space (Lofland & Lofland (1984); Oppenheim (1992)).  They 
thus are accordingly less likely to give their legitimate views than if they were taking 
part in a one-to-one interview environment, where by being the sole focus of attention, 
they can deliver their views in a more private and relaxed setting, and by this means, 
enhance the validity of the output being researched (Saldana (2011); Richards (2014)). 
 
In regards the possible adoption of the Survey research technique, this was a technique 
that was considered because it was thought it would generate a notable quantity of 
feedback in relation to the research phenomenon, in a very quick and simple manner.  
Hence, a survey was constructed, the design of which took the form of four 
statements, with each one focussing on the broad relevance of each of the three 
research themes.  The survey was initially sent out online to all local Labour 
representatives in both Allerdale and Carlisle.  This occurred prior to the interviews 
taking place, however unlike the interviews where the feedback was in the main 
positive, the surveys feedback was very poor, and in the few completed forms which 
were received, the content was not fully completed.  In response to such a situation, it 
was decided that the survey participation would be streamlined to just interviewing 
participants as it was thought they would be most likely to provide a stronger feedback 
as they had voluntarily agreed to take part in the much longer interview process.  The 
general structure would be for the interview participants to complete the surveys 
immediately after the interviews had taken place, the reason for this being, that it was 
thought that it would potentially strengthen the content as the subject was still fresh in 
their minds.  This aspiration though turned out to be unrealistic, as by using the first 
interviewee as a test case, the output she noted verbally via the surveys was 
considerably less focussed and relevant to the content she had espoused verbally via 
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the research interview.  It was thus decided, in conjunction with my academic 
supervisors, that this form of methodological analysis was not adding any positive 
dimension to the evaluative perspective of the study and should be scrapped, for with 
its relatively poor feedback, was weakening to some extent, the strong analysis 
garnered from the interview technique. 
 
The sample of the study as previously stated, consisted of 15 North-West Cumbrian 
Labour Party representatives, they being present or past local councillors in either the 
districts of Allerdale or Carlisle.  In regards firstly, the number of participants who 
took part in the study, the initial invitation to partake in such a process was extended 
to all Labour councillors in North-West Cumbria.  It was unrealistic in practical terms 
to expect the majority to agree to such an in-depth interview procedure, but following 
such standard guidelines that are attached to such qualitative phenomenological 
research of this kind, the appropriate sample size so as to make the exercise viable for 
analytical evaluation, generally ranges between 12 and 15.  The foundation behind 
such a sample size is generally subjective, but the view purported by it is that less than 
10 would mean that the sample size is not strong enough to provide a valid 
perspective to the subject being researched, whilst more than 15 has the potential of 
over-generalising such data, thus weakening any potential conclusions which may 
arise out of findings of this sort (Marvasti (2003); Yin (2009)).  The second issue to 
consider is the professional viability of the participants themselves, for this to be 
effectively realised then certain guidelines attaining to their personal background were 
required.  It was important that the participants had to have experience of being a local 
Labour political figure in the area, and not just a member of the public who 
traditionally voted Labour.  This is because being a North-West Cumbrian 
representative clearly demonstrates that they have a genuine interest and knowledge of 
the party, and how it is regarded on a local level, as opposed to a standard voter, who 
not having such an experienced background in such affairs, would potentially not have 
the same level of first-hand understanding so as to provide as strong a level of 
feedback to the phenomenon being investigated via the interviews. 
 
In addition, it would have been much more problematic to generate a definitive 
sample from the mass public, as their histories, perspectives, interests, and potential 
prejudices, would have been far more variable and thus the content they would state 
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would inevitably be far harder to substantiate, and generalise as to being relevant to 
the core phenomenon being explored.  This is in contrast to a specific sample set 
within the views of Labour representatives in North-West Cumbria, for being a local 
representative alone allows for them to come at the subject from similarly structured 
terms of reference, which in pragmatic terms, leads to a stronger sense that their 
feedback would be most appropriate to understand, discern, and subsequently analyse 
and evaluate in an academic context.  A further key proponent to the participants was 
not just that they were Labour representatives in the part of the county, which was 
being studied, but that they had all been elected by the public at large to their 
positions, as compared to being unelected party officials.  This qualification was 
deemed important as it strengthened their content further, as they were giving a 
prospectus from a legitimate localised level concerning the breadth of the ward which 
they represented.  Such a quality would have been missing if they were an unelected 
party official where their first-hand knowledge of the local area, and the party’s place 
within it, could arguably have been considerably weaker. 
 
The structure of the questions like the structure of the Conceptual Analysis research 
undertaken prior to it, was broadly centred on the three themes and their natural 
linkage to each other, so as to advance the general research phenomenon.  These three 
themes thus provide the basis for the three stages that made up the broad interview 
structure which provided a simplistic stability to the research technique being 
undertaken.  The first stage then was to understand the meaning, and subsequent 
relevance of class in both an historical and contemporary perspective, the shift from 
the communal to the atomised (Question 1).  This led on to the second stage which 
endeavoured to link such class perceptions to general support for Labour, again 
providing analysis from both a past and present perspective, comparing Old, New, and 
Post New Labour in such a context.  After the meaning of class, and its subsequent 
relevance to Labour support was ascertained, emphasis shifted to understanding how 
any potential shifts may have occurred.  This took the form of enquiring into the 
importance of ‘brand politics’ and the role of the atomised communications culture 
which became prevalent in British politics post the rise of the New Right in the late 
1970s (Questions 2-5).  Such questioning enabled one to reach an understanding of 
how and why the Old to New, to even Post New Labour shift occurred, particularly 
from a national perspective.  It was therefore important in concluding the interviews 
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and the broad research phenomenon, to use such knowledge to evaluate the relevance 
such a phenomenon had on a general local level, and specifically within the confines 
of North-West Cumbria (Questions 6-8). 
 
On a practical level, the interviews lasted approximately between thirty minutes, and 
two hours.  There was no specific time limit placed on any particular interview, it was 
wholly centred on the length of time the participant wanted to give to the process.  
Such an approach was deemed relevant because being purely a qualitative study, the 
subject and the questions being analysed took priority over any potential practical 
constraints such as time limits.  The study being designed in such a qualitative 
fashion, asked broad open-ended questions structured within a broad three-themed 
phenomenon, there was no clear right or wrong answer or opinion.  The content being 
discussed was primarily subjective in nature, which inevitably meant that responses 
could vary in regards the time they took (Seale (1999); Hennink (2010)). 
 
This subjective style did not generally lead on to there being subjective analytical 
categorisations being placed on such questions, thus terms such as ‘traditional’ when 
referring to Old Labour, or ‘atomised’ when referring to New Labour were avoided.  
The purpose for this is that there could be a fear by initiating such terms to specific 
political constructs, that the participants could be led into developing an answer which 
had been biased by prior-assumptions that may not genuinely reflect their honest 
perspective, and in that way weaken the legitimacy of their feedback.  The exception 
to this was the inclusion of the term ‘Post New Labour’, and this is because such a 
political categorisation had been developed in the contemporary era, during the 
leaderships of first Miliband and then Corbyn, which was clearly distinctive in class 
lines, from the previous Old and New Labour incarnations. 
 
Perceived Methodological Limitations (and how they were overcome) 
The mixed methodological structure in general proved very effective and was the most 
suitable for this type of qualitative research, but there were, by following such a 
design, some problems which had to be overcome, as outlined below.  This thesis also 
by adopting a purely qualitative methods research approach integrated both critical 
and philosophical perspectives.  It has in this manner, constructively contributed to the 
dialogue concerning philosophical and critical phenomenology and drawn attention to 
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the need to conduct text interpretations with critique and scepticism.  It is also crucial 
to acknowledge short-comings because by doing so it will maintain the study’s 
authenticity.  There are still lessons that can be learned from the experience of 
undertaking a research study of this kind within this research field.  Some of these 
relate to points of detail in the general design of the study that might make future 
projects of this type more effective.  In view of that, due to the findings and 
subsequent discussion and analysis of the research phenomenon, the following 
recommendations should be considered. 
 
The first recommendation, is that the content generated from the conceptual analysis 
in total amounted to a considerable sum, which naturally made it difficult to 
scrutinise, and then subsequently provide suitable analysis of such content.  This 
limitation was overcome by gradually dissecting each interview transcription and 
selecting relevant content which broadly correlated with the general perspectives of a 
specific research theme.  The interview questions though could be deemed as too 
broad, which would inevitably lead to generalised responses that would undermine the 
analytical validity of the research phenomenon being studied.  This perceived 
constraint was as hitherto noted, mastered by the inclusion of ‘prompt’ and ‘probe’ 
statements, which supplemented each interview question so as to define the responses 
in a more condensed, and concise fashion.  The shortcoming of undertaking this 
particular methodological structure is thus that there was always a potential risk that 
the content derived from the conceptual analysis would potentially prove rather 
opaque in practical terms, under interview conditions.  This though turned out not to 
be an issue as the research participants, having read the required information sheets, 
fully understood the methodological design of the study, and by this means, answered 
the questions accordingly. 
 
A further key limitation of this study in practical terms, is the narrow scope of 
interview participants.  Central issues related to the quality of qualitative research are 
reliability, validity, sampling, and generalisability (Parker & Roffey (1997); 
Collingridge & Gantt (2008), both cited in Smith & Thomasson (2005)).  Dreyfus & 
Hall (1982), encouraged researchers to consider both the length of time and the 
number of participants in interviews.  They argue that to capture the voice, a sufficient 
number of words need to be collected from the participants, failing to do so, leads to a 
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crisis of representation (i.e. inability to capture lived experiences) and a crisis of 
legitimation (i.e. inability to interpret and evaluate data).  The study by interviewing 
only fifteen out of a potential sixty Labour representatives in North-West Cumbria 
makes the findings to some extent, difficult to generalise.  This accordingly, by being 
solely focussed within the localised confines of North-West Cumbria, makes it 
inevitably difficult to correlate such research findings to any other area, county, or 
locale of Britain.  Such a limitation though is considerably outweighed by the standard 
perception that a sample of 15 which encompasses a quarter of the potential 
participants available is the ideal amount for the balance of first and second-hand 
content to be most effectively analysed, evaluated, and summarised.  This broad 
research structure clearly outlays a core foundation for the potential of such a three-
themed phenomenon of this kind being expanded in future, by for instance, placing 
greater emphasis on the role of ever-changing and ever-advancing media outlets.  
How such evolving changes react and correlate with a continually more atomised 
political, sociological, and geographic landscape could possibly be the focus of post-
doctoral studies in this or similar academic fields at a future date. 
 
The research data being collected from a single political group within a small 
geographic area may have facilitated data collection but also limited the concrete 
generalisability of the findings.  This occurs by placing emphasis on a specific locale 
which logistically can make it difficult to comprehensively relate any such findings in 
a wider context, a limitation which also could be investigated in a post-doctoral 
research setting.  It is not possible practically though to evaluate all Labour Party, 
political representatives in either Allerdale or Carlisle, so the study was limited to the 
number of representatives that were available and willing to give up their time to 
participate in the Interview process.  Although the Interview process offered plenty of 
time for participants to state their individual and specific interpretations to the 
questions asked of them, the findings presented here represent only a snapshot of 
opinion which might not necessarily correlate with the common outlook of the North-
West Cumbria Labour group as a whole.  Some of the findings although worthwhile, 
do only offer an introductory framework over such a research phenomenon, thus for 
the study to stay relevant it needs to be verified in further post-doctoral research 
follow-up studies.  This would allow for the research avenue not just to remain open 
but also be potentially broadened out to other counties in Britain.  Any similar study in 
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other areas in Britain or even a within a cross-country comparative study could be 
worthwhile to validate the findings.  Any replication might provide a more 
comprehensive research setting for generalising the present findings.  Despite such 
criticisms as discussed in this chapter, major effort was made to enhance the reliability 
and validity of the study, primarily through the in-depth and flexible nature of the 
interview structure and its precise linkage to specific themes. 
 
Many such practical difficulties were faced in the process of qualitative data 
collection, and these imposed some constraints on this study, an example of which 
would be the role of location to the phenomenon.  The location though was in itself 
not markedly crucial, as the terms of analysis was on the relevance of location through 
a generic British context and not within the specific confines of North-West Cumbria.  
Any future research if deemed appropriate to the research framework of that particular 
study, may aim to place more emphasis upon the role of the specific locale.  If that 
were to be North-West Cumbria, then possibly a greater exploration of distinct local 
issues such as the role of the Sellafield nuclear power plant could be undertaken.  This 
could be correlated with the unique employment opportunities it brings and with it the 
possible distinctive effect it has on class and political party affinity. 
 
In addition, even though the role of atomised brand culture for the most part, was 
included in this study to examine the antecedents of the relevance of contemporary 
Labour Party support both nationally and within the context of North-West Cumbria, 
the correlation of the three themes could prove hard to specify.  A separate 
examination of the relevance of contemporary communications, and with it, the ever-
changing concept of the brand, could lead to a more robust approach in any future 
research direction.  In other words, an analytical study with a greater emphasis on the 
rapidly evolving role of communications within politics as well as society at large 
could play a constructive approach in any future research study. 
 
A final shortcoming of the research design was the limited background offered in 
regards the research participants.  This study concluded that, it was the themes 
themselves and not the individual participant perspectives which should take 
precedence.  This makes sound analytical sense, but it would have been useful also to 
possibly have more information about individual participants’ political outlook as this 
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could have provided a further route in which to delve into feedback in greater detail.  
If an ethically and practically sound manner of obtaining a greater balance over these 
two areas could be achieved, then it would be a useful addition to future studies. 
 
In review, the methodological strength of this study is that it is a simple research 
design structured through two contrasting types of qualitative methodology, 
theoretical conceptual analysis, and practical interviews.  This divergence in 
approaches was critical as it allowed for the phenomenon to come under the scrutiny 
of both primary and secondary research perspectives which provided separate, but 
necessary dimensions to the general structure of the study.  Such a framework allowed 
for the data to be dissected, analysed, and evaluated in a coherent, concise manner, 
and consequently allowed for an in-depth exploration of the broad research 
phenomenon.  This chapter thus overall provided a detailed description regarding 
sample selection, data sources, and methodological reflexivity.  In the next chapter 
entitled ‘Hypothesis & Findings’, the research analysis both theoretical and practical, 
will be correlated to the core research themes examined within this thesis, via 
primarily reviewing the practical results generated from the research study. 
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CHAPTER V 
HYPOTHESIS & FINDINGS 
 
 
This chapter is split into two segments, the first headed ‘Hypothesis’, outlines a broad 
indication via the use of a range of empirical theory and statistical data, that the ever-
increasing atomised nature of contemporary social class categorisations has made 
Labour’s relationship with class more complex, both on a national and localised level.  
This is defined in greater detail in the second segment headed ‘Findings’, which 
through a first-hand semi-structured Interview technique, aims to define the practical 
relevance of the secondary research in relation to both the three-themed study 
phenomenon, and broad research hypothesis.  This is achieved by outlining the 
meaning of class from both an historical and modern context, how such meanings 
affected Labour support both pre and post Thatcher and the rise of the New Right, and 
what consequences may arise in relation to how the party is seen on a class level, in a 
specific localised context, with a particular focus being placed upon North-West 
Cumbria. 
 
Hypothesis 
The thesis hypothesis is absorbed within the standard theoretical research framework, 
which endeavours to critically examine and link the Labour Party’s past and present 
relationship with class, image and communications, voting support, location and area 
through the three concurrent thematic stages.  The theoretical emphasis of the study 
thus has three dimensions or themes, which are predicated on the research hypothesis.  
Each respective theme and how they link within the research phenomenon is described 
in greater detail as the study progresses, but a brief outline of the merits of the three 
thematic categories is outlined below. 
 
The first is to define the concept of ‘class’ within a British context.  This primarily 
clarifies, through understanding the meaning of class as an entity in contemporary 
Britain, how the more complex and fragmented relationship between class and 
political party affinity, has clearly become orthodox in modern times.  The initial part 
of such evaluation first and foremost aims to define the meaning of class both from an 
historical and contemporary perspective.  This will be achieved chiefly through the 
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works of its key theorist Karl Marx and two of his most famed critics who refined the 
theory to relate to contemporary times, they being Max Weber and Pierre Bourdieu. 
 
The second is then to connect such findings to the Labour Party in the context of their 
historic ‘Old’, ‘New’, and contemporary ‘Post New Labour’ brand guises.  Such 
evaluation will describe how the Labour Party over time altered its class perspective, 
this will be achieved by contrasting the simplistic traditional class culture of Old 
Labour to the concise classless brand culture promoted by New Labour.  This second 
theoretical theme is narrowed further by connecting the studies of Marx, Weber, and 
Bourdieu to the class history and foundations of the Labour Party, advocated by the 
historical writings of Marxist scholars such as Gramsci, Hall, Thompson, Miliband, 
and Hobsbawm.  Such content leads on to a breakdown of Old Labour and their 
communal class ethos, and how the decline of such a structure led to the gradual 
atomisation of Labour support.  This theme defines New Labour’s class relations in 
the context of the rise of atomised brand politics.  The first three themes although 
supplemented by quotes from the North-West Cumbrian participants, primarily derive 
evaluation from a general national perspective.  This theme states how this new 
atomised class perspective came into being in accordance with the rise of the New 
Right and their tireless promotion of the consumer brand culture which replaced the 
broader class divisional structure that inspired the shift from Old to New Labour.  
Analysis of this kind will consequently be linked to the atomised discourse of the 
modern-day consumerist brand culture like that initially promoted by Bernays.  This 
will be achieved by explaining how his theory laid the general foundations for the 
New Labour classless brand, under the banner of the ‘Third Way’, derived by Giddens.  
Content of this kind focuses upon how such a theory became prominent in British 
politics in the 1980s through the dominance of the powerful Thatcherite government 
and their New Right individualistic ethos which due to its formidable electoral success 
inspired a decade later, New Labour’s atomised class conversion. 
 
This contrasts with the third and concluding theme where through focussing on the 
relevance the phenomenon plays in regards specific location, the first-hand content of 
the Labour political representatives naturally becomes more pointed.  This theme 
accentuates the widespread relevance of specific locales in regards support for the 
Labour Party, with an emphasis upon North-West Cumbria.  Analysis will finally then 
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state how, with this new individualistic class ethos, Labour support has naturally 
become deeply fragmented, both nationally and within the localised context.  This has 
led to the electorate being judged on a more individualistic, atomised, or even 
classless basis in relation to social class categorisation, where external factors such as 
image and locale, instead of once traditional indicators like background and 
employment, have become greater factors in determining its potential relationship to 
current political party affinity. 
 
This research phenomenon is achieved by connecting all of the above findings to the 
relevance of broad locational perspectives (such as North-West Cumbria) in regards 
contemporary Labour political support.  Such work thus examines the comparison 
between the Labour Party at a national and local level from a political, 
communications, and class perspective. 
 
A prime focus though is placed upon the role of class, image, and the consumerist, 
atomised culture in regards the party’s supporter base nationally and with that the 
possibility of the party following a more corporate structure, espoused through the 
New Labour brand.  This is correlated with a second inference that questions such a 
phenomenon within the specific locational confines of North-West Cumbria.  Analysis 
in general, from the range of left-of-centre theorists will then centre on the relevance 
that social class plays on the Labour Party’s supporter base.  This will question 
whether or not the communal class perspective, which for so long was the bedrock of 
the party’s sociological ethos, was indeed replaced by New Labour and their post-
Thatcherite, atomised alternative.  This will be achieved by comparing its broad 
relevance to its Old Labour predecessor and its, still to be defined Post New Labour 
successor.  The definitive aim in undertaking such a study is to enhance the three core 
subject themes – ‘Class/Identity’, ‘(Labour) Party’, and ‘Geography (North-West 
Cumbria)’ – for future research of this kind.  Urban and rural societies in North-West 
Cumbria and in the respective districts of Allerdale and Carlisle, as it appears have 
traditionally had dissimilar class and political interests, which are supplemented 
through distinctive geographic disparities.  Labour’s traditional core sociological 
support is still generally substantiated in urban culture where communal class 
perspectives are for the most part, still prevalent, such as for instance in urban 
Allerdale and Carlisle.  Rural Allerdale and Carlisle, in contrast, not being associated 
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with the stereotypical traditional class discourse, would thus find the classless, 
atomised perspective of the New Labour brand, more appealing.  The results of this 
are outlined below, comparing the electoral performance in North-West Cumbria of 
the party in the last five general elections (2001-2017) to the average support the party 
achieved in the 1997 New Labour electoral landslide. 
 
 
Table III: British General Elections (North-West Cumbria) 
 
 
Party: Labour                                                            Party: Labour 
District: Carlisle                                                        District: Allerdale 
Constituency: Carlisle                                              Constituency: Workington 
 
New Labour (NL) North-West Cumbria (NWC) Average (Avg.): (1997) - 60.8% 
 
Labour – After 1997 (2001-2017) 
Year % vote  +/- NL  NWC Avg.                              Year % vote  +/- NL  NWC Avg. 
2001:  51.2     (60.8) = -9.6                                          2001:  55.5     (60.8) = -5.3 
2005:  48.1     (60.8) = -12.7                                        2005:  50.5     (60.8) = -10.3 
2010:  37.3     (60.8) = -23.5                                        2010:  45.5     (60.8) = -15.3 
2015:  37.8     (60.8) = -23                                           2015:  42.3     (60.8) = -18.5 
2017:  43.8     (60.8) = -17                                           2017:  51.1     (60.8) = -9.7 
 
 
*Old Labour (OL) North-West Cumbria (NWC) Average (Avg.): (1945-1992) - 54% 
 
 
Table III demonstrates that after New Labour’s 1997 electoral peak (2001-2017), the 
more rural constituency of Workington was statistically affected to a greater positive 
degree electorally in each of the five general elections since 1997 in relation to the NL 
(New Labour) NWC (North-West Cumbria) vote share % average, than the urban 
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constituency of Carlisle.  Such analysis suggests that the emergence of the classless 
New Labour brand has had a relatively more powerful effect on the non-traditional 
rural areas in North-West Cumbria than in their urban equivalents which historically 
were the basis for the bulk of the party’s support.  This data shows that an area that is 
chiefly rural and that has sizeable surrounding urban areas, like for instance Allerdale, 
would be akin to accepting such a marketing classless New Labour shift, if such an 
atomised change is networked or communicated in an appropriately substantial 
manner (JWT (2009)).  This perspective can also be extrapolated to Carlisle as it, like 
Allerdale, is a district with a wide mixture of urban and rural geographic 
classifications, and so any potential patterns that may arise in the traditional 
urban/rural support for the Labour Party could still be deemed relevant.  There is also 
a clear view that election results rose both from a broad localised perspective when the 
New Labour brand came into being.  This was demonstrated from the party’s average 
support in North-West Cumbria which increased from 54% in the fourteen post-war 
general elections held during the Old Labour era, spanning from 1945 until 1992, to 
60.8% in the 1997 electoral zenith of New Labour. 
 
Rural marketing in practical terms, is unlike that of marketing to urban consumers 
because being geographically spread, rural societies have a higher degree of social 
detachment, and consequently are somewhat disconnected from the mainstream 
population.  Although even accepting that the dispersion of media communications is 
on the continual rise within rural societies, principally with the ever-increasing 
advancement of broadband and digital technology businesses in such settings, it must 
also be stated that it is still urban areas which are seen to be more advanced in regards 
media and communications development (Griffiths (2007); JWT (2009)).  There are, 
as Griffiths (2007) expressed, few restricted rural channels which focus explicitly 
upon rural interests and particular sensitivities, of any magnitude in most media 
markets.  Creating knowledge in rural communities for that reason, becomes more of a 
challenge and the concept of developing any type of brand devotion is more impaired 
than it is in an urban setting (JWT (2009)).  Both Allerdale and Carlisle being districts 
that are in general proportionately mixed in regards both rural and urban areas 
consequently provide notable locational overlap and convergence over this matter.  
This thus suggests more of an intra-district urban-rural divide than a direct district by 
district comparison (Constantine (2006); Emett & Templeton (2010)). 
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Interview Data 
Research Participants (North-West Cumbria) 
The research participants are listed in Table IV, in the order in which their interview 
was conducted (number of interview and date on which it was undertaken).  Following 
on from that is an account of their district (Allerdale or Carlisle), then their respective 
broad geographic area (Urban or Rural) for which they stood for Labour in North-
West Cumbria, their sex, and party membership tenure.  The interview structure and 
questions asked at interview are noted underneath. 
 
 
Table IV: Research Participants’ Geographic Background 
 
Number & 
Date 
District Area Sex Membership 
Tenure 
01 - 16/06/2015 Carlisle Urban Female Late 1970s 
02 - 28/07/2015 Carlisle Urban Male Early 1970s 
03 - 06/08/2015 Carlisle Urban Female 2010 
04 - 11/08/2015 Allerdale Urban Male 1980 
05 - 14/08/2015 Carlisle Urban Female Early 1990s 
06 - 25/08/2015 Allerdale Rural Male 1983 
07 - 01/09/2015 Carlisle Urban Male Early 1980s 
08 - 04/09/2015 Carlisle Urban Male 1996 
09 - 10/09/2015 Carlisle Urban Female 2009 
10 - 16/09/2015 Carlisle Urban Male 2005 
11 - 02/10/2015 Allerdale Urban Male 2007 
12 - 15/10/2015 Allerdale Urban Male 1965 
13 - 24/11/2015 Allerdale Urban Male 1980 
14 - 10/02/2016 Carlisle Urban Female 2013 
15 - 17/02/2016 Allerdale Rural Female 1966 
 
 
The interview procedure was needed in basic practical terms, as it offered a distinctive 
prism in which the findings could be discussed, analysed, and evaluated through.  The 
participants, as Labour political representatives in North-West Cumbria, naturally 
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offered a first-hand account both in broad terms (see Appendix II), and specifically in 
relation to the research phenomenon.  This is noted in the below ‘Findings’ section 
which analyses the relationship that the party via its respective ‘brands’, has had with 
class through a specific localised context. 
 
Findings 
The analysis in this section is thus mostly concentrated upon the content provided by 
the research participants in their respective interviews.  The content of such findings 
though places the relevance of the three broad thematic categories over that of the 
eight interview questions (see Appendix II).  This is because the research subject 
being broad in nature, is in the main, theme-led and not question orientated. 
 
On a practical level, some questions post-the interviews taking place, but prior to the 
write-up beginning, were deemed for all intents and purposes, fairly irrelevant to the 
core thematic research phenomenon being explored.  An example of this appeared in 
Question 4 which outlined the role of communication techniques in regards 
contemporary Labour support on both a national and local basis, over that of the 
relevance of the brand itself.  Such limitations also occurred in Question 6 which 
explored the relevance of class to a participant on a personal basis when the research 
phenomenon was primarily centred on the generalised perceptions of class to Labour 
politics and location than to that of specific individuals. 
 
The structure of this section is thus dialectical, as it correlates the practical first-hand 
content of the research participants (primary data), to the theoretical workings of 
secondary research theorists (secondary data - see Chapters II, and III), within a 
concurrent analytical format.  Each quote used, be it noted on an individual basis or 
supported by similar sentiments from other research participants, be they from an 
urban or rural constituency, is conveying an appropriate perspective to the 
development of the research phenomenon being explored.  This provides a greater 
degree of research validity, for the theoretical content to correlate with the research 
phenomenon and subsequent hypothesis then the general theoretical findings must be 
in accordance with the broad perspectives opined by the interview participants. 
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The Meaning of Class: The Shift from the Broad Communal, to the Complex 
Atomised, and Cultural Structures 
The general aim within this research phenomenon is thus to determine the relevance 
of social class in regards Labour Party support within a broad localised context, with a 
specific focus on North-West Cumbria.  If this aim is to be realised then first of all 
there needs to be a clear understanding of how class has broadly been categorised 
from both an historic and contemporary perspective.  This general sense of class 
division is primarily stated by the three most prominent class theorists of the last 150 
years; Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Pierre Bourdieu.  In view of that, for this to be 
achieved the participants were asked their opinions on what the term ‘class’ in a broad 
sense, meant to them.  The original, more simplistic Marxist class perspective, still 
provided a clear class framework in which to follow, as one participant suggested: 
 
‘It all depends, are you a Marxian or a Weberian?  I understand social class really as a 
construct related to status, social status.  My understanding of class is an essentially Marxian 
one, an economic determination’ (participant 4). 
 
Participants were then asked to comment on various points of detail in regards why 
class in contemporary Britain has become more complex.  They gave consideration to 
a range of reasons as to why such a situation has occurred, like for instance the 
advancement in general economic enrichment, which has led to a greater degree of 
material aspiration and ambition.  A range of interviewees, five of whom outlined 
below, in the context of North-West Cumbria, thus raised issues primarily in the 
context of how the modern cultural class-capital model has made the traditional 
Marxist class perspective less relevant (Webb & Schirato (2002); Savage (2015)).  
New Social Movements such as these ‘represent a significant break with class politics.  
The basis of their organisation does not correspond to socio-economic classes 
(traditional Marxist or Weberian), or their corresponding left/right ideologies, but 
[are] rather coded in categories taken from the movements issues’ (Offe, 1985, p.833), 
like for instance, personal income and educational aspiration.  An example such as 
this, of these new more complex class initiatives coming into being at the expense of 
broad communal class structures in contemporary Britain has wider societal effects.  
This is because it provides a clear focus towards the belief as noted below by five 
research participants, from both Allerdale and Carlisle, that a greater degree of 
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educational and consumerist opportunities has opened up for people from traditional 
working-class backgrounds: 
 
‘I have noticed for instance, that I represent one of the poorer wards in the city and I have 
noticed that more and more children are going on to get Level 3, 4 qualifications and the 
parents are supporting them in this’ (participant 1). 
 
‘I think over time social class has merged with more opportunities potentially with working-
class kids to get to University’ (participant 5). 
 
‘In terms of the way it feels to individuals it is more pronounced and that is partly because we 
have encouraged a great level of aspiration.  Yes, a broader aspiration would be that people 
feel, not an entitlement perhaps, but feel that you’ve been successful in relative terms if you 
have a foreign holiday every year, if you have that in consumerist terms and because of the 
nature in the way that society operates that is in the minds of everybody’ (participant 7). 
 
‘I think it became harder to define so it became less important and as people began to be able 
to achieve more, I mean we sort of had more women going out to work, people had more 
income, women started staying in education a lot longer so people were being educated much 
more so therefore, their class was changing based on other aspects of society, whether they 
had more money’ (participant 14). 
 
‘It is more complex because people have more access to get into different classes because of 
their education and income, therefore there are more opportunities to switch classes or aspire 
to have a better education or to earn a better salary, there is more mobility certainly and there 
are probably more sub-sections but basically it is still there’ (participant 15). 
 
There is though, a clear perspective from the research participants that even with 
accepting that social class has become ever atomised, that the concept itself has 
become absorbed paradoxically with a core belief in the traditional categorisations of 
the communal era.  This is demonstrably shown by the continual attachment which the 
research participants held towards the traditional class categories like working and 
middle-class.  Even though they accepted that class in today’s Britain is harder to 
define, they still naturally defined it through old and supposedly outdated Marxist 
concepts.  Marxist theology, as noted by Callinicos (2011), and Baronian (2015), 
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would argue that, that naturally occurs because any such atomisation of social class 
categories is erroneous. 
 
It is thus impossible to define because it is a mere blurring by the capitalist classes to 
distract and divide the working-masses from their true class interests which are best 
served through communal-styled unity.  Giddens (2000), by promoting a classless 
vision, Bernays (1955, and 1965) an atomised perspective, and Bourdieu (1977, and 
1984) with his cultural structure, offer a greater refined and flexible version of such 
class differentials.  There is yet still a compelling case as the interviewees’ note, to 
ignore these outlooks of greater class complexity and promote the simplistic historical 
two-class structure stated by Marx or the three-class structure espoused by Weber (see 
Appendix II).  Alongside this common feeling that class in Britain has become more 
complex and harder to define, there were opinions to the contrary that believed the 
communal Marxist divisional class status is still prominent.  Such atomised social 
developments do not coincide with a belief that the social class structure in Britain is 
individualistic in nature but instead, is still concentrated within the more simplistic, 
traditional paradigm.  This perspective was stated by two Labour political 
representatives, the first from Carlisle; the second from Allerdale: 
 
‘I think there are a lot of people who think it’s very fluid but I do think there are quite clear 
distinctions’ (participant 3). 
 
‘It means to me that people put themselves in categories of class and from early on, you hear 
of you know, “lower-class”, “middle-class”, “upper-class”, and whether you believe that 
system is still out there, to me, your social class would be where you fit-in in one of those 
three and often that is presumed by background, attitude, availability to finance an education 
would be my view on how you would determine your social class and opportunity’ 
(participant 10). 
 
The central point which is highlighted by this research participant is that the 
Bourdieu/Savage class structure is far more relevant in contemporary Britain than the 
more simplistic communal equivalents.  A number of different factors, as broadly 
stated by Fowler (1997), Robotham (2005), and quoted by Giddens (2002), ‘served to 
push class analysts in the direction of identifying a “priori”, a “class structure” located 
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within the structure of work and employment.  A key element was the established 
convention in American and British sociology of identifying classes as occupational 
aggregates, the influence of structural Marxism, and the revival of sociological 
interest in the labour process’ (Giddens, 2002, p.4).  These developments ran in 
parallel with other approaches to the study of social class such as that purported by 
Bourdieu, which tended to be associated with a humanistic methodological approach 
which drew mostly upon anthropology (Jenkins (2002); Grenfell (2004)). 
 
There is still for the most part, a class-based society in modern Britain, but it is in a 
sense much more nuanced and insidious, and harder to ascertain and evaluate.  At the 
same time, the contemporary varied class system, as noted in Chapter II, and broadly 
alluded to by Ford (2016), and McDougal (2017), has become increasingly aware of 
the associational richness and diversity of people’s specific social characteristics.  
This may play a role in their specific contemporary class perspective.  For instance, as 
Inglehart (1990), and Savage & Devine (2013) allude, and Cannadine (1999) quotes, 
‘as men and women, husbands and wives, parents and children; as members of 
churches or trade unions or sports clubs or political parties; as individuals with 
loyalties to their firms, their villages, their districts, their towns, their cities, their 
counties, their regions, their country’.  This was for the most part indicated by 
numerous participants, who following years of political party campaigning believed 
that this standard collectivist class construct is being replaced with a more complex 
perspective, be it cultural class capital or individualistic consumerism, where 
contemporary class perceptions have become markedly more opaque.  Several 
interviewees, from both urban and rural areas comprising both the Allerdale and 
Carlisle districts, made the point that the rise of such an atomised class focus from the 
late 1970s onwards has had acute outcomes, by and large being the gradual blurring of 
the modern class system in comparison to its historical equivalent: 
 
‘To me, I don’t think the definitions of the social class divisions are as clear as they were in 
past history’ (participant 3). 
 
‘So, there is still a class-based society, it’s in a sense much more kind of nuanced and 
insidious and harder to break, harder to find your way through’ (participant 4). 
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‘It is more fluid, people are less constrained but I thought that the importance of social class 
perception was dying out in the 1970s’ (participant 6). 
 
‘I think for some people it is; some people see the class system as still being there, but it has 
become so blurred, they do not understand it’ (participant 8). 
 
‘There is so many ways in which people identify themselves now and not just about being 
“working-class”, “middle-class”, or “upper-class”’ (participant 9). 
 
Most Marxists, as remarked by Blumberg (1998), and Schmidt (2013), and in contrast 
to such atomised class sentiments, believed that a person’s class identity was 
collective rather than individual, and was in the main, determined by his or her 
relationship to the means of production.  This became developed on a more 
contemporary basis through a Weberian three-class model which, although refined 
further through a more focussed atomised, classless, cultural ethos, is still relevant 
within local North-West Cumbrian Labour Party circles.  An argument in favour of 
such a perception was expounded below by two participants: 
 
‘There is a greater status gradation for those who work with their hands and those who work 
with brains and I think that’s what it tends to mean in this country, “middle-class” means you 
work with your brains, “working-class” means you work with your hands, by in large it is all 
to do whether you wear a tie at work and a suit or you wear overalls and get your hands dirty’ 
(participant 4). 
 
‘“Working-class”, well “traditional working-class” means somebody who has generally got a 
physical job usually working with their hands, I think someone who sits in an office with a tie 
on, is a white-collar worker’ (participant 11). 
 
The standard long-held perception is that the traditional working-classes vote Labour 
and their middle-class equivalents were naturally Conservative.  This communal 
notion generally speaking, is an accurate one, as it was widely accepted by the 
research participants.  ‘In 19th Century Britain for instance’, as Cannadine (1999) 
states, ‘which had supposedly witnessed the final triumph of the bourgeoisie’, politics 
remained on the whole, a patrician pursuit, as there was never a hegemonic middle-
class or working-class political party (Giddens (1994, and 2002)). 
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In 20th Century Britain though, many of these workers have voted Conservative, for if 
this were not the case then it would have been practically impossible for the 
Conservatives to have won elections so frequently on a full adult franchise (Weininger 
(2005)).  While ‘the leadership of the Labour Party has for the most part been middle-
class rather than proletarian, now as in earlier times, political parties are not 
dominated, as Marx had too readily assumed, by the exclusive interests of a single 
class, and thus political affinity is never merely the direct, unmediated expression of 
class identities and class conflicts’ (Cannadine (1999)).  This position contended that 
many financially successful working people evidently broke with ingrained, historic 
Marxist structural social class stereotypes and instead followed external cultural 
factors like lifestyle and locale by moving out to more prosperous rural areas and as a 
consequence voted Conservative.  This perspective was noted by two of the 
participants who strongly supported this electoral class dealignment: 
 
‘I think the structured approach, where you could put people in one of three or four categories 
is not there anymore, and I think that is the success of post-war Britain in the sense that a lot 
of those divisions in regards political party support, have broken down’ (participant 7). 
  
‘I think there has always been a much more variegated picture and after all if you had a united 
working-class that voted Labour there is no way the Conservative Party would have won an 
election after 1918’ (participant 12). 
 
These quotes and other comments appear to suggest that the two biggest political 
parties in Britain, be it Conservative or Labour, have never been completely defined 
by a clear class consciousness in regards to their entire mass support.  Politics, as 
testified by Muspratt et al. (1997), and Chilton (2004), is never merely the direct, 
unmediated expression of communal class identities, and class conflicts.  It has 
become much more complex with the contemporary emergence of the cultural 
tradition which is derived through a more refined contemporary atomised context. 
 
There is a view, in regards Labour politics at least, as illustrated in Chapter III by 
Giddens (2000), that such a class, political merging was derived through the flexible 
Third Way classless agenda which was the theoretical bedrock for the New Labour 
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brand.  Giddens’ utopian vision of a classless society, where classes are so complex 
that their relevance can be questioned in its entirety, is commendable.  The notion 
though that contemporary social class division has been atomised and fragmented to 
such a degree that the concept of ‘classlessness’ and their promotion of the idea that 
class as an entity in itself is irrelevant in contemporary Britain, is infeasible.  This is a 
vindication of the standard Marxist parlance that like the concept of atomised class 
categories, the idea of classlessness is unrealistic as capitalist society is driven by a 
simplistic class structure of the bourgeoisie oppressing the workers (Miliband (1961); 
Thompson (1963)).  There was an almost collective agreement amongst research 
participants in North-West Cumbria as noted by the six quotes below, that social class 
categorisation, be it communal, cultural, or atomised, is an integral part of British life.  
This is in contrast to the concept of ‘classlessness’, which although deemed 
theoretically possible as nothing could effectively stop a person from not feeling part 
of the class structure, it was not in practical terms, realistically viable, as the class 
structure, be it communal or atomised, is ingrained within British culture: 
 
‘What’s “classlessness”, well it does not exist, there is a class, there is always going to be a 
class in my opinion’ (participant 2). 
 
‘I do not feel that you can declare anybody else classless, an individual person may want to 
declare themselves as classless if that is the kind of life which they are idealistically 
endeavouring to lead’ (participant 3). 
 
‘No, well my view would be that, if you actually look and examine the idea of a classless 
society as a base concept, then it’s not feasible; I liken it to someone who says, “we should 
leave politics out of sport”, it is based on a false premise’ (participant 7). 
 
‘Unless we just totally wiped away all the structures what we have got including from the 
“House of Commons”, “Peers of the Realm”, “Royalty”, everything like that, unless we 
totally change what Britain was, then I don’t think that classless exists in this structure that we 
have got in Britain’ (participant 9). 
 
‘I think the BBC did an on-line one where you could go on and find out what you were and 
there was like “Emergent Middle Class”, and it is based on your “cultural capital”, I think it is 
more to do with that and it is fluid’ (participant 14). 
127 | P a g e  
 
 
‘No, I think it is a myth.  You might aspire to be but if you are brought up in this country then 
it is just there, in your make-up, as a cultural thing’ (participant 15). 
 
There were counterarguments used by some interviewees stating that Britain has 
become a classless society.  There was though greater agreement that this had arisen 
because of the rise of brand culture in the late 1970s which led to a greater degree of 
social class atomisation.  Following such an individualistic brand ethos (Bernays 
(1955)), an atomised society in regards class has clearly replaced the traditional, 
collectivised structure as one participant alluded to by stating: 
 
‘So yes, a classless society, in one sense there is such a thing as a classless society because 
people do not break down into these homogenous blocks, it is much more atomised, so it is 
much more difficult to see any kind of commonality between people in these different 
situations’ (participant 4). 
 
The preliminary general conclusion from these discussions seems to support the view 
that ‘where class differences matter politically, the most basic way in which social 
change might influence political alignments is through increases or decreases in the 
sizes of the different classes.  The class structure simply refers to the relative size and 
number of classes.  There is no theoretical agreement about the ways in which “class” 
itself should be defined’ (Sarre (1989)).  Cochrane & Anderson (1989), states that ‘an 
alternative Marxist-influenced approach is that classes are defined by deep-seated 
aspects of where people stand in a system of production.  Modern Marxist schemas 
classify people by whether they control the means of production or not, whether they 
control other people’s labour or not, and whether they dispose of substantial amounts 
of “educational capital” which can form the basis for social class definition’.  In this 
approach, Cochrane & Anderson (1989) continue, analysis, like that also broadly 
noted by Lowith (2004), and Steadman Jones (2016), ‘move fairly directly to 
distinguish a smallish number of social classes on theoretical grounds.  Both 
approaches argue in terms of the theoretical significance of their schemas, but also 
seek to show empirically that class differences structure other aspects of social 
relations in fundamental ways’ (Cochrane & Anderson, 1989, p.175).  There is a 
perception though that class within Britain has become ever more complex and harder 
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to define.  Consequently, logic suggests that the concept of ‘classless’, even if not 
clearly defined in itself could be deemed relevant in social and political discourse if 
such contemporary fragmented class categorisations cannot be clearly defined in any 
convincing, coherent, and credible way (Giddens (2006)). 
 
Modern British class groupings are more complex than ‘working-class’, ‘middle-
class’, and ‘upper-class’, although people still commonly refer to these traditional 
Marxist groupings as they are easier to understand and define.  Social class in 21st 
Century Britain is fixed within more categorisations which are more atomised and 
harder to define than the traditional model.  Such fluid ‘cultural’ class divisions like 
education, economics, materialism, and aspiration play a notable role in such a 
contemporary atomised class culture, but the idea of ‘classlessness’ in contemporary 
Britain, following previously noted communal logic, is not a viable social concept. 
 
Old Labour and its Communal Class Traditions 
Equally, if, as stated from the first section, that social class in contemporary Britain is 
far more complex than in the simplistic Old Labour class centred era, then its 
relationship within the context of the Labour Party through its Old, New, and Post 
New forms needs to be explored. 
 
Labour firstly in general terms, by accepting such a class atomisation ethos, needs to 
go beyond the narrow communal class interpretations and open itself up to the 
contemporary diverse atomised ethos in regards the public at large who are not part of 
the economic ‘Elite’ (Savage & Devine (2013)), but are considered part of the 
universal economic working masses.  Giddens attempted to relate such cultural 
differences in class attitudes and values to differing images of the class structure 
which, he thought, tended to prevail in different types of community and occupational 
situations (Giddens (1987, and 2006)).  The typical proletarian worker, he said in 
Marxian terms, similar to Lockwood (1966), and Goldthorpe et al. (1969), from a 
more historical perspective, has distinct cultural tastes and social interests that 
coincide with a broad political doctrine known as ‘Labourism’ or ‘Labourist’, the 
substance of which is denoted below by two participants: 
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‘Yeah, there is a very strong “Labourist” strand in the Labour Party, and I have seen it, I was a 
grammar school lad who went to University, from a Labour family background, in the 1980s 
there was certain older people who said, “Ah but you’re not really Labour are you, you’ve got 
a degree, you wear a suit and collar to go to work” - you know a collar and tie to go to work – 
“you’re not real Labour, you don’t really get your hands dirty, you’re not a real worker”’ 
(participant 4). 
 
‘It still carries that connotation.  Its purpose was to originally represent the unions and their 
interests in parliament’ (participant 6). 
 
This Marxist working-class perspective of the perception of the proletariat according 
to McNally (1993), ‘as an entity in itself’ was in contrast to Thompson’s (1963) 
concentration of ‘patterns of capital accretion and market competition’ (McNally 
(1993)).  In taking up this position, Thompson, ‘was arguing against what he 
perceived to be the dominant sociological approach to “class analysis”’ (Crompton, 
2008, p.39).  Thompson’s theory was arguing in regards to the Labour Party, that they 
as a broad class entity in itself is defined by an attachment to, and promotion of 
communal working-class interests.  This is a prominent perspective in urban North-
West Cumbria, two examples of which are detailed below: 
 
‘I think there was a strong connection and over the years, this has been going on for a long 
time now, although in possibly less linear ‘class’ times, such a perception on the whole has 
not got eroded, for it is there as a kind of a core facet to Labour support in North-West 
Cumbria; because Labour is their party, whether they would articulate that as, “I’m working-
class, Labour’s working-class, therefore I vote Labour”, it is more about, “I vote Labour 
because they’re like me, they feel my pain, they’re people like me”’ (participant 4). 
 
‘I would suggest that Old Labour is what I would call the “traditional” perspective on the 
Labour Party, that being predominantly a party of the “working-class”, for the “working-
class”, so its roots are very clearly set within the development of the Trade Union movement 
and are very clearly set within historical events through the 20th Century in terms of the 
overarching ambition to improve the lives, the standard of living, the welfare, and the 
aspirations of the working-class’ (participant 7). 
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In regards this, ‘working-class collective action, as expressed in trade unionism and 
support for the Labour Party, has been steeped in instrumental rather than ideological 
motives’ (Scase, 1992, p.67).  Rooted in such clear historic, communal class 
solidarity, Old Labour, as Hay (1999), and Jefferys (2002), largely alluded, conjured 
up the vision of strong trade unions; a real culture that was above all, dominated by 
the said traditional working-class solidarity.  Within such a context, Old Labour, as 
noted by Ziegler (1995), and Griffiths & Hickson (2009), was like any political 
movement, that being a product of its times and its respective culture which is 
embedded with that.  ‘The setting up of workingmen’s clubs, workers educational 
associations, trade unions’, and local branches of the Labour Party as were prominent 
in urban Allerdale and Carlisle, ‘enhanced such feelings of class affinity as well as the 
necessity of collective action if self-improvement were to be pursued’ (Scase, 1992, 
p.67).  Sentiments of this kind were noted by several participants from a range of 
geographic backgrounds in North-West Cumbria: 
 
‘The experiences of many of those during the Old Labour era was that it was very socialist, 
very left-wing, but also very outward looking as well, for the Labour movement has always 
been an international movement’ (participant 1). 
 
‘Old Labour was about giving the working-class, which came to mean almost, almost the 
manual working-class, this chance to get on the ladder’ (participant 4). 
 
‘Old Labour to me was the traditional working-class people wanting better schools, better 
education, retaining the NHS, good economy, and jobs’ (participant 5). 
 
‘Old Labour would be, your working-class, Old Labour, yeah, the blue-collar, terraced houses, 
working a hundred hours for the boss’ (participant 10). 
 
‘Old Labour to me tends to be people who have come from trade union backgrounds, strong 
union leaders, strong union members.  I would tend to say it is made up of what we would call 
working-class’ (participant 11). 
 
‘Old Labour to me would be going back to the miners, so working-class definitely, blue-
collar, strength in the trade unions, that sort of thing.  I would agree with that; they are 
actually fighting for the rights of workers’ (participant 14). 
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A ‘return to the values and policies of Old Labour’, Fielding (2006) notes, ‘or the 
period up to the early 1990s, is extremely unlikely’ in the Post New Labour era.  This 
is because of the ‘change in contextual circumstances, that Britain in 1997 was a very 
different place from the country that had last elected a Labour government’.  The 
modern world in ‘which political parties have to operate has changed drastically from 
the world that Old Labour operated within’.  The most meaningful ‘changes that 
caused the Labour Party to move away from the left’, Fielding (2006) maintains, ‘and 
will continue to prevent it from returning to social democracy, include globalisation, 
the prevalence of neo-liberalism, and its economic classical liberalism’ (Fielding, 
2006, p.6), which promoted social atomisation. 
 
This shift occurred as the Keynesianism social democratic economic system and its 
social communal ethos was being discredited, which inescapably led to the decline of 
the traditional working-class, which previously had been the nucleus of Labour’s 
supporter base (Fielding (2006); Beech & Lee (2008)).  Such a decline, which is 
linked to the hitherto stated broad economic changes, meant that Labour had to try and 
widen its support to other parts of the political spectrum, including the traditional 
middle-classes. 
 
The Impact of Thatcher & the New Right to Labour in the 1980s 
Labour thus clearly moved from a traditional Old Labour ethos towards a more 
atomised, brand orientated outlook promoted by New Labour.  The inspiration 
primarily arose through the success of the Party’s great political nemesis a decade 
before; Margaret Thatcher.  This atomised perspective, as Micklethwait & Wooldridge 
(2005) commented, initially promoted by the New Right meant as quoted by 
Crompton (2008), ‘that left-leaning parties suffered successive electoral defeats in 
both the United States and in Britain, which ushered in a neoliberal free-market 
agenda in government policies (‘Reaganomics’ in the United States, ‘Thatcherism’ in 
Britain)’ (Crompton, 2008, p.86). 
 
In the face of this desperate electoral predicament, an ever-increasing number within 
the Labour Party became persuaded that if they were ever to return to government 
office, they would need to come to terms with the new individualist consumer-driven 
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way of life at the expense of previously held rigid class divisions (McClelland (1996); 
Devine (1997)).  The intensification of such cosmetic class fragmentation promoted 
through the revolutionary Thatcherite premiership was powerfully emphasised by a 
number of participants, two of which are outlined below: 
 
‘When I joined the party (in the 1970s) there was a clear distinction there, you knew that you 
were joining a party that was going to look after working people, right, by whatever means 
but all that has changed and the other element that has affected that change was Thatcher, she 
said, “there is no such thing as community, only self”’ (participant 2). 
 
‘Thatcher’s genius was to appeal right the way across and Thatcher was a “class-warrior” per 
excellence you know, that was her philosophy of life really, but she recognised that electoral 
success was very much wedded to drawing in the broadest coalition of people and it was not 
until Tony Blair came along, I would contend that we got the same message’ (participant 7). 
 
Following on from such statements, in a broad-spectrum, drawing explicitly on the 
Gramscian hegemonic structure, Hall (1997) discussed the shift towards this 
Thatcherite atomisation from traditional, communal class politics as a response to an 
organic phenomenon.  He argued that political forces in favour of the status quo had 
intervened to create a new balance of forces with the intention of maintaining their 
power.  A further argument used to support such class fragmentation, as Hall notes, 
was Mrs. Thatcher’s success in translating free-market economics into the language of 
experience, moral imperative, and common sense. 
 
This in the wider sense, provided a philosophy which promoted an alternative ethic to 
that of the collectivised ‘caring society’ (Smith (2016)).  He described this as a 
translation of a theoretical ideology into a popular idiom.  Thatcherism, as 
documented by Jackson & Saunders (2012), and Veldman (2015), articulated a new 
desire-fueled populist politics through drawing attention to such 
commercialised weaknesses of the then entrenched traditional political, class structure, 
through addressing people as consumers rather than producers.  This Bernaysian 
concept of the political party as a brand that could be packaged-up and sold to the 
individual voter as an atomised, classless consumer has become a standard perception 
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of contemporary British politics.  The central tenet of this is aptly stressed by two 
Labour political representatives, the former from Allerdale; the latter from Carlisle: 
 
‘Like all sales and marketing, you can sell anybody something once.  Marketing is about 
positioning yourself so that you have got what people want so they keep going back and 
buying it over and over again, so if you have a product that actually is not what it should (be), 
no amount of advertising space will actually get people to buy it, well there may be a gullible 
few but you have to actually create a brand identity, you (the political party) have to identify 
with something’ (participant 4). 
 
‘I can accept that you have to have the disciplines that go with that, you have to have the 
repetitions, you have to have the identity, you have to build on certain key strengths, and 
consequently be attractive in the broadest possible sense’ (participant 7). 
 
During ‘the 1980s, the Conservative government in this manner, started their very 
own revolution, it was a political revolution of ideas that has all but removed the 
notion of “class” from public discourse’ (Thorpe (2011)).  A practical and highly 
effective example, as documented by Foote (1997), and Rosen (2005), of embedding 
this atomised perspective in pragmatic political terms was by encouraging traditional 
working-class aspiration through selling off council houses.  The objective was to 
change people’s attitudes towards their social standing to achieve the broadest social 
class supporter base.  Thatcher understood, indeed, promoted such materialistic 
perspectives, which were the bedrock of Bernays’ theory, and by this means changed 
the predominant communal perception of political party affinity towards a more 
atomised ethos (Curtis (2002)), a view supported by one Allerdale participant: 
 
‘I think if you say; “we are standing up solely for the working-classes”, then I think you 
disenfranchise anybody else who is not part of that class.  That was the issue with Thatcher, 
Thatcher offered Council Houses, she gave people aspiration and whether you agreed with it 
or not, a lot of people who were born working-class and owned their own council house 
suddenly became shareholders’ (participant 11). 
 
In the process, following the atomised premise, consumers were persuaded to see the 
gratification of their desires as the paramount priority, through the concept of a 
political brand (Bernays (1955); Driver & Martell (1998)).  Such a brand, as noted at 
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first by Bernays and supported by the research participants, is a multidimensional 
construct, involving the merging of functional and emotional values to tally with 
consumers’ preferences and psychosocial desires (De Chernatony & Dall’Olmo Riley 
(1998)).  One of the goals of branding is to make a brand not just expansive and 
relevant but also unique on dimensions that are both relevant and welcomed by 
consumers (De Chernatony & McDonald (1999)). 
 
Success, as Bernays’ theory evokes, ‘in an overcrowded market will depend on 
effective brand differentiation, based on the identification, internalisation, and 
communication of unique brand values that are both pertinent to and desired by 
consumers.  Powerful brands communicate their values through every point of contact 
they have with consumers’ (Cleaver (1999)).  This atomised brand culture, which the 
participants accept has come into being in contemporary British politics, has made the 
relevance of outmoded class categorisations gradually obsolete.  This was no more 
evident than within the confines of the Labour Party, who could effectively promote a 
classless brand, an image central to obtain electoral success (Giddens (2002)).  Such a 
standpoint is highlighted by an Allerdale Labour representative: 
 
‘The class-based politics became less relevant, there are other ways of skinning a cat, you 
didn’t have to nationalise, you didn’t need to take over the means of production, you didn’t 
have to go down that route, have an alternative I suppose; Labour light’ (participant 6). 
 
In both the United States and in Britain, the concept of branding, as noted by 
Buchanan (1996), and Braman (2003), through the development of media and 
marketing communications has become increasingly prevalent.  In relation to the 
context of the Labour Party, outdated communal perspectives of political 
communication where the primary function was to motivate their traditional working-
class support base has been replaced with an atomised, consumer sovereignty (Curtis 
(2002)).  This has led to a shift from debates surrounding the party’s socialist ideology 
in the Old Labour era towards a non-ideological age, where post-Thatcher, the concept 
of socialism with its broad communal class structure has been notably weakened.  
This has been replaced by the ever-increasing relevance of image and brand 
perception, which were the core foundations of the New Right revolution (Wring 
(2004)). 
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The understanding of when such a shift occurred in a Labour context, whether directly 
under the Blair leadership or it being achieved on a gradual basis prior to that, with the 
development of the New Labour brand being the culmination of such change, is open 
for debate, although it was clearly an important factor. 
 
Labour with its movement towards a less traditional, class-focused perspective was in 
effect a gradual process, firstly through the revisionist leadership of Hugh Gaitskell in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s; a figure promoting a New Labour-styled agenda, forty 
years before the actual reincarnation.  This moderation was advanced in regards the 
contemporary era through the leadership of Neil Kinnock in the 1980s.  Gaitskell and 
Kinnock though unlike Blair, failed to receive the electoral benefit so naturally their 
political relevance is not seen as great, but certainly in the case of Kinnock, as the 
research participants agree, he played an important role in the development of the 
New Labour brand (Wring (1996a, and b, and 2004)). 
 
Kinnock to some extent started the journey by recognising that Old Labour was 
institutionalised in its original collectivised class-based form.  This ‘stern and 
effective party management was the most impressive aspect of the Kinnock 
leadership.  It is doubtful that the Labour Party would have survived as a major player 
in British politics without him’ (Cole, 1995, p.273).  He realised that the party was 
becoming less electable as people had gradually grown to define themselves less by 
communal class groups based on background but by external classless individualised 
proponents like locale, material possessions, and specific interests distinctive to 
themselves as atomised consumers as two participants from Carlisle claimed: 
 
‘There was a gradual move (from Kinnock to New Labour), then when Blair got elected, we 
all know what happened to Clause IV, so then the Labour Government got elected with Tony 
Blair as the leader, he moved to the right and he took the people with him, we were seen as the 
party of the middle’ (participant 2). 
 
‘It almost feels like Kinnock took all the pain on the party’s behalf, he took the bullets, and 
Blair was the electoral beneficiary’ (participant 8). 
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On an electoral level then, that traditional communal class outlook was electorally 
undermined in the 1980s when the atomised class ethos of the Thatcherite revolution 
took hold.  Blair following in the footsteps of Kinnock’s modernisation agenda, 
recognised that the party needed to move beyond the traditional constituency so as to 
be deemed relevant to the wider spectrum of the electorate. 
 
The New Labour Classless Conversion 
New Labour, as Coates (2005) states, ‘was created and represented capitalism with a 
social conscience by replacing’ the formerly held communal class dictum of ‘equality 
of outcome’ with a revisionist ‘equality of opportunity and making social democracy 
more bearable by toning it down’.  The party though from a communal critique was, 
‘restricted to this narrow centrist ideology, because it could neither move to the left 
because of the political landscape, nor the right of the political spectrum because of its 
historical background’ (Coates, 2005, p.30). 
 
This means that Post New Labour, whose definitive class perspective as formerly 
noted, are limited as it is an embryonic brand in ever-evolving class, political times.  
They will despite its communal policies, still on a communications basis at least, be 
compromised by the electoral success of the atomised New Labour brand.  They thus 
may invent new methods to achieve a distinctive brand edge with the aim of 
increasing their popularity, as Corbyn for instance, did so effectively during the 2017 
general election by generating the youth vote (see Postscript). 
 
At its core, though, there was a reckoning in the sense that Blair had to reconcile some 
of the issues with the traditional support because there was a danger that if the party 
completely transferred to the same atomised class ground as the Conservatives then 
they would leave party loyalists behind (Jefferys (2002); Geary & Pabst (2015)).  
Many interviewees claimed that such a risk was necessary as by so doing they were 
building a powerful classless focus for which the party could gain and subsequently 
sustain political power: 
 
‘I think there is a strong faction who would think themselves as classless or kind of 
aspirational, and I think they refer to themselves as Blairites’ (participant 3). 
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‘What they were basically saying was, at one level look, “do not look down on him because 
he’s got a University degree and works with a pen, you know he can be part of our movement 
too”.  So, it was classlessness in a sense, it was breaking down barriers of social status.  I 
think in New Labour the concept of class became something we didn’t talk about, it almost 
became an embarrassment, it was something people did not want to talk about because people 
would say, “oh yes, we’re all classless now”, what they actually meant to say was, these social 
gradations between the white-collar and the blue-collar are blurring’ (participant 4). 
 
‘I think it is much less so now than it used to be and I think it shifted and shaped into a 
different kind of party in order to ensure electoral success’ (participant 7). 
 
‘Yeah, I think so, I think it took class out of it’ (participant 11). 
 
‘I think it did happen, yeah, I would agree with you that definition of classless that it became a 
party for everybody or anybody’ (participant 14). 
 
The communal class critique of this New Labour classless vision was that as they 
were converged within an erroneous atomised class ethos, they were accordingly 
restricted in regards political theory and respective substance, a position summarised 
by two participants: 
 
‘That got picked up by the Blair era, New Labour, remember he did not have a political 
philosophy about what works, it is about spinning what works and eventually we got to the 
point where it was all spin and there was no bloody substance left, nobody knew what Labour 
believed in anymore’ (participant 4). 
 
‘It in some way, can be a deception, and that is maybe what people felt about the Labour 
Party, that they were too slick and clever’ (participant 15). 
 
This is a marked difference ‘between conventional Old Labour politicians who were 
generally working-class, having strong links with trade union culture, and were seen 
as being easily relatable to the class position of those who elected them’ (Paxman, 
2002, p.56).  This outlook, Marxist in character, was also in extensive agreement with 
the standard Weberian perspective of individuals being connected to communal class 
categories through playing specific roles, for Dahrendorf had developed a model of 
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the ‘class structure’ in which ‘classes are…based on a structural arrangement of social 
roles’ (Dahrendorf, 1959, p.148).  Dahrendorf’s analysis focuses on the structuring of 
these roles, rather than on their incumbents: ‘Classes are based on the differences in 
legitimate power associated with certain ‘positions’, i.e. on the structure of social roles 
with respect to their authority expectations.  It follows from this that an individual 
becomes a member of a class by playing a social role’ (Dahrendorf, 1959, p.149).  The 
party accordingly shifted emphasis from the traditional class perspective, from 
initially promoting collectivised communal interests, to that of atomised individuals, 
who defined their modern class position upon consumerist factors such as cultural 
interests, career aspirations, and locale (Savage & Devine (2013)).  The conclusion, as 
suggested by a number of participants, must be twofold, first that this is just a sign of 
the more complex, or possibly even classless times.  Secondly though on a negative 
note, there could be a perception that despite such contemporary class complexities, 
that on a social class level at least, the party and its national political representatives 
by promoting a classless brand politics, lost touch with the party’s long-established, 
traditional class grassroots: 
 
‘The perception was; they all look the same, they all dress the same, they all speak the same -  
you didn’t get any real hard line working-class, you get certain members, but a lot of the 
Cabinet were all very well spoken, it is almost like they came off the production line’ 
(participant 5). 
 
‘The composition of Labour MPs has moved from Old Labour times of union people, 
teachers, councillors, you put in a lot of time before you were finally elected, you know as a 
middle-aged person usually a man, whereas now, you get a perception that it is sanitised; they 
go in as private parliamentary secretaries and then are parachuted into a constituency and from 
there they just stay in parliament for the rest of their lives’ (participant 6). 
 
Some local representatives in North-West Cumbria stated that there was a question 
mark on how such a classless New Labour clientele could possibly understand what it 
is like to be involved in local politics.  This degree of connection, as broadly alluded 
to by Paxman (2002), and Seyd & Whiteley (2002), within all echelons of the party, 
be it national or local, is an area which requires improvement.  This more atomised 
attitude towards social class and parliamentary selection contrasted markedly with the 
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more rigid traditional class stance conventionally perceived to be the stereotypical 
hallmark of the Old Labour politician: 
 
‘I think the problem with New Labour was they all seemed to be copies of each other.  Yeah, 
especially in Parliamentary Selections, because there is definitely a feeling out there, or there 
was, that prospective parliamentary candidates were being parachuted is the phrase, into 
parliamentary constituencies and often they were policy advisors, they were people who had 
been quite close to people within the party, parliamentary party’ (participant 11). 
 
‘Old Labour to me generated a feeling, be it true or otherwise, that working-class people ran 
the party, New Labour brought in people from university who were educated in a more 
middle-class manner.  They had a good education and they went right into politics’ 
(participant 13). 
 
In contrast to the stereotypical Old Labour traditional working-class culture, New 
Labour with their newly elected MPs from a range of social class and educational 
backgrounds was developing a classless brand to be potentially attractive to a far 
wider section of the electorate in a more atomised contemporary class structure.  Even 
so, while the explicit causes may be complex, the importance of communication in 
establishing and sustaining the brand and its perceived broad appeal cannot be 
understated.  New Labour were thus promoting a classless political brand so as to 
garner a greater level of support across traditional class lines.  This led them to 
successfully court non-core working-class voters in the communal tradition.  This is a 
position summarised below by two long-standing Labour representatives in Carlisle, 
an area that was on the whole, enticed by the New Labour classless brand: 
 
‘They realised that they could have their core Labour voters, but they needed to attract non-
Labour voters from a higher social class, more middle-class people, from richer areas, and try 
and persuade them that they were the party of the future; an investment’ (participant 5). 
 
‘I think what they wanted to do was to retain the base and then add on to it and make the party 
have a broader appeal across different class levels.  That is what I believe it tried to do, it tried 
to be all things to all people and it recognised that in order to stay in power for any length of 
time it needed to have broader appeal with people who saw themselves perhaps as higher in 
social standing than the communal blue-collar working-classes’ (participant 8). 
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In regards Labour’s sociological development, within a contemporary framework, the 
New Labour brand clearly was more attractive to a wider scope of people than that of 
its Old Labour predecessor.  Despite the previous entrenched loyalty to stereotypical 
working-class interests, Blair, according to Dell (2000), and Wallace (2010), could see 
past such narrow class baggage.  He was the first Labour leader to prioritise the 
communal middle-classes and the relevance of the atomised individual over the 
party’s established mainstay working-class electorate.  This was done in the main, to 
broaden their general class appeal in specific marginal areas such as North-West 
Cumbria, and make the prospect of electoral success seem realistically attainable, a 
sentiment epitomised by a Labour representative in Carlisle: 
 
‘Absolutely because of what he did in recognising and supporting the middle, and saying the 
right things to the middle, and giving policies to the middle, that is what he did so effectively, 
and as a consequence they became Labour supporters, and they said, “this guy is looking after 
us”, which is what it is about, so that happened yes, it drew the middle-class in from his 
policies and the way he looked, and the way he spoke’ (participant 2). 
 
New Labour ‘was seduced by the gospel’ of atomised consumerism, ‘which is self-
regulating and requires no social or institutional framework to function.  The 
sovereign consumer had replaced the ideas of the citizen and the public sphere.  The 
image that guided New Labour’s policies is one of the lonely individual, set free from 
the state in order to face life’s risks alone – like those lean urban “survivors” on their 
mountain bikes who haunt our streets’ (Giddens, 2000, p.12).  It can be seen, as stated 
by Dunleavy (1989), and Rosen (2005), that such an aspirational ethos was a political 
project that worked to secure consent of popular forces, by playing to their inner-
selfish consumer desires. 
 
This strategy was orchestrated so as to accumulate the widest possible class support, a 
strategy which a decade later would inspire the New Labour classless outlook.  The 
outcome of this was the fragmentation of the communal class ethos as the politics of 
aspiration required that people materialistically pursued larger houses and richer more 
fulfilled lives; they were hence eager to trade communal commonality for atomised, 
consumerist gain.  The rise of this New Labour alternative to Thatcherism had notable 
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detrimental effects on the Conservative Party as they were seen as socially redundant 
during the Blair years, for ‘although they valued individual freedom and at least 
claimed to value communities’ (Thorpe (2011)), they failed unlike New Labour, to 
appreciate that this must be tallied with the promotion of social justice and 
egalitarianism. 
 
The traditional working-class, the core of the Old Labour support, is currently though 
in decline as it has been fragmented, and atomised.  It can no longer be assumed that 
all working people, or to follow Marxist parlance, those with only their labour power 
to sell, feel a natural political association or relevance to those of similar economic 
background that they possibly once did in the early post-war years. 
 
The Blairite New Labour agenda pronounced an end to the party’s dependence on 
class division, as the traditional working-class for whom the party had consistently 
spoken up for, and as a consequence which it relied upon for its core political 
viability, was disappearing (Dale (2008); Ormrod et al. (2013)).  This impression is 
illustrated below in the context of Labour support in North-West Cumbria, where the 
voter determines his or her vote on what can advance his or her as an atomised 
individual rather than as part of a communal class grouping.  This is an argument 
noted by two participants, the first from Allerdale; the second from Carlisle: 
 
‘People in their everyday lives frankly do not talk about specific political issues; when people 
go in the ballot box, the most important thing that is in their mind is, “does this person I’m 
voting for understand me, get where I’m coming from, can I rely on him or her if I seek 
support, will they almost instinctively act in a way that I would agree with?’” (participant 4). 
 
‘It’s about what people want out of it now as individual citizens; it is not particularly about 
broad ideological argument’ (participant 9). 
 
The rise of the atomised Thatcherite agenda has clearly taken root in common class, 
political discourse, thus Labour needs to keep adapting itself so as to keep up with the 
enormity of such an ever-evolving contemporary structure.  Class divisions, in the old 
communal sense, have become irrelevant (Gould (1998); Kriegel & Williford (2006)).  
Politics in Britain, like that in the United States, ‘is now an open contest between 
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conflicting solutions to real problems in which parties must convince individual voters 
of the force of their arguments’ through an acceptable, packaged-up political brand 
(Daly (2008)).  This was a widely-held view encapsulated below by three participants 
from a variety of areas and districts in North-West Cumbria: 
 
‘I think in the New Labour era, the position was, “if we want to have our values and we want 
to deliver on them, we will package ourselves up so that we’ll get elected”’ (participant 5). 
 
‘What they saw was the emergence of a new brand; which in the main, was very much about 
how people looked, how people spoke, what they wore, it did become much more corporate, 
definitely.  I think they learned that from the Conservatives, that you, in order to be seen as 
politically viable, then you have got to present a brand’ (participant 14). 
 
‘I mean everything just seemed to be right, didn’t it, like he (Tony Blair) was saying; “this is a 
slightly unknown shiny new party”, which had been out of power for so long and they seemed 
to have shaken-off their old-fashioned class image, which was less relevant’ (participant 15). 
 
In addition, as Coates (2005) notes, ‘the class structure changed, public opinion also 
changed with the creation of a new popular rhetoric by the Thatcher governments.  
For example, all mainstream political parties now endorse the new atomised “popular 
capitalism” ethos which encourages people to see themselves as distinct individuals’.  
This ‘meant policy and ideological change were needed to reflect these permanent 
changes in the political landscape and to be electorally viable, and New Labour was 
born for this purpose’.  It is thus more likely that that New Labour ideology, which 
refers to the period from 1994 onwards, will remain in some fashion because it 
reflects the context within which the mainstream party politics operates. 
 
This ‘is because it is difficult for the party to change further in terms of ideology as 
they are restricted by their history and the circumstances in which they find 
themselves.  There are only two broad economic systems; socialism which is 
associated with the left, and capitalism which is associated with the right, within 
which parties can locate their ideology.  Labour was created by the trade unions and 
working people to support their [communal] class cause, which means that the party 
has to lean towards socialism, or the left, if only slightly because they are hemmed in 
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by their historical structure and party tradition.  Old Labour leaned towards socialism 
with its brand of social democracy but this is no longer viable’ due to contemporary 
class atomisation, ‘so there has been a move to the centre for the party with the 
creation of New Labour’ (Coates, 2005, p.30). 
 
New Labour as follows had to break explicitly with its collectivist class past, and to 
demonstrate this they symbolically altered their long-held principles (Gould (1998); 
Dell (2000)).  This involved changing the party’s constitution and founding communal 
class principles, among them Clause IV, which committed the party to taking major 
components of the economy into public ownership.  A revised Clause IV allowed for 
the workings of the consumerised market economy at the expense of the historicised 
rhetoric of the workers owning the means of production. 
 
New Labour, as stated by Foote (1997), and Fairclough (2000), set out to represent 
functional classless values of openness, modernity, economic orthodoxy, and 
redistributory social policy.  The brand had to emotionally reassure and hence remove 
the fear that voters still after many years felt that a Labour government would return 
the country to the dark days of obsolete, communal class-war mentality whose 
philosophy was depicted theoretically at least, through Clause IV.  This was an 
interpretation mentioned below by Labour representatives in both Allerdale and 
Carlisle: 
 
‘It (the Labour Party) identified with the “working-class”, but as an industrial class it has died, 
it had to find a new constituency so to speak’ (participant 6). 
  
‘The abolition of Clause IV was the perfect example of where Blair’s was, if you like in the 
sense of what needed to happen symbolically, to show the party had changed’ (participant 7). 
 
Blair accomplished these objectives, persuading the party to accept that Thatcher’s 
atomised cultural discourse of the 1980s is here to stay, and successfully carrying 
through the abolition of Clause IV (Dell (2000); Griffiths & Hickson (2009)).  The 
key to Blair’s politics was the nurturing of the reciprocal relationship between the 
atomised individual and society at large, where this culture of community and 
inclusivity left no room for the outdated notions of communal class identity, class 
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interest, and class conflict (Cannadine (1999)).  Such an assessment is lucidly denoted 
in the explicit parochial setting of North-West Cumbria by an experienced Labour 
political representative in Carlisle: 
 
‘They probably do look at themselves as a brand now, yeah, and making themselves appealing 
to whoever, that is the issue now’ (participant 10). 
  
This brand culture specifically arose as an attempt to destroy the communal ethos by 
dividing working people from believing they had common class interests; but were 
instead individual consumers that could be manipulated to promote a capitalist system 
which suppresses them.  Thatcher, as a result of her policies, as stated by Bottomore 
(1991), and Cannadine (1998), went a long way towards achieving her ambition of 
banishing from political debate the language of traditional class dialogue and with it 
the powerful class loyalty it inflicted upon the Labour movement. 
 
The fact that ‘Blair did not resurrect it is a measure of her achievement in changing 
the way people think about social structures, social relations, and social identities in 
today’s Britain’ (Crompton, 2008, p.87).  The party had shifted and they were 
communicating to the new atomised populace, the contemporary class discourse that 
they wished to hear; they were for the most part, won over, so consequently there was 
a meaningful class-based shift. 
 
Kinnock and his successor John Smith were doing a genuine repositioning of the party 
to what would become New Labour (Drower (1994); Jones (1994)), nonetheless, as 
Hay (1999), and Stuart (2005) stated, under Blair it was polished and spun to create an 
effective electoral package, a view supported by four research participants below: 
 
‘Branding, you could use the word modernise because they (the New Labour modernisers) felt 
that the Old Labour appeared to be an old class-based lumbering, so when New Labour 
formed they issued with new badges, bright red things, everyone used to wear them to begin 
with.  You go to “middle-class” theatre functions and there were people with these bright red 
badges on, pronouncing “New Labour, New Britain”’ (participant 6). 
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‘If a party is serious about wanting to run the country and if it is serious about being a national 
political party of government, then they have to get serious about how they promote and 
portray a professional communications image as nobody gets any plaudits for being 
amateurish; New Labour ultimately did this and were electorally successful’ (participant 7). 
 
‘In the New Labour era, the position was, “if we want to have our values and we want to 
deliver on them, we will package ourselves up so that we will get elected and we can start 
changing things”.  I think it was a brand that they were putting across, this idea that the party 
was not simply just for the “working-classes” anymore but it was for anybody so, yeah, it is 
classless.  They came across as slick and efficient, and more importantly they, unlike Old 
Labour, were non-threatening in the sense in a class and policy-sense’ (participant 14). 
 
‘I think people were saying, “Yes, this New Labour, this is really good”’ (participant 15). 
 
The election of Blair in 1997, then to some extent changed the party’s generic past 
class brand persona as it became cool to be associated with the Labour Party, as it was 
part of the ‘Cool Britannia’ new cultural theme which was prescient at the time 
(Panich & Leys (1997)).  It must also be stated that such consumerism, although 
clearly relevant, does has its limitations (Crompton (2008); Baines & Shaughnessy 
(2014)), as the British public will only support such a party if they believe what is 
behind the change in brand image is genuinely real and true.  This position was noted 
by one Carlisle participant in the context of the New Labour classless brand success: 
 
‘I think it can be overstated, and I think there was a recognition in the Labour Party that in 
doing that, there were potential pitfalls and I think we (New Labour) guarded against those to 
some degree, so the party at that time did not just become a completely empty vessel that was 
defined and promoted via a more attractive logo or whatever, the party actually had to have 
some solid stuff there and it had to be grounded in something and I think they (New Labour) 
pulled that off very well, they managed that trick very well’ (participant 7). 
 
A political party can broadly, according to the research participants, be successful for 
a limited period of time, but eventually people in these atomised class times, start to 
question the party’s brand authenticity.  Equally, there are required standard 
disciplines that go with that, like the repetitions and the brand identity which aim to 
build on certain key strengths so as to be as attractive in the widest possible sense. 
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This section ascertained the relevance and role which the rise of such an atomised and 
classless consumerist, communications culture has played in regards Labour’s position 
and their class-based support.  New Labour skilfully embraced the new brand culture 
promoted by Bernays and the New Right a decade before.  They developed a classless 
political brand which was very effective both nationally and locally. 
 
The ideological challenge for Labour in the future, is to provide a pragmatic, leftist 
alternative in the promotion of individual aspiration, which is distinctive from the 
standardised Thatcherite atomised ethos (Giddens (2002); Cohen (2007)).  By being at 
heart, the party of the communal working masses, Labour must ensure that they take 
ownership of the socio-political consensus, and in this manner, dictate the narrative 
for future political, class debate in Britain. 
 
Post New Labour and its Class Confusion 
Post New Labour for that reason, given the emotional power of its traditional class 
history, have to recognise as the research participants alluded to, that they must not 
within both a general or a specific geographic context of North-West Cumbria, come 
across as ideologically and/or sociologically threatening in this contemporary 
atomised classless era.  This sociological contradiction has led to a confusion as to 
what Post New Labour was meant to represent, an interpretation of which is outlined 
below. 
 
This was a commonly-held sentiment held by a range of research participants.  By this 
means, by combining such scepticism of New Labour with a refusal to endorse a 
return to Old Labour communal politics, the party portrayed an image of confusion in 
regards its class perspective, a belief reinforced by five research participants below: 
 
‘(The party is) a complete mess, it’s struggling to redefine itself’ (participant 1). 
 
‘Well that is what Ed Miliband tried and the country rejected, it was in essence a compromise 
between Old and New without having a clear definition.  The leadership tenure of Ed 
Miliband was much divided, the reason he failed to convince was because he tried to speak 
left to the party and moderate to the country and they could see through him’ (participant 2). 
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‘I mean from 2010 (the election defeat), obviously and then the disastrous election defeat 
(2015), I think that’s just indicative of how confused I think the party was’ (participant 3). 
 
‘Wishy-washy Labour, it was not a clear message, and this is the key point’ (participant 7). 
 
‘I just don’t think he (Ed Miliband) had the opportunity to describe a new vision, whatever 
way he went, whether he tried to be like Blair, or he tried to be like Harold Wilson, somehow 
he didn’t have the opportunity or the skill to stamp his own identity’ (participant 15). 
 
Further insight into this issue of the contemporary Post New Labour class outlook is 
that it is in constant and continual flux.  This assessment was particularly prevalent 
since the election of left-winger Jeremy Corbyn in September 2015 (and re-election a 
year later).  There is now a strong perception within the party in North-West Cumbria 
that he could take the party back to the Old Labour, more traditional class-based 
politics, a perspective commonplace before the premiership of Tony Blair. 
 
This notion that Corbyn was associated with Old Labour communal class politics 
(Prince (2016); Seymour (2016)), is highlighted on a locational backdrop as the new 
members that have joined the party in Carlisle and Allerdale are from predominantly 
urban areas.  The sociological assumptions being for the most part, that they are 
people from a conventional Old Labour class tradition that are reaffirming a desire for 
the party to return to promoting the interests of a collectivised working-class: 
 
‘It will go back to the class politics, and it will alienate anyone else from wanting to vote 
Labour’ (participant 5). 
 
‘I think it would be very much about income redistribution, climbing heights of industry, it 
would be very much about an economic policy based around high taxes and an approach to 
business which is very different to where you are now’ (participant 7). 
 
‘But now Corbyn has also got elected, he is veering towards the other direction, the left’ 
(participant 11). 
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‘I think they are trying to move towards an Old Labour direction, definitely, I’m just speaking 
of what I’ve experienced through the surge of the new members and the new people that have 
joined the party in Carlisle, there is that definitely, those people from Old Labour have re-
joined and are reaffirming, “let’s get it back to what it was”, that old style’ (participant 14). 
 
Jeremy Corbyn definitely should be acclaimed for shepherding in this traditional type 
of class-centric ideological politics.  He has achieved this, as Oborne (2016) stated, 
‘by reinventing public discourse itself.  He has abandoned the discredited politics of 
spin and manipulation associated both with Peter Mandelson and Tony Blair’s New 
Labour and David Cameron’s Tories.  Corbyn is not by any means a great orator, but 
he speaks in the simple, intelligible language of ordinary people’.  This communal 
perspective was highlighted by the final research participant, who after witnessing his 
performance as leader at the despatch box in the House of Commons could sense that 
Corbyn had moved considerably beyond the once dominant New Labour classless 
theme: 
 
‘He is going back to Old Labour in the sense that he stands up for the ordinary person in the 
street and like in his first “Prime Minister’s Question Time”, he actually read out emails or 
tweets from ordinary people, so he has got that spirit in him to say, “hang on, never mind all 
this House of Commons nonsense, let’s stand up for ordinary people”’ (participant 15). 
 
Notwithstanding the rise of the left, there are still sizeable splits in the party, as it 
struggles to define its new class outlook.  This was shown during the last but one 
election campaign as one participant noted: 
 
‘Ed Miliband just dropped the “New” and the party became Labour again, but it was not Old 
Labour either, they are all Post-New Labour’ (participant 4). 
 
There is clearly as of yet, not a new, clear class consensus for which the party could 
unite under at this point in the Post New Labour era.  This is notably illustrated 
through the bitter divisions highlighted during the last two leadership elections in 
2015 and 2016.  On a general class level, the party’s strategy, according to Dell 
(2000), and Golding (2016), needs to be recalibrated.  They must endeavour to try and 
recapture the atomised and classless ethos which they have lost in the last decade 
149 | P a g e  
 
which was so skilfully developed and engineered during the New Labour years.  They 
must also though from a communal perspective, accept that Labour first and foremost 
is the party which must support the traditional working-classes, a communal class 
categorisation which even with the rise of the atomisation ethos, is still the most 
definable in contemporary class discourse. 
 
The Conservatives are endeavouring to stigmatise Labour as being the party of the 
unemployed, or as Savage & Devine (2013) would assert, the ‘Precariat’ or the 
‘Underclass’.  They are trying, as stated by the research participants, to portray the 
Post New Labour brand under the leadership of Corbyn like that to a lesser extent as 
with Miliband, as an antiquated communal-styled class dinosaur which is irrelevant to 
the wider electorate.  The question is still open, certainly from the content stated by 
local representatives in North-West Cumbria.  At the time of writing, whether Labour, 
in its contemporary Post New Labour guise, can prevent such a brand perception from 
taking root is still an open-question which can be further dissected in future academic 
research of this kind. 
 
In summary, the Labour Party’s class consciousness has developed with that of 
society at large, as the party generally speaking is chiefly class-based, but as time has 
advanced the party has altered its accustomed stance over this issue.  Old Labour was 
principally traditional in its class outlook by promoting the communal interests of the 
working-classes.  New Labour, since the elevation of the Thatcherite atomised 
revolution of the 1980s, followed the rise of the individualised class culture promoted 
by the New Right, while Post New Labour is struggling to define its class position.  
The next section aims to show how the party under the new fragmented class culture 
was affected by rural/urban locational basis, specifically within North-West Cumbria. 
 
The Urban/Rural Dynamic of Labour Support – The Spatial 
Such analysis is correlated to Althusser, Lefebvre, and Harvey’s Marxist social spatial 
analysis, and Castells’ atomised network society theory.  Attention is placed upon the 
final theme of the study which relates to issues concerning the Labour Party’s brand, 
be it Old, New, or Post New, to the relevance of a specific geographic space, and the 
resulting attitude that could develop in regards potential affinity for a particular 
political brand.  This thematic category through distinctive first-hand interview 
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research, consequently endeavours to link class, communications, and location to 
support for the Labour Party both nationally and within a broad localised context with 
a specific focus placed upon North-West Cumbria. 
 
The initial part of the interviews focused on the general awareness of the role of class 
and political party affinity, and the subsequent relevance of contemporary 
communication and brand culture at a national rather than a local level.  In this 
fashion, not unexpectedly, knowledge and understanding of these themes did not vary 
considerably. 
 
This was outlined when the dialogue turned to the role of locality, where the rural and 
the urban representatives, agreed that Labour is still seen, both nationally and within 
the spatialised confines of North-West Cumbria, as a traditional working-class urban 
centric party which fails to promote its class image effectively in rural areas. 
 
Both urban and rural representatives stated the belief that the party is not especially 
comfortable campaigning in rural areas as its common class character which is urban 
by nature, is not suited to campaign to such an electorate: 
 
‘If you’re talking about Labour, there is still a strong perception that Labour does not 
represent the interests of people that live in rural areas’ (participant 1). 
 
‘I suppose people were a lot friendlier and pleased to see you in the urban areas; in the rural 
areas, by the time you had walked up the drive and knocked on the door you didn’t quite 
know what was going to happen to you, you know that you are going to meet more opposition 
in a rural area’ (participant 15). 
 
Labour, Old, New, or Post New, is chiefly an urban working-class party.  This is 
highlighted over the issue of the broad allocation of resources at election time, where 
typical predominance is given to the urban area as it is still the locale where the party 
believes their natural working-class base still resides, and hence needs to be given 
priority of focus as it will deliver the greater number of votes and seats: 
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‘Traditionally, in the rural, we have struggled.  Labour core support tends to be in urban 
constituencies’ (participant 2). 
  
‘Resources, well yeah, I could tell you the Carlisle story, I think it will give you an indication 
of the difficulties here, from a resource perspective, our ability to get around to face-to-face 
communications is much easier in an urban area than it is in a rural area because they are more 
disparate but I think ultimately the level of concentration on the urban area is because we can 
basically do more work in a much shorter space of time’ (participant 7). 
 
‘Quite often they would, if it came down to a choice between campaigning in an urban area 
and campaigning in a rural area, they would campaign in an urban area because you would get 
more done, the houses are packed together, you are more likely to get elected by those people, 
whilst if you went into the rural areas you’ve got miles and miles of driveways to walk down, 
you maybe knock on three houses and drive ten miles and none of them would vote for you 
anyway, you have got to make that judgement’ (participant 11). 
 
This contrasts greatly with the rural representatives who believe that this prioritising 
of the urban vote at the expense of the rural support is deeply flawed.  The party is 
missing a chance to widen its appeal within rural locales with a sizable composite of 
habitual working-class voters who in the past they have failed to connect with, and if 
they ever could do so then the party’s electoral strength in such rural areas would be 
considerably enhanced (Griffiths (2007); Griffiths & Hickson (2009)). 
 
Most interviewees noted the entrenchment of this type of position, where the 
following three quotes illustrated the justification for such an argument.  The major 
problem, as one Labour representative in a rural area in Allerdale observed, is brand 
recognition: 
 
‘We went to see people in the villages around Cockermouth where they had never seen a 
Labour Party person ever and we found all sorts of people who voted Labour’ (participant 15). 
 
Similarly, another two participants representing urban wards in Carlisle agreed with 
such sentiments: 
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‘Oh, we go out every Saturday but because we focus our efforts on the areas we represent, 
now as a Council, I did listening Council events last week where it was about talking to local 
people about what should our priorities be for the next three years and I actually went out into 
Longtown, and Brampton and did some sessions there.  What was interesting was that people 
were saying, “thanks for coming out, we’re really impressed that a Labour politician has 
actually come and sat in our rural community centre for two hours to listen to us”, so it was 
almost a bit of a surprise that Labour had turned up’ (participant 8). 
 
‘There is less work done in rural areas because they are seen as more Conservative areas 
(class-wise), and they are thus simply written-off as Conservative areas’ (participant 14). 
 
The clear marketing shift which played a role in the rise of Labour support from the 
class-based Old Labour to the more classless New Labour cut through locations, 
chiefly highlighting its rise in prominence in non-traditional rural areas in North-West 
Cumbria: 
 
‘Politics is complicated in a place like Cumbria, it is very complicated because I think 
ultimately it is quite Conservative with a small “c”, and I think the Labour Party in Carlisle 
and probably in Allerdale as well has taken a lot of coaxing and shifting and moving into a 
place where it recognises that in terms of modernising; communications are really important’ 
(participant 7). 
 
The overriding conclusion appears to be that the Labour Party in the Post New Labour 
era in North-West Cumbria cannot campaign in rural areas because they have limited 
resources so they tend to concentrate on protecting the traditionally more urban wards 
that the party stereotypically believe are more attainable electorally.  In some areas of 
rural Allerdale, the party follows this traditional rigid class perspective to extreme 
limits, where people are categorised along broad spatial socio-geographic lines 
(Althusser (1970); Lefebvre (1974); Harvey (2010)).  The party tends to ignore the 
numerous rural wards such as in the villages near Cockermouth where the populace is 
traditional rural middle-class.  They instead favour prioritising their resources in the 
far fewer urban wards, like for instance in Workington.  This is a stance highlighted 
by a participant who as hitherto noted, represents a rural area in Allerdale: 
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‘I now represent a rural constituency, I live in a village and the Labour Party was campaigning 
away in Cockermouth, we said, “we’ll just do our own thing out here” and they said, 
“Alright”, so we went around all the villages and saw everybody but that was a conscious 
decision.  We weren’t encouraged to do that and it’s never happened before, so we went to see 
people in the villages around Cockermouth where they had never seen a Labour Party person 
ever and we found all sorts of people who voted Labour, so it is more difficult to campaign in 
rural areas because you have got to walk there or get in your car.  Labour does not feel 
particularly comfortable campaigning in a traditional rural area because they think around 
every corner there is going to be a Conservative supporter, which is not necessarily true’ 
(participant 15). 
 
Following the rigid Marxist socio-geographic symbolism (Castree & Gregory (1996); 
Middleton (2013)), the urban populace is widely perceived to be chiefly of the 
communal working-class, whilst the rural inhabitants are to some extent seen to be 
more middle-class and accordingly are sociologically atomised (Susser (2001); Bell 
(2006)).  The Labour Party in North-West Cumbria thus mostly see rural 
constituencies as simply being out of touch on a traditional class basis.  This was a 
position noted by participants from both districts, whether they represented an urban 
or rural district made no difference, the first example of which is noted below from a 
participant representing an urban ward in Carlisle: 
 
‘We are never going to get them (rural electorate), now that might change over time, but what 
they (the Labour Party in North-West Cumbria) do is they strategically target areas [where] 
they know they will get the vote’ (participant 5). 
 
Another interviewee from a rural background in Allerdale similarly recounted that the 
degree of concentration on the urban area, and the importance placed upon the 
relevance of cultural space like that promoted by the works of Lefebvre (1974), is 
evident in North-West Cumbrian Labour politics: 
 
‘Yes, I would agree that generally Carlisle, Whitehaven, Workington, Barrow (urban areas) 
would all vote Labour, but out in the rural areas (in North-West Cumbria) they would return 
Conservatives’ (participant 6). 
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More importantly though in terms of communications, the Labour Party certainly as 
hitherto noted, in its current Post New Labour form, within the context of North-West 
Cumbria, commonly follows this broad spatial concept.  This occurs not just because 
of resource prioritisation, but also due to a belief that rural areas are not electorally 
attainable, thus as a consequence they do not focus on the rural wards as much as they 
should.  Such frustration is expanded underneath by a leading Labour political 
representative in urban North-West Cumbria: 
 
‘We don’t have any rural wards, we have held them in the past, but we generally don’t, so our 
foot soldiers are focussed on the wards that they represent, now we do go out in places like 
Dalston, Longtown, Brampton, but not as frequently as we would do in our urban areas 
because that is where our core support is.  We normally lose them (non-traditional rural 
wards) now by a significant margin and what happened was we thought “we’ve lost them, 
we’re not going to get them back any time soon, so we won’t have much of a focus on them”’ 
(participant 8). 
 
The message and the kind of publicity that is being promoted by the party in urban 
areas has to be different to what needs to be promoted in rural areas; for it must 
promote rural issues which traditionally in general terms, is not the natural political 
message associated with communal Labour politics.  This perspective follows the 
spatial analysis (Sprinker (1992); Elden (2004)), that location in its traditional sense, 
is still the determining factor of voting behaviour.  Subsequent political affiliation is 
demonstrated on a communications level by how Labour accept that they need to 
brand themselves differently depending on whether they are fighting for votes in a 
predominantly urban or rural constituency. 
 
Such a notion in practical terms, is supported by one local Labour Councillor 
representing an urban area in Carlisle, who ascertained that the communications of 
such a message in a rural area would have to be different to that of an urban one: 
 
‘I think it would need a lot of thinking about, how you would brand a Labour Party that would 
go out to say not Stanwix urban, but Stanwix rural and say, “how do we brand ourselves for 
the electorate here”, I would be interested to see how it could be done’ (participant 9). 
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There is a successful precedent for such a strategy in North-West Cumbria.  Labour 
for instance branded themselves successfully in a rural ward in the Solway area at the 
2011 local election, where the party branded a local candidate under the banner of the 
‘Labour Coast and Countryside candidate’.  He primarily promoted the spatial idea in 
North-West Cumbria which communicated the Labour Party’s message differently in 
the deep rural areas because coastal areas, coastal resorts, seaside resorts, farming 
communities react more negatively to communal class politics than their urban 
equivalents (Griffiths (2007)). 
 
This atomised party branding, inspired by locational class priorities, on the whole 
prevailed, as the candidate polled above expectations, a view outlined by as hitherto 
noted, a senior Labour representative in Carlisle: 
 
‘This occurred because the leaflets going through people’s doors didn’t look like Labour 
leaflets; they had “Labour Coast and Country”, which almost got the individual into trouble 
with people in the regional office because they were very centralistic about branding but he 
was promoting a message, very effectively, that the Labour Party was actually speaking to 
rural people on a socio-political level, about their specific problems’ (participant 8). 
 
This strategy equally can work in practical terms in reverse, as was illustrated when 
the party prevailed in the customary Conservative town of Keswick in 1991, three 
years before Tony Blair became party leader.  The party used Old Labour style 
communal class politics, where the Labour representative concentrated on solidifying 
his core ‘working-class’ support, and as a result gained a surprise victory in an area 
previously deemed unattainable to the party: 
 
‘For years Labour kept losing here (rural Keswick ward) and then we stopped putting up 
candidates and so I had a go and I realised that despite the general Conservative voters in this 
area, one third of people lived in Council Estates, a very high proportion, so I concentrated on 
them, on getting them out, but everyone assumed Keswick was just Tory’ (participant 6). 
 
It would be logical to recognise that if Labour does not promote a wider geographic 
perspective, then they are not going to increase their support in such non-traditional 
areas.  A strategy of meeting and communicating with people who are not of a 
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traditional, spatial class locality, would be more beneficial as it would widen the 
perceived relevance of the party’s message.  This view is espoused by a Labour 
representative below who from a rural perspective in Allerdale, presents a first-hand 
account of such a class focus in North-West Cumbria: 
 
‘Labour have got to realise that there are deprived people in the countryside who are 
struggling for whatever reason, maybe they are renting an old damp cottage, it is not just all 
about big houses.  It is seen that the Labour Party are not interested in them because they are 
in a rural village and you have got to try and change that.  Nationally as well, the Labour Party 
does not get themselves represented on to rural forums in North-West Cumbria.  However, 
because they do not have many representatives in the rural areas, it is difficult, but I feel it is a 
missed opportunity possibly’ (participant 15). 
 
In the last analysis, broad class categories, although important, are never the 
determining factor of political party affinity, a view supported by Best (2005), and 
Marcuse et al. (2011), who state that class and its relationship with a specific area is 
always a disfigured expression of social reality.  This is not to undermine the strides 
that the party has made to widen its class appeal to the more refined contemporary 
class categorisation by placing more emphasis particularly during the New Labour 
classless era to identify a more atomised, cultural class support in the rural areas.  
Following the increase in Labour support in such locales, this modern cultural class 
concept could, and to some extent, did work in practical terms.  This was principally 
true with individuals who were deemed to be from traditional middle-class 
backgrounds who generally speaking, in the post-Thatcherite, New Labour period 
would naturally feel less need to associate themselves with the historic working-class 
traditions which were the hallmark of the Old Labour brand (Hay (1999); Rosen 
(2005)). 
 
In addition, this though would be enmeshed, or as Althusser (1970) would state, 
hegemonised within a specific urban locale of traditional middle-class individuals who 
largely worked in the educated social sectors such as for instance, teaching, and 
counselling.  They would inexorably also still feel more inclined to have a natural 
cultural affinity for the party on a class basis, as one urban-based participant observed 
in the context of Carlisle: 
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‘Yeah, say a situation in an urban constituency when you can have a teacher living in that 
urban constituency, who could be deemed “middle-class” because of their surroundings they 
may feel that they are part of a big society here and would be more associated with Labour’ 
(participant 7). 
 
By following such a diverse modern cultural class framework, this same participant 
claims that the party in North-West Cumbria were taking some of that cultural 
contemporary class support for granted: 
 
‘If you were a Labour voter living in Wetheral, a village just outside Carlisle, the sense is that 
if you are a middle-class person, and if you are voting Labour, then you are going to vote 
Labour anyway, you are going to have enough political literacy about you’ (participant 7). 
 
The party activists have to, following the communal spatial ethos, make a pragmatic 
judgement in regards to prioritising their greater natural, traditional class support in 
urban areas, over that of rural locales where there is a general view that the party, in 
the main, has less of a natural class affinity.  This is a perception which is lamented 
from the standpoint of the party in rural Allerdale: 
 
‘I think it is seen that the Labour Party are not interested in them because they are in a rural 
village, yeah, so in my experience I would say that in an urban area they will spend far more 
time canvassing in Workington than you would in Keswick for instance’ (participant 15). 
 
The party also on a strategic level, has to realistically judge where they are going to 
get the maximum result from, so the accepted long-established class prejudices occur 
when faced with such harsh pragmatic electoral realities of party politics in North-
West Cumbria.  The issue of ‘class’ emerged, as remarked by Goonewardena et al. 
(2008), and McQuire (2016), as a heuristic for the idea of ‘comfort’ and economic 
wealth, and how the perception of the space in and around these factors is part of the 
natural attachment towards conservative ideology and hence contrary to stereotypical 
Labour values. 
 
Several of the participants interviewed recognised, in a similar fashion to Diamond & 
Kenny (2011), and Diamond (2015), that Post New Labour, by following a communal 
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class structure, contradicts the New Labour’s classless brand itinerary.  This in the 
context of North-West Cumbria, was noted concisely by three Labour representatives 
in urban wards who have experienced such perceptions in regards potential rural 
support for the party: 
 
‘I walk up some rural roads and see some big houses and driveways and think to myself; “why 
would you vote Labour”’ (participant 7). 
 
‘Ultimately then, there are more refined class differences and Labour has traditionally 
neglected more mixed, small town rural areas in North-West Cumbria.  If you analyse North-
West Cumbria, the rural area tends to be what you would class as Conservative areas, the 
party struggles in the Brampton’s and Hayton’s of this world to get the vote’ (participant 8). 
  
‘When we have had lots of time and supplies, we have gone to places that are rural, out of the 
way and they’ve said, “this is great and it’s so good that you have come because nobody ever 
comes here”, but we still do not get voted in because they are naturally Conservative, we may 
go around knocking on the door and the Conservative candidate hasn’t but they still vote for 
the Conservative candidate’ (participant 11). 
 
There is thus, according to the Labour political representatives interviewed in North-
West Cumbria, an assumption that rural areas like those who border prosperous 
employment sites, the most prominent of which as noted in Appendix I, being 
Sellafield, are natural Conservative areas.  In such areas where there is a 
predominance of large houses and economic wealth (Wynne et al. (1993); Blowers 
(2016)), they habitually have been averse to communal Labour politics where income 
redistribution was deemed a priority. 
 
This historic class perspective where the party concentrated on traditional locales 
associated with previously held communal class allegiances is contradictory to the 
New Labour dream of becoming a truly classless party, able to win in any locale.  In a 
broad localised context, influenced by the Giddens’ Third Way tradition, such a 
philosophy endeavoured to move the party away from big Trade Union communal 
influence, and to instead speak to a new classless group of working people who were 
endeavouring to adapt to this new atomised reality (Hay (1999); Geary & Pabst 
(2015)).  Such changes, as alluded to by Castells (2000, and 2012), and quoted by 
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Giddens (2010), ‘included intensifying globalisation, the development of a post-
industrial or service economy and, in an information age’ the emergence of an 
unskilled, less politicised, atomised class culture.  The expansion of the service 
economy went hand in hand with the shrinking of the communal working-class, and 
with it the weakening of the Old Labour supporter base.  Such sentiments are 
supported by a Labour representative in an urban ward in Allerdale: 
 
‘Consequently, the political certainties which they had grown up with and used as their anchor 
pads were gradually breaking down.  The concept of traditional employment, lifelong 
employment, apprenticeships, where “working people” could rely on, were all breaking down, 
national barriers were breaking down, everything was becoming much more fluid on a class 
level, with more complex atomised classifications.  New Labour was an attempt to build a 
new coalition of those who found, all that was solid in their lives as being melted away.  All 
the old Weberian and even Marxist traditional structures of solidarity, social structures were 
breaking down.  People no longer lived within half a mile of their nearest relatives, there was 
this whole kind of breakdown of the solid structures of society’ (participant 4). 
 
By this means, New Labour’s refined modern class message impacted on Labour 
voters in North-West Cumbria similar to how it impacted on Labour voters in any 
other industrial area.  This was undertaken for the most part by creating an intra-
district class divide, but on more focussed class terms which theoretically was a 
compromise between traditional and atomised perspectives. 
 
The above noted interview participant from Allerdale, stated that the contemporary 
Labour Party (Post New Labour) from a traditional spatial analysis, should, as Hasan 
& Macintyre (2011), and Prince (2016) allude, and Thorpe (2011) quote, ‘be 
embracing these disparate communities and uniting them as the vanguard of a new 
21st Century’ communal ‘Labour Movement’: 
 
‘Jamie Reed (Labour MP for Copeland) has an interesting thing of what Labour needs to do, it 
needs to reconnect with the Rugby League, lower division Football League towns in this 
country, the Carlisle’s, the Swindon’s, the Darlington’s, the Doncaster’s, the Crewe’s, the 
industrial towns not the metropolitan’s, not the Greater Manchester’s, the Birmingham’s, not 
the big metropolitan cities, the city regions, but the towns like Carlisle’ (participant 4). 
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It seems to be, following the geographic areas in which they are winning local 
elections, that the Conservatives concentrate their support in the less dense rural areas, 
whereas Labour supporters are economically assembled within the urban heartlands.  
In view of that, crucially, if it came down to a choice between campaigning in an 
urban area and campaigning in a rural area, the party in North-West Cumbria clearly 
promotes a ‘spatial’ strategy to maximise electoral political capital.  The opinion 
prevails that they would campaign in an urban area because following the spatial 
prioritisation agenda, it numerically would be more productive as they believe the 
majority of their core working-class supporter base are located there.  This would have 
the effect of increasing the chances of maximising their vote in such environments and 
by this means, keep the party’s electoral representation strong in those areas.  In 
contrast, as by and large referred to by Bell (2006), and Griffiths (2007), rural areas 
are sporadically spread spatially and realistically there would be limited expectations 
of there being any communal-styled class support within such geographic 
surroundings. 
 
In urban areas, Labour activists for that reason, will spend far more time canvassing in 
urban Workington, as it follows their core, spatial class geographic outlook, than they 
would in rural Keswick.  They also would determine an area as either urban or rural 
and campaign accordingly in such a place notwithstanding specific localities.  This is 
powerfully emphasised below by the previously noted participant, who by 
representing an urban ward in a predominantly rural district of Allerdale, compares his 
general attitude towards the hypothetical situation where he was based in the chiefly 
urban district of Carlisle: 
 
‘I would campaign in an urban part of Carlisle in exactly the same way I would in the urban 
part of Workington or Whitehaven or Barrow or Lancaster or whatever, and I would run a 
different campaign in Longtown and Brampton or in Aspatria’ (participant 4). 
 
This spatial ethos which clearly defines Labour’s attitude to Urban/Rural politics is 
clearly still prominent, but since New Labour, the party have realised that class 
perception has become more complex, and been replaced with an atomised network 
thesis, where the relationship between class, political party affinity, and location, has 
become harder to discern. 
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The New Labour effect on Locale (North-West Cumbria): The Network 
There is thus a recognition that the rise of this atomised network thesis in regards 
Labour’s support has occurred on both a national as well as on a local level in North-
West Cumbria, a view effectively voiced below from the insight of rural Allerdale: 
 
‘The change to New Labour would have been part of winning in rural areas, but also there was 
the extreme reluctance of people to continue supporting the Tory government that had run out 
of ideas, so therefore it was not just because of the class shift to New Labour that led to 
electoral improvement both locally and nationally, but it did make it more acceptable to some 
people’ (participant 15). 
 
Having a figure like Tony Blair as the modern charming face of the New Labour 
classless brand which developed a diverse societal network, was beneficial on a class 
level as it helped them win over the atomised voter who had previously voted for the 
Conservatives during the Thatcher era.  This enabled the party to comfortably win the 
general elections of 1997, 2001, and 2005 (Giddens (2000); Pugh (2011)).  Such a 
perception was not lost on three participants, who speaking in the context of 
differential Labour support in North-West Cumbria, recognised his appeal: 
 
‘I think he did have an appeal and he was totally different to anything that the Tories were 
offering as well, people were ready for a change’ (participant 1). 
 
‘Yeah it must have done purely by the scale of the MPs that we returned’ (participant 3). 
 
‘We managed to win in Keswick which is two thirds Conservative but the Labour candidate in 
1997 managed to win here’ (participant 6). 
 
It is clear from these replies that if Labour in a broad sense, can have a balanced class 
perception and focus then they can transcend established class politics in North-West 
Cumbria.  New Labour, as noted by Rubinstein (2005), and Heppell & Theakston 
(2013), offered a modern classless image which was a clear difference from the 
traditional Old Labour vision which encouraged a wider spectrum of people who were 
prepared to vote for the party.  They, largely were enticed by New Labour’s atomised-
162 | P a g e  
 
styled brand; a classless network realistically open to anybody in any geographic area, 
a view maintained by two participants in urban Carlisle: 
 
‘You then have this massive shift and yes support the urban, but you have to by some means 
encourage rural to become involved and support you, which is what Blair did’ (participant 2). 
 
‘I think it was very much about selling the party to those people and to try and convert them to 
support the Labour Party’ (participant 8). 
 
In their early stages, New Labour, as acknowledged by Hay (1999), and Russell 
(2005), managed to hold on to their core support and add on to it those wavering 
voters who might have voted Conservative in the past but were now comfortable with 
the classless image New Labour was promoting.  This was a position stated below by 
two urban-based participants, firstly by a Carlisle, and then by an Allerdale Labour 
Councillor, as they both believed that the party during such an era, began to try and 
expand the atomised, Castellan network further away from its traditional class-based, 
urban-centric support roots: 
 
‘I would imagine that there was a general appeal as far as, the electoral uprising did not just 
occur from what I would deem to be from the working-classes, there must have been an 
(atomised) appeal from a range across the board’ (participant 9). 
 
‘Yeah it was more acceptable, maybe not acceptable, that is not the right word, but New 
Labour were offering everybody and anybody something that you could sign-up to if you 
lived in a rural area’ (participant 14). 
 
Such an atomised, if not classlessness philosophy, which was triggered particularly 
during the New Labour era, has though at times failed.  This is because the traditional 
class categorisations, no matter how outdated they may seem in contemporary society, 
still to some extent at least, determine broad perspectives over the issue and its 
subsequent correlation to political party affinity (Heffernan (2000); Minkin (2014)).  
If no party can please the whole electorate on contemporary atomised class terms, the 
question naturally arises whether they should return to communal class politics, or in 
fact instead look for different demographics.  In addition, with the relative electoral 
success of the New Labour brand in rural areas both in North-West Cumbria (see 
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Table III) and within a nationalised context, there is a suspicion, as broadly noted by 
Robotham (2005), and Parker (2015), that such contemporary atomised class 
perceptions have led to a form of political party merging. 
 
This is a perspective which would have been unthinkable in the previous communal 
class era.  In this current complex classless era though, external sociological and 
political network factors such as where a person is geographically located spatially 
and the cultural implications that occur through this, can potentially affect political 
party affinity which then can lead to a merging of political convictions (Bell (2006); 
Howard (2011)).  This position, inspired by the core spatial works of Castells (2000), 
was expressed by a research participant from an urban area, whilst discussing 
Labour’s political representation on a generic scale in North-West Cumbria, where she 
suggested: 
 
‘I have come across Labour politicians that really are Tories and Tory politicians who really 
are Right-Wing Labour’ (participant 1). 
 
There are doubtless similar Conservative areas where activists join that party with the 
purpose of being active in local politics, but this viewpoint through this study has been 
expressed in the context of the Labour Party in North-West Cumbria.  This classless 
dissection can also affect political representatives or prospective political 
representatives who do not have any strong political convictions on an ideological 
level but just want to play a part in local politics.  This view, as noted below by four 
urban participants, claimed that they thought they would become hegemonised 
through geographic identity into the dominant network: 
 
‘It is definitely blurring; the edges are blurring.  There certainly is at least one city councillor 
who is a Labour councillor and I doubt if he is Labour; he is right-wing’ (participant 2). 
 
‘I think it is easy to join whichever party.  There were people locally here do it, there is a 
councillor on the City Council who joined a party because they want to represent the ward 
where they live’ (participant 3). 
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‘Yes, they would become Tories, but only if Labour defines itself in an Old Labour way.  For 
example, I could point to several members of my own political party and even some 
Councillors in Cumbria County Council and Allerdale Borough Council who I keep thinking, 
that, “you’re only in the Labour Party because that’s how you get elected in your area, you 
don’t actually believe a word that the Labour Party believes in”’ (participant 4). 
  
‘I have heard, I will not name names; a local politician got elected for a party that he is not 
really in full support of and I think if he could have got a seat to stand for his original political 
affiliation then he would have done but it never happened so he swung’ (participant 5). 
 
These quotes seem to suggest that there is broad support that in such atomised class 
times there is a potential merging of traditional political affiliations.  Labour 
representatives, as widely denoted by Butler (2014), and Clark (2014), certainly might 
be reticent in expressing their genuine political allegiance, be it over class or specific 
policy, because they perceive it to be a potential hindrance in obtaining support in a 
place such as Keswick in rural North-West Cumbria.  They would instead, with the 
benefit of this new classless political era, stand as an ‘Independent’ and then after 
being elected, could vote with the Labour Party if they so wish.  This would allow 
them to disguise to some extent their true ideological allegiances; a view noted by two 
participants from contrasting demographic backgrounds in North-West Cumbria, the 
former from rural Allerdale, the latter from urban Carlisle: 
 
‘For some people, yes, I think certainly some people might conceal their true politics at a 
parish level, maybe even at a district level, for personal political advantage.  If a person stood 
for the Parish Council or stood for the district, it may well be perceived to be politically 
advantageous to be an Independent rather than a Labour person because they may intrinsically 
feel that being a Labour candidate would lose votes’ (participant 6). 
 
‘I mean I have seen such a situation occur in North-West Cumbria, I have seen someone who 
has been more left leaning as a Conservative councillor and you know, there are difficulties 
there, then they go and stand as an “Independent”, so yeah people do it’ (participant 9). 
 
Interviewees were next asked to comment on their perceptions of the overall impact of 
such potential merging during the ascent of the New Labour brand.  The party during 
the New Labour era, by and large became a catch-all classless party, in the Giddensian 
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tradition, one which tried to capture support in non-traditional rural areas, areas which 
previously were out of bounds to the Old Labour brand (Giddens 2002, and 2006)).  
The following six quotes show that the success of such a philosophy has led to a 
gradual merging of political party affinity between Labour and the Conservatives, in 
relation to the wider electorate as well as to their potential political representatives: 
 
‘“When in Rome do what the Romans do”, if you move to a particular place there would be 
pressure on you to conform to the culture of that place.  If everybody washes the car on a 
Sunday morning, then curtains would twitch if you did not do it as well’ (participant 4). 
 
‘I would find that really hard to swallow although it probably does happen’ (participant 5). 
 
‘Oh, yeah absolutely, I think it is a danger for both (political parties: Conservative and 
Labour) and I think it is a reflection of something of this whole notion of political allegiance 
becoming less, if you like, wedded on one side or the other and that is a reflection of 
improving living standards for people definitely and it is also a reflection of the fact that our 
politics allows or has moved into a place where support is less structured’ (participant 7). 
 
‘I think some people just want to serve their community, they are not actually that interested 
in the broader picture, they just want to be a local representative and make their community 
better and therefore you look at them and think they are not particularly political so they will, 
maybe opportunists are too strong a word, but they will go into whatever party will help them’ 
(participant 8). 
 
‘Yeah, I think that could actually happen; if you move out to a rural area and you are a Labour 
voter but you are a soft Labour voter, absolutely you could well become a Conservative voter’ 
(participant 9). 
 
‘I think this can happen, you do hear from time to time, “oh such and such is a Tory”, in an 
insulting way when he is actually a Labour Party member and as I said before, “if such and 
such were in a different place, they wouldn’t be Labour, they would be Conservative”.  Yeah, 
I think so, there is bound to be people who think, “right what is the easiest bus to get on here’ 
to where I want to be”’ (participant 11). 
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This argument must be considered critically though, as there was common agreement 
with the research participants that this would likely reinforce such a hegemonic ethos.  
In practical terms, this would occur if a Labour voter is surrounded by many other 
Labour voters, be it socially or geographically, as it would in general simply reinforce 
their spatial or atomised network perceptions.  If a person moves out to a small rural 
village maybe because they get employment at Sellafield or somewhere else, they may 
be surrounded by new neighbours and friends who may commonly be less inclined to 
vote Labour.  Such a potential locale shift may gradually atomise them on both a 
social and/or political basis, for they could come to see themselves as an individual 
entity in their own right rather than being part of a collectivised group (Hart Davis 
(1997); Bernard (2005)).  The consequence of this is that they might find that their 
previous communal class ethos is hegemonised by a classless perspective, as testified 
below from a general rural perspective: 
 
‘Yeah, but you would probably reinforce each other so if you are a Labour voter and you are 
surrounded by a lot of other Labour voters then that will reinforce your opinion basically.  If 
you move out to a small village and your neighbours and friends may be less inclined to vote 
Labour and then you might find that your own attitudes are questioned’ (participant 6). 
 
The corollary is that their political class affinity has been compromised through the 
locale in which they reside.  They have become individualised in their perspective, as 
their political party allegiance is affected by New Labour’s atomised and consumerist 
underpinnings like individual status and area, and not by ideological principle fostered 
through a clear class background, which was the theoretical feature of the 
collectivised Old Labour class era (Hay (1999); Ludlam & Smith (2000)).  Such 
sentiments were greatly supported by a Labour representative in urban Carlisle: 
 
‘Oh yeah, I think again, if we go back to Old Labour in the 1960s, and 1970s, it was very 
much, “this is your background, this is your political party”, and it was inherent, but now it’s 
like, “I’m doing this, this is my choice, so I’m changing”’ (participant 14). 
 
In this thematic category, the relevance that the ‘atomised’ and/or ‘classless’ class 
culture has had in relation to Labour support on a local level was ascertained, chiefly 
comparing urban to rural areas in the context of North-West Cumbria and with that, 
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the possible subsequent political effects which may occur.  The Labour Party though 
still feels more comfortable in traditional urban areas, for that is where the majority of 
their potential class support is still based.  This perception is shared with a common 
acknowledgement that there has still been a clear rise in atomised class culture in 
contemporary Britain. 
 
In regards North-West Cumbria, the New Labour classless brand was still deemed 
appealing in once non-traditional areas, hence differentiating it from their previous 
more communal Old Labour guise.  There is some blurring in relation to the 
traditional class, political lines in North-West Cumbria, which to some degree has led 
to a merging of the ideological and class divisions (Savage (2015)).  Such blurring is 
further supported by the general analysis that an atomised class shift has weakened the 
individual’s long-held political and sociological perceptions, which can result in their 
view of class being fragmented and atomised mainly through external, non-political 
matters such as relocating area. 
 
The findings confirmed the core perspectives of each of the major theorists but 
extended their findings through correlating them together via a broad theoretical 
framework.  It informed the topic very effectively, as by outlining the theoretical 
positions of the respective theorists in their respective themes it demonstrated a clear 
thematic link to the phenomenon being investigated.  This provided a distinct basis for 
the thesis overall as it allowed for the connection of such analysis to the primary 
findings, thus generating outcomes which were well supported and correlated to a 
range of core literature previously undertaken in this field (s) of research. 
 
In respect to the context of the data garnered within this study, there is a sharp 
correlation between, hypothesis, theory, and practical analysis.  It follows, that 
modern social class groupings, as documented by Giddens (1997), and Diefenbach et 
al. (2013), are more complex and atomised than ‘working-class’ and ‘middle-class’, 
predominantly following the logic of the cultural categorisation (Savage & Devine 
(2013)).  The concept of ‘classlessness’ as a broad term, exists, for as class perception 
has become so fragmented via the promotion of the atomised ethos of the late 1970s, it 
has made such a concept more realistic to comprehend.  This position although 
relevant in broad theoretical terms, is pragmatically considered by most of the North-
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West Cumbrian Labour political representatives as erroneous on a generic level within 
contemporary Britain. 
 
The concept of social class in contemporary Britain is thus structured within more 
categorisations which are more atomised and thus harder to define than the communal 
model.  This is further enhanced by cultural class divisions such as education, 
economics, materialism, and aspiration that were born out of the rise of such 
structures.  In general, people still refer to these traditional groupings, because they 
are the core communal class categories which can be defined and understood; in this 
manner, the idea of classlessness as defined by Giddens (2002, and 2006) in modern 
British culture is far too vague a concept to be deemed viable in such terms.  The 
Labour Party’s class consciousness has developed with that of society at large as the 
party is primarily class-based, but as time has advanced the party has altered its 
accustomed stance.  Old Labour was communal in its social class outlook as it 
defended the political concerns of the working-classes.  New Labour in contrast 
embraced the new brand culture promoted by Bernays and the New Right a decade 
hence.  They developed a classless political brand which was very effective both 
nationally and locally, especially within the context of North-West Cumbria where 
contemporary social class support for the Labour Party became more adaptable. 
 
This atomised shift in class politics in the context of the Labour Party and the 
formation of the New Labour brand culture occurred when Tony Blair became party 
leader.  The feeling that by the mid-1990s Labour had shifted from their communal 
Old Labour discourse and had become a fully-fledged apostle of the contemporary 
atomised, post-Thatcherite initiative was crystallised, ‘primarily by Blair himself, 
when he consistently spoke of his genuine admiration of Mrs Thatcher as a “radical, 
not a Tory”’ (Seldon, 1997, p.595).  More importantly though, as Stephens (2004) 
notes, ‘he remade the landscape of British politics’ because he was the first Labour 
leader to make sizeable inroads into traditional Conservative electoral territory’.  He 
derided the old communal ideological outdated divides between the centre-right, 
representing the interests of the traditional middle-classes and the centre-left, 
representing the collectivised interests of the traditional working-classes.  He instead 
embraced the values of progressive communitarian style politics while crucially 
discarding the accumulation of traditional class-based socialist dogma which had 
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dominated Old Labour discourse.  This, with the rise of Thatcher and the New Right 
atomisation ethos, as Stephens (2004) continues, ‘had played a seismic role in the 
party’s electoral downfall for the previous two decades prior to the formation of New 
Labour’ (Stephens, 2004, p.3). 
 
This atomised marketing shift from Old to New Labour was thus very successful in 
regards consistently winning general elections.  In regards a general localised 
perspective and specifically that of North-West Cumbria, the New Labour classless 
brand was also deemed more appealing in non-traditional class areas than their Old 
Labour predecessor.  This though in the long-term had its negative consequences, for, 
as commented by Hay (1999), and Griffiths & Hickson (2009), the New Labour 
consumerised brand became tarnished, as by endorsing marketing techniques they 
began to be compromised.  This situation arose because they were to some extent, 
seen as ideologically erroneous; they were ‘professional politicians’ who naturally 
embraced this new classless framework.  There then also followed a clear blurring of 
the traditional class, political lines according to the research participants in North-
West Cumbria, which has led to a merging to some degree of the traditional 
ideological and social class divisions. 
 
Post New Labour under the leadership of Miliband and particularly now under 
Corbyn, were, and are, not clear what their class focus or image/brand should be.  
There was, and is, confusion on whether they should promote historically rigid Old 
Labour class politics or the more atomised New Labour class perspective.  Unlike 
their previous Old and New incarnations, Post New Labour is a continuing brand and 
consequently their position in relation to the contemporary class structure is still yet to 
be defined.  Such a position, as noted by Hasan & Macintyre (2011), and Seymour 
(2016), has led to the party being naturally unclear about their class position.  Ed 
Miliband sought a compromise between Old and New Labour, but Jeremy Corbyn 
with his focus on poverty and social issues has moved towards a more Old Labour 
trajectory. 
 
In general terms, Post New Labour’s confusion over class is a symptom of 
contemporary political, class times where political allegiance has become less class or 
location conscious, and more brand orientated or personalised.  Some affluent manual 
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workers may even have joined the middle-class; by this means consolidating the so-
called ‘embourgeoisement’ theory.  Such blurring is further supported by the general 
analysis that an atomised class shift has weakened the individual’s traditional political, 
class perception towards a more complex modern cultural perspective, which 
consequently can be affected by external issues such as relocating area.  Even so, 
despite the rise to prominence of this modern fragmented class, political culture, the 
party in the Post New Labour era still feels more comfortable following the traditional 
spatial analysis (Althusser (1970); Lefebvre (1974); Harvey (2010)).  They, in the 
main, prefer campaigning in an urban constituency rather than a rural one because 
their time-honoured working-class base support is chiefly located within urban areas, 
this is evident in North-West Cumbria.  By this means, their geographic differentials 
are slight, making the urban-rural split intra-district, rather than a comparison between 
the two districts.  In dispersed rural areas, as for instance in the outlying rural parts of 
Carlisle and Allerdale, the party needs to adopt a stronger localised communications 
strategy which deals with the specific needs of the rural community at large so as to 
show the local inhabitants that Labour understands their area’s specific concerns and 
accordingly can adapt beyond their natural urban hinterland. 
 
This clear definition of geographical areas within North-West Cumbria needs to be 
stated to enable the urban-rural division within the two districts to be analysed and 
evaluated in its most accurate context.  The prominence of the New Labour brand in 
contrast to Old Labour, led to creating a classless network support in non-traditional 
Labour areas like in rural North-West Cumbria.  This lead to some extent, a merging 
in political values between customary political left and right positions, as the parties 
being less divided over hitherto stereotypical class loyalties, endeavoured to prioritise 
a wider section of the electorate.  The result being, political representatives or for that 
matter general voters, that move from one geographic area to another, like that noted 
by the research participants within the context of both urban and rural North-West 
Cumbria, could be likely to change their pre-held personalised perception of class and 
accordingly their natural political affiliation (Savage (2000, and 2015)).  There is then 
a search for class consciousness, as measured in terms of political beliefs or class self-
placement, to demonstrate the continuing salience of class subjectivity in modern 
society.  Such Marxist writers though such as Korpi (1983), proceed to argue that it is 
only the absence of an appropriate political agency, which is normally a role given to 
171 | P a g e  
 
the Labour Party in Britain, that prevents the working-class from becoming a major 
force for revolutionary social change. 
 
The objective is perhaps rather more prescriptive as the thesis endeavoured to 
highlight a range of issues which, though perhaps characteristic of a new political 
science of Labour politics, have arguably tended to be overlooked or, at least are 
insufﬁciently developed in the political analysis of Labour.  In addition, ‘that such 
change has not already occurred is usually interpreted to be the result of ideological 
and organisational failings of these political agencies and their inability to nurture the 
latent class consciousness of their natural supporters’ (Scase, 1992, p.2).  If this study 
plays some part in encouraging dialogue between such competing contemporary class 
interpretations of Labour be it Old, New, or Post New, then the party might beneﬁt 
from the unleashing of such knowledge on a national as well as from a local 
perspective.  This is an acutely opportune time for such reﬂections, as contemporary 
political analysis is perhaps more conscious than it has ever been of its most core 
analytical assumptions. 
 
In summary, the objective of analysis like that used in this chapter was to highlight a 
series of key theorists, connect them to a relevant theme or themes and emphasise the 
relationship that their works have in regards the subject in question.  In such analysis, 
it is not so much the empirical evidence as the selection of what counts as evidence in 
the ﬁrst place that is the pre-determined factor, but the relevance of the interpretation 
placed upon such content to the wider thesis argument (Maxwell (2005); Cooper & 
White (2011)).  This chapter overall provided a detailed description regarding the 
relevance of the first-hand interviews to the broad research themes analysed via 
secondary research as part of the review of literature.  In the next chapter entitled 
‘Discussion’, the research analysis, précised in this section, will be evaluated in 
greater depth and detail, to form an appropriate discussion to the core research themes 
examined within this study. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
This chapter endeavours to use the relevant content outlined through the research 
findings and extrapolate it to the wider secondary research, structured through the 
three-themed phenomenon.  This will be achieved in the first theme ‘Class/Identity’ 
by outlining how class has become more complex in contemporary society, where 
there has been a noticeable shift from the communal towards the atomised ethos.  This 
leads on to the second theme ‘(Labour) Party’, which links such class atomisation to 
the broad effects it has had in relation to Labour support in general terms.  The 
traditional Old Labour communal perspectives had post-Thatcher been made 
practically redundant, the party had to adapt to the new conditions to how the 
electorate defined their personal social class perspective, and consequently then 
related it to their natural political allegiance.  This they did most successfully during 
the New Labour years, where inspired by the atomisation thesis of the New Right, 
they promoted a refined classless agenda which kept the party electorally viable.  Such 
changes in the Class-Labour Party dynamic lead on to the third theme ‘Geography 
(North-West Cumbria)’, which analyses the relevance any potential shifts of this kind 
have had on a general locational perspective, with a particular emphasis on North-
West Cumbria.  The chapter concludes with a ‘Postscript’ evaluation of how Labour 
in its Post New Labour form, under the current leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, will 
develop in regards its future relationship with class, and how that might affect them on 
a specific localised basis.  The first aim though, following this term of reference, is to 
evaluate how the meaning and subsequent categorisation of class has gradually 
become atomised in contemporary culture. 
 
Class/Identity 
The interviewees generally expressed strong views that people in Britain commonly 
still refer to class under the broad Marxian (bourgeoisie, and proletariat) and 
Weberian (owner, manager, and worker) vernacular.  There is subsequently a 
perception according to the research participants, growing up in the early post-war era 
that class as a distinct concept followed the Weberian three-class category system 
(Whimster (2006)).  They as a rule, consequently followed the standard communal 
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perspective that ‘working-class’ was a person who worked with their hands, known as 
‘blue-collar’.  In contrast, ‘middle-class’ represented a person who worked with their 
brain, known as ‘white-collar’ (Dahrendorf (1959); Lee & Turner (1996)).  In many 
such cases, the clear point which must be stated is that the traditional Marxist 
distinctions or even the more contemporary Weberian distinctions are still, as stated 
by Derham (2012), and Brunn & Whimster (2013), to some extent, relevant in modern 
British vernacular. 
 
Most interviewees noted that these stereotypical communal class terms were quickly 
cast aside and overtaken by a more concise and relevant theme; that class in 
contemporary Britain had moved beyond such expansive categories and become far 
more atomised, and hence more complex (Savage & Devine (2013)).  The relationship 
between ‘class’ and the ever-increasing complexities of modern British society is a 
view verified, as with all quotes denoted in this chapter, by a range of North-West 
Cumbria Labour Party participants within this study, both from an urban and rural 
locality.  The form of such complexities, as remarked by Butler & Savage (1995), and 
Caffyn & Dahlstrom (2005), is similar to that noted in contemporary cultural 
discourse of Bourdieu (1992), and his modern protégé Savage (2015), as there are 
simply a variety of class positions and categorisations in which people can clearly 
identify themselves with now.  In addition, as the research participants consistently 
referred, and Cannadine (1999) quotes, ‘to write the entity of class out of British 
history and British life is to disregard or misunderstand one of its central themes’, that 
being of categorised identity, be it communal, cultural, or atomised. 
 
In its post-war peak, as the research participants concluded, the issue of class and its 
connection to political party affinity was the sole defining factor in determining 
political party affinity.  This dominant narrative, communal and simplistic in its 
nature, is today deemed erroneous in the post-Thatcherite era where such broad class 
divisions and thus their once natural political connections are seen as outdated and 
irrelevant.  In its place instead, there is the atomised version of individual fulfilment 
which has taken primacy over that of the one-dominant communal vision of society. 
 
Such an approach indeed may prove particularly valuable in reaching fresh 
understandings of the most recent ideological transformation of the party from Old to 
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New Labour, which is a complex political problem which requires continuous analysis 
and evaluation.  Old Labour, as alluded to by Diamond (2015), and quoted by Kelly 
(2010), ‘was at its most powerful when it spoke to a clear sense of national purpose 
and gave expression to the cultural’, as well as the communal class identity of 
working people.  This type of culturalised class politics in this sense, as the research 
participants noted and Kelly (2010) stated, ‘lay in articulating the aspirations and 
culture of the broad mass of voters’.  It was, as Kelly (2010) continues, ‘mainly white, 
mostly male, and unashamedly collectivist.  In Britain, this endowed Labour with a 
social patriotism for much of the post-war period and helped maintain its affinities to 
its working-class base’.  The primary research confirmed that, as Kelly (2010) notes, 
‘the decline in traditional industrial working-class communities’, as the research 
participants asserted, ‘with the patterns of life and historical memory they maintained, 
levied a high toll on Labour’s class self-identity, cutting away’ the communal 
foundation ‘on which the party’s core support was built’. 
 
Above all, far from following the Marxist structure of joining together to overthrow 
their capitalist overlords, they as the research participants stated, became atomised and 
fractured into a plurality of different roles which lead on to different interests.  
Equally ‘subversive of this traditional perception of class has been the rise to 
prominence of postmodernist literary theory which was promoted by the discovery of 
the “linguistic turn”’ (Cannadine (1999)), like that alluded to by Stedman Jones (1976, 
and 1983), which promoted the atomised class, political ethos from a Marxist literary 
standpoint. 
 
The research participants following such a more complex, classless, political structure, 
as quoted by Cannadine (1999), ‘no longer regarded class as the study of the vexed 
Marxist communal relations among land, capital, and labour, and of the political 
conflicts arising out of them’.  Equally, as Baert & Carreira da Silva (2009), and 
Mount (2012) state, they see class as the study of the language that people used, and 
their material consumerised ambitions and locales where they resided.  Such 
contemporary atomised constructs provided the principal source of their social and 
political identities, as class was still a definable entity in itself, but in modern times it 
was categorised in a far more atomised perspective. 
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(Labour) Party 
The ‘lessons from this’, as reflected by Davison (2011), ‘are firstly that hegemony 
was actively constructed, it was not inevitable, and secondly that the left could also set 
about constructing a project that tapped into popular thinking with a view to 
mobilising around a different’ set of fragmented class, political aims.  In relation to 
this research phenomenon, the preeminence of the individual as a consumer or a brand 
in itself surpassed the rigidity of historically broad class groupings which were 
beginning to be seen as tired, outdated, and irrelevant to the common needs of the 
atomised, individual citizen as the 20th Century came to a close. 
 
The second issue concerned the effectiveness with which ‘the idea of a hegemonic 
project is to take the elements of good sense that already exist and articulate them 
together to create new ways of making sense of the present, embodied in a political 
programme’ (Davison (2011)), which focused on the benefits of the individual over 
that of the society in which they reside.  By the 1980s, as the research participants 
professed via first-hand perspectives of having lived through such times, Thatcher and 
her advisers and supporters in the communications and media industry had transported 
the atomised desires of the individual to the very centre of the political mainstream as 
she encouraged business to take over from government the role of fulfilling the needs 
of the people (Jackson & Saunders (2012); Evans (2013)). 
 
On a broader functional point, applying branding principles to a political party is 
effective if the brand is suitably developed to offer functional and emotional values to 
an electorate as part of its appeal.  The New Labour brand, as the research participants 
affirmed, was developed, as enunciated by Driver & Martell (1998), and Fairclough 
(2000), as part of the modernisation of the Labour Party, which occurred of necessity 
between 1983 and 1994.  The class shift within the context of the Labour Party 
occurred during this time with the atomisation of class categorisation.  This view, in 
accepting the more complex nature of class divisions needed to create a brand that 
could electorally cater to satisfy an extensive swathe of the newly materialised, 
atomised consumers.  The party, as the research participants elucidated, thus had to 
shift and change in some major ways, partly because, as asserted by McSmith (1996), 
and Thomas (2015), they needed to be more brand-orientated, and accordingly seen as 
more plausible to the modern electorate. 
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This is well exemplified as the participants recalled, in the case of Tony Blair himself, 
who following the stance taken by his Conservative predecessors Margaret Thatcher 
and John Major, was an ideal personality to be Labour leader and prime minister for 
the contemporary atomised times.  Blair was not saturated as the participants claimed, 
with Labour’s archaic language and categories of class, and as a result inevitably 
expressed no ambition to promote communal class consciousness or to incite such 
class conflict.  He was above all interested in talking about a classless consensus amid 
an atomised categorisation; hence, standard Marxist class categorisations like those 
portrayed by Miliband (1961), act as an outdated irrelevant political class obstacle to 
such contemporary discourse.  This, as the participants described in general terms, 
explained Blair’s determination to rid Old Labour of its ‘Marxist intellectual analysis’, 
with its ‘false’ perception of class, a categorisation which was always out of kilter 
with the real atomised contemporary world. 
 
New Labour’s attitude towards embracing the ever-changing atomised structure was 
pragmatically realistic.  They, as the research participants agreed, realised that the 
traditional, collectivised working-class, for whom the party had previously depended 
upon for political viability, was disappearing.  The new political argument as the 
research participants in the main claimed, is not focused on social class as an entity in 
itself as was the formerly perceived wisdom during the Old Labour era; instead it is 
about classless social mobility (Giddens (2002); Pugh (2011)).  The rise of the 
classless New Labour brand as all the research participants believed, demonstrated the 
increased importance of communications in modern British politics.  In contemporary 
times, political allegiance has clearly become less communal class conscious and 
more brand orientated or personalised.  New Labour’s success at shifting the party 
away from such traditional leftist values, as noted by Butler & Savage (1995), and 
Toynbee & Walker (2005), demonstrated the resilient strength that reactionary, 
atomised conservative politics such as that promoted by Thatcher and the New Right 
played in regards to the relationship between social class and political affinity in 
Britain. 
 
The view that rigid class associations cause political parties in Britain to struggle to 
gain meaningful support is a strong example of class dealignment, that being, a 
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weakening in the association between social class and political party affinity, is taking 
precedence.  This theory, as noted by Joyce (1995), and supported by the research 
participants, was consistently illustrated during the 1980s when the Labour Party in 
opposition to the Thatcher administration, was for the most part, seen as an old 
fashioned, antiquated, communal party.  The prime aim was to champion the 
wellbeing of the shrinking electorate who saw themselves as part of the traditional 
working-classes and their collectivised interests.  It did not, as the research 
participants emphasised, appeal to the growing number of white-collar employees and 
failed to adapt their policy or image to cater for the more atomised class stratification, 
which saw people gradually move away from conventional class loyalties and 
concerns, a shift which took root during the Thatcher era. 
 
From the mid-1990s the Labour Party, after nearly two decades of opposition 
encompassing four successive general election defeats, decided to draw a dividing line 
between its past (Old Labour) and its present and subsequent future (New Labour).  
Everything connected with Old Labour on a class level, as the research participants 
reluctantly but firmly admitted, was as Northedge (2013) noted, ‘communicated as 
archaic, socialist rhetoric.  This was contrasted with the contemporary New Labour 
communications image of embracing the accumulation of wealth through the 
promotion of the laissez-faire capitalist societal framework’.  By this means, 
participants confirmed Giddens’ (2000) view ‘that Labour’s continual rejection at the 
polls, Labour or New Labour felt the need to shed themselves from working-class 
institutionalised internal forces.  An example of this would be the overbearing 
influence of the traditional, collectivised class centred influence of the Trade Unions 
and Clause IV, which followed Marxist class discourse, that being that the workers 
should control the means of labour production.  A move to the political-centre was 
consequently required for the party to have any chance of reclaiming government 
office’ (Giddens, 2000, p.43), and as a result, a more refined classless perspective 
which is concentrated upon in Giddens’ Third Way, became a clear path for the party 
to follow. 
 
These findings ‘stand behind the disquiet of Third Way politics and its connection 
with the political-centre’ (Giddens, 2000, p.43).  ‘Third Way politics by its nature is 
moderate, and those who are divided within the traditional left-right political struggle 
178 | P a g e  
 
and the stereotypical class allegiances which derive from such a divide, consider the 
centre to be ideologically weak’ (Giddens, 2000, p.44).  This is mainly because it 
enabled them to be seen as more appealing to a sizable portion of ‘Middle England’, 
which according to Prideaux (2005), and Rentoul (2013), the Old Labour brand 
simply could not attract.  Such broad class politics, as detailed by Panitch & Leys 
(1997), and Beech & Lee (2008), though had an electoral price, for as time passed, 
their long-established core working-class support became disenfranchised with the 
classless New Labour ethos.  This was demonstrated as the interviewees claimed, and 
Northedge (2013) also quoted, ‘that after thirteen years of power from 1997 until 
2010, and with the continual political and personal scandals, as well as the enduring 
disaster of the Iraq War, the New Labour classless brand by the start of the second 
decade of the 21st Century had become significantly tarnished’. 
 
Following on from this though, despite its gradual decline, the ‘New’ brand, as several 
participants stated, was, and is, as further noted by Northedge (2013), ‘seen as crucial 
to the party’s general acceptability to the wider electorate’.  The party’s marketing 
shift as noted by the research participants both at a general national level, and also 
supported by their first-hand localised knowledge of North-West Cumbria, had 
prevailed, for during the New Labour era, ‘the party represented brand values of 
modernisation and victory.  They, by doing so, discarded out-dated and unattractive 
traditional Old Labour brand values of socialism and defeat’ (Northedge (2013)). 
 
It is a consequence of such a branding success that Miliband and latterly Corbyn, have 
decided that the ideological political shift has occurred and thereby the party cannot 
be accused of representing irrelevant traditional socialist values.  The ‘removal of the 
“New” brand does have some ideological undercurrents, Blair in his autobiography 
(2010), criticised the party’s 2010 general election campaign for not embracing New 
Labour values, claiming that it offered a genuine new political direction and was not 
just a sophisticated marketing gimmick’ (Northedge (2013)).  The initial success of 
the New Labour brand as the research participants concluded similar to Blair (2010), 
was very symbolic as it demonstrated the clear shift both policy and image-wise that 
the party had made from Old to New Labour.  It was though not an empty gesture, for 
the “New” marketing prefix’, as many research participants alluded to, despite its 
electoral victories, is seen as ‘more than a meaningless tag in front of the name of a 
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party’ (Northedge (2013)).  This advancement in brand politics during the New 
Labour era, had notable effects on Labour’s support on a specific locational basis. 
 
Geography (North-West Cumbria) 
The ‘social class structure of modern Britain’, as a number of the research participants 
stated, and Cannadine (1999) notes, ‘was more elaborate, and also more integrated, 
than Marx had allowed’ in his theory which stated that the conflict between the classes 
was the direct, inevitable consequence of a repressive capitalist system which in the 
end determined the nature of the political structure.  In regards North-West Cumbria, 
and within the districts of Allerdale and Carlisle, this traditional outlook is supported 
as the party generates the bulk of their class support from the more industrialised 
habitual ‘working-class’ urban areas.  They by this means, struggle within the more 
fragmented class outlooks stereotypically portrayed in rural areas.  Such perceptions 
coincided with the already stated belief by the research participants that the party feels 
more comfortable campaigning in urban rather than rural areas.  The data 
demonstrated that Labour Party political representatives recognised that they as 
individuals, and the party in general campaigned differently communications-wise, in 
an urban area than they did in a rural area, outlining the urban-rural Marxist spatial 
ethos of Althusser (1970), Lefebvre (1974), and Harvey (2010).  This is evident in 
North-West Cumbria where the divide in this context is for that reason based on area 
rather than district, this occurs as the hypothesis stated and the participants supported, 
because although Carlisle being predominantly urban and Allerdale being 
predominantly rural, they both have substantial rural and urban areas in their 
respective districts. 
 
The participants overall therein allowed stereotypical conventional class norms to 
dictate their behaviour in regards campaigning in what they considered to be a core or 
for that matter, a non-core locale.  This perspective contradicted the widely-held 
conclusion that New Labour had a meaningful effect on destroying such class-locale 
assumptions in North-West Cumbria.  This is because there is a sense, as Thacker 
(2009), and Parker (2015) stated, that as traditional class categorisations have 
disappeared this inescapably has led to a gradual dilution of its stereotypical 
relationship with respective political party affinity.  This contemporary predominance 
of atomised class culture connotes that political parties have become further 
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ideologically merged, and consequently class perception has become more 
individualised and less communal. 
 
It must be stated all the same, that Labour in its current Post New Labour pretext, did 
a great deal of work in the rural areas in North-West Cumbria during 2015 compared 
to previous elections because of the increased degree of finance generated by the 
centralised party machine.  This support in such individual cases as those stated 
above, cannot disguise the reality that Labour ordinarily, feel more class affiliation in 
a conventional traditional sense, with working-class urban areas over that of middle-
class rural areas (Woods (2005); Griffiths (2007)).  The party still to a large number of 
people who live in traditional rural communities, bears no relation to their specific 
area, as Labour from a class perspective, simply does not have any relevance in such 
surroundings.  The reasons for Labour’s general election defeat in 2015 both 
nationally and within a localised context of North-West Cumbria was that it fatally 
took for granted the traditional working-class categories which were the core basis of 
the party’s support. 
 
Althusser (1970), Lefebvre (1974), and Harvey (2010), through focussing on the 
relevance of the role of space and by questioning how such spatiality affects class 
perception and political affinity, examined struggles over the meaning of space and 
considered how relations across urban and rural territories were given cultural 
meaning.  In the process, they attempted to establish the importance of traditional 
‘lived’ grassroots experiences and understandings of geographical space as being part 
of a communal class, political context.  Such theoretical connections between political 
affinity, social class, and geographic location, set the general tone for the comparative 
shift in Labour support from Old, to New, to Post New, in both a localised and 
national context.  This account is replicated throughout North-West Cumbria, where 
for instance in an urban area like Denton Holme there is little chance of the party 
surrendering their electoral dominance.  The same issue arises in relation to most rural 
wards like those which border Sellafield for instance (Blowers (1999, and 2016)), so 
in both Allerdale and Carlisle, where they still contest elections in such non-traditional 
areas, although they realise pragmatically that success is unrealistic. 
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In view of that, via a specific localised context that is in accordance with the rigid 
spatial class perspective, the party does not undertake much publicity in rural areas.  
This is because such a community is small-scale and particularistic in the sense, ‘that 
most individuals are known to most others and seen and judged as individuals’ 
(Hamilton & Hirszowicz, 1993, p.183), and hence more naturally akin to the 
contemporary political, class culture promoted by Bernays and Thatcher.  Such 
communities, as observed by Sprinker (1992), and LeGates & Stout (2015), have an 
innate culture that promotes the concept of social individualism over that of social 
collectivism.  This perspective is demonstrated on broad industrial-class terms, where 
workers in rural areas tend to be employed within small sectors like agriculture and 
farming which traditionally have more of a conservative ethos and are thus less trade 
union orientated.  This is in contrast to the larger urban-focussed manufacturing 
sectors, which historically have had a greater level of collectivised action.  They are 
thus less culturally suited to the traditional class structure promoted by Old Labour 
and were naturally more attracted to the atomised ethos promoted through the New 
Labour brand. 
 
This communal class rigidity, like that noted by (Dahrendorf (1959); Shortell (2014)), 
was meant though to have been dismantled by New Labour’s inspired classless 
politics, where the party was supposed to be able to gain support in any area or 
locality throughout the country; but in regards North-West Cumbria, this concept has 
to some extent, succeeded.  In short, the party was not as fixated on the urban/rural 
communal class divide which clearly is still prominent in North-West Cumbria, but 
instead was more focussed on defining a different type of class-based supporter 
through the ever-changing atomised class perspective taking root in contemporary 
Britain. 
 
Prior to Blair becoming leader, in rural North-West Cumbria in places such as 
Keswick, the Labour Party had roughly one third of the electorate which could be 
relied upon, but as the New Labour brand and the communitarian, atomised network 
took hold, they gradually managed to perform electorally better in such traditionally 
Conservative areas.  The New Labour brand was on the whole seen as less threatening 
in rural North-West Cumbria.  This was allied to the fact that large sections of the 
electorate had become utterly tired with the then existing Conservative government, so 
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they as a consequence felt comfortable enough in its modernised brand to vote for the 
classless vision being sold to them by New Labour.  Such sentiments lead to a 
perception that there is not a great deal of class or ideological difference between the 
two major parties (Giddens (2002, and 2006)).  The interviews proved to be useful in 
examining the role and context of such potential political party merging through locale 
and as a result, all of the stakeholders representing the Labour Party in North-West 
Cumbria felt it to be an important issue which needed to be discussed.  They were 
though clear in justifying this widely-held view that such a prospective class shift or 
merger would only occur during the classless New Labour years or, potentially in the 
still to be defined Post New Labour era. 
 
It is perhaps plausible to argue as the research participants in North-West Cumbria 
state that some people doubtless just want to be politically active in their community; 
They are not acutely political, and hence the relevance of the traditional communal 
class, political divide is not of a high priority, so they will go into whatever 
geographic locale or ‘spatial’ (Shields (1998); Elliott (2009)), or party network, which 
will help them succeed electorally.  These perceptions are meaningful in that, as Dear 
(2000), and Montag (2002) note, the arguments relate as much to the social as well as 
to the political effects.  If a person, be it a political representative or for that matter a 
general voter, moves from an urban to rural setting be it in North-West Cumbria or 
anywhere else, with the aim of being enmeshed into the stereotypical class ethos of 
the area then clearly there is less reason for them to remain attached to any ideological 
commitments held by the Labour Party. 
 
The standard perception as the research participants noted, was that more complex 
contemporary and atomised factors have become prevalent in regards to influencing 
political party affinity.  Following the cultural class structure espoused by Bourdieu 
and later Savage, new factors were emphasised which in previous communal class 
times were deemed irrelevant, such as for instance someone’s gender, their ethnicity, 
the media they consume be it predominantly mainstream or social, and more 
importantly the geographic locale where they live. 
 
Those espousing this atomised and classless thesis promulgated first by Thatcher and 
later by New Labour, certainly are correct in their assessment that the social class 
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structure, particularly within a political context, has changed.  It is also perhaps true, 
as noted by Goonewardena et al. (2008), and Thacker (2009), that these structural 
changes have emboldened new class perceptions to arise.  This thesis, again both 
within a national or a general localised or a specific North-West Cumbria context, 
suggests that class categorisation is still an important factor for individual voters, even 
if the relevance of such class divides is smaller than it once was.  Voters in other 
words in these modern atomised times have become less tied to traditional, 
collectivised voting patterns, in that they are less likely to use such out-dated 
communal class loyalties as a short-cut to party choice (Giddens (2006); Tunney 
(2006)). 
 
The power of this new atomised structure, which focussed on new political, class 
constructs like image and locale, in regards support for the Labour Party was most 
aptly demonstrated when the party returned to power in 1997.  Labour at the height of 
the New Labour classless ethos could confidently assert, as Reynolds (2015) states, 
‘for the first time in its century-old history, it was “the party of the countryside”, 
because it genuinely competed with the Conservatives for rural votes.  The current 
electoral map of North-West Cumbria mirrors that of England at large, as it follows a 
pattern where the Conservatives dominate the rural constituencies and Labour the 
urban ones.  This reflects an unhealthy urban-rural political divide that has rarely been 
more pronounced.  Labour has not always been an urban party as in the early to mid-
20th Century it was far more popular in the countryside than it is today’.  In 1997, 
‘even in the 50 most rural seats, Labour won 31.5 per cent of the vote against the 
Conservatives 40 per cent.  Labour’s rural vote has shrunk dramatically and its urban 
vote expanded, as in 2015 Labour won an average of 41 per cent of the vote in urban 
areas, and just 18 per cent in the 150 least densely populated constituencies; as it 
stands, Labour holds nearly half as many rural seats as the Conservatives’. 
 
This is a similar pattern in North-West Cumbria as noted in Table III, where support 
for Labour as a rule, in its Old Labour guise was for the most part urban-based, while 
support for the party in the county’s rural heartlands only improved once the New 
Labour classless brand took hold.  The ‘stereotypical urban centric Labour 
alternative’, as Reynolds (2015) continues, ‘to such Conservative dominance in rural 
England, is not a viable electoral challenge; poverty, disempowerment, and cuts to 
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services in rural areas should improve the party’s chances’ in such historic, non-
traditional geographic areas, but as the research participants stated, using their 
personal knowledge of the area that Labour in the context of North-West Cumbria, 
still gives the impression that the rural culture is contradictory to their urban centric 
political, class mentality.  Today, much of Labour’s current agenda, in the Post New 
Labour era, is still defined by urban-rural spatial antagonism, designed to appeal to 
their spatial urban base and not prioritise the needs of rural people (Griffiths (2007); 
Lees-Marshment (2009)).  There is no doubt that Labour in both image and focus is 
perceived to be attuned to urban rather than rural interests, as has all too often been 
the case, there is not much sense, as alluded to by the Labour representatives in North-
West Cumbria, that the party is markedly interested in rural locales.  It, as Shopova 
(2014) states, ‘is also worth remembering that Labour has only won general election 
landslides – 1945, 1966, 1997, and 2001 - when it has done well in rural Britain’.  
Labour for that reason needs to promote an atomised class agenda, both nationally and 
locally, which means, as stated by Carter & Wright (1997), and Fielding (2003), the 
party placing priority in regards attracting rural, as well as urban voters.  Labour must 
find a new idiom and a relevant class narrative which appeals beyond the spatial ethos 
and instead to the more complex network-styled rural vote, both locally as in areas 
such as North-West Cumbria but also within a national context, if they are going to 
succeed in capturing power.  In ‘truth, there are strong Labour traditions in many rural 
areas, but they have become lost or confused’ (Shopova (2014)). 
 
The record of Labour councils in North-West Cumbria is overall effective, but it could 
be doing a great deal more to trumpet its success on issues that matter exclusively to 
rural voters.  This could happen, as noted by Labour representatives in rural North-
West Cumbria, with the party activists being more visible in the local area and 
showing more interest in specifically rural concerns which previously have been 
neglected by the party.  There should, as Clapson (1998), and Geary & Pabst (2015) 
clearly state, be a point in voting Labour in such locales, but for too long in many 
constituencies, these reasons have not been made clear.  Lack of resources has also led 
to a focus only on those target urban seats which correlated with the traditional spatial 
ethos.  It is too easy for Post New Labour strategists to see rural seats as out of reach, 
equally, while the party traditionally may not feel a natural class compatibility with 
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many rural voters since the New Labour era, they cannot simply write off thousands 
of voters as unwinnable. 
 
This represented a clear move away from a traditional working-class supporter base 
concentrated within a redundant rigid social class structure, to the modern fragmented, 
widely culturalised framework (White (2001); Rosen (2005)).  This caused a 
substantial scale of working-class divisiveness around the contemporary relevance of 
the connection between the atomised, localised network of social class and political 
party affiliation.  The theories, according to the research participants for why such a 
situation has occurred principally within the context of North-West Cumbria was, as 
Weakliem (1991) notes, ‘largely due to changes in social and geographical mobility.  
The prime reason being the movement from rural to urban allied to the tremendous 
growth of mass communications’ which has promoted such class, political atomised 
discourse. 
 
This chapter overall provided an expansive discussion of the relevance of the content 
dissected in both the secondary conceptual analysis and primary interviews in regards 
the research phenomenon hypothesised.  The analysis by dissecting the critical 
fragmentation of the development of social class categorisations in Britain through the 
mid-20th Century to the present day, linked such demographic and social shifts to the 
changing perspectives of the Labour Party over the issue, and how it has broadly 
affected the party from the localised perspective of North-West Cumbria.  In the next 
and final chapter entitled ‘Conclusions’, the research analysis, detailed in the previous 
two chapters, will be summarised to form an appropriate conclusion to the core 
research themes examined within the study. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts, the initial emphasis is placed upon a summary 
of the core analysis within the three-themed research phenomenon.  Those findings 
state that social class in Britain has shifted from an historic communal construct 
towards a modern atomised one.  This atomised ethos occurred on a broad political 
level with the rise of the New Right in the late 1970s, led to the symbolic Old to New 
Labour shift, which altered the party’s general class perspective along such lines.  
Such a class shift has to some extent, made the party in the New Labour era more 
appealing to a wider class base than during the hitherto Old Labour years, particularly 
in non-traditional rural areas, where the traditional spatial perspective has been 
replaced by an atomised network structure.  Such analysis leads on to the second part 
of the chapter which states a range of theoretical implications in regards the study as a 
whole.  Directed by the research findings, the limitations of the research are noted, 
and several future research directions are also suggested to possibly advance similar 
studies in this academic field. 
 
Core Analysis 
The concept of social class has become more complex since the rise to prominence of 
the contemporary atomised communications and cultural networks which occurred in 
the latter quarter of the 20th Century and are still predominant until the present day.  
Class in contemporary Britain is accordingly getting evermore difficult to classify.  
On a more specific level, the findings in the main, correlated with the broad 
sentiments outlined by the research hypothesis, and by combining the theoretical 
approach from relevant theories within a distinctive three-themed phenomenon, this 
research thus has made a clear academic contribution to this field of expertise.  The 
first of these themes was to determine what class means in a generic sense in 
contemporary Britain.  The answer was that although almost all of the participants 
accepted the standard Weberian three-stage class model (working-class, middle-class, 
and upper-class), they also accepted the modern cultural thesis that class in 21st 
Century Britain is a more complex concept, with wider status gradations.  They did 
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not accept though that within this more convoluted contemporary class structure that 
the concept of ‘classlessness’ although theoretically viable, is practically realistic. 
 
A further reason why class, political relations in 21st Century Britain are more 
complex is because it is mostly centred on the concept founded through the works of 
Bourdieu (1990), and refined by Savage & Devine (2013), of ‘cultural class capital’.  
Following such perspectives this study emphasises a need to shift away from 
traditional and long-standing concerns about historic, communal class groupings of 
middle and working-class, and instead argues that there is a new more sophisticated, 
pragmatic, and socially cultured way to analyse the nature of class in today’s Britain.  
This is where non-traditional class distinctions such as materialism, aspiration, and 
cultural taste have come to the fore, and as a consequence have had an important 
effect on how class is seen, understood, and categorised in modern Britain.  There is a 
notable legitimacy about the accuracy and hence the overall reliability of such 
sentiments that state how class in contemporary Britain is more complex because of 
the possible predominance of such cultural class indicators like educational attainment 
or personal enrichment from a wider social context.  This refined cultural class ethos 
has also above all placed greater emphasis on the relevance of locale, where people’s 
area surroundings, be it urban or rural, now are deemed an inherent part of their 
cultural make-up, and also their potential political party allegiance. 
 
This complex class framework has had a notable effect on the Labour Party, whose 
contemporary support, naturally following the less rigid, atomised ethos of the post-
Thatcherite era, have become less traditionally class orientated.  This contrasts starkly 
with the communal class age of the Old Labour Party era, which in more simplistic 
times, fervently promoted the interests of the collectivised working-classes.  This 
leads on to analysing how this atomised class context has affected the development of 
British politics, principally in relation to Labour support.  The findings demonstrated 
that Labour, chiefly Old Labour, were very much regarded as a class-based party, but 
such characteristics clearly seem at odds in a modern Britain where class distinctions 
are notably more multifaceted and harder to define in relation to general political party 
affinity.  The party, particularly after four successive election defeats between 1979 
and 1992, aimed to counter such limitations.  They did so by making themselves more 
appealing to a wider section of the electorate who with the advancement of the 
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Bernaysian-styled consumerist ethos saw themselves as individuals in their own right 
rather than being part of a collective social group. 
 
The advance of such a contemporary communication culture coincided with the rise of 
the New Right on both sides of the Atlantic which paved the way for the concept of 
the political party as brand ready to be marketed for consumption towards an atomised 
voting public.  Labour in this fashion under the leadership of Tony Blair created a 
New Labour brand which followed a modern atomised and classless agenda.  This 
shift from the communal to the atomised structure characterised the classless New 
Labour brand, which was defined by not being tarnished with the out-dated class 
limitations of the Old Labour era.  Such a consumerised shift from the historic Old 
Labour to the modern New Labour class brand was valuable because it led to 
unprecedented electoral success.  New Labour’s effective Third Way classless 
perspective though, it must be stated, was nothing new in itself as it was primarily 
borne out of such an atomised shift in class consciousness two decades before. 
 
After the 2010 election defeat, the Post New Labour era was born, where the party has 
endeavoured on a class basis, to find a compromise between the positions of Old and 
New Labour.  Post New Labour firstly under the perceived moderate leadership of Ed 
Miliband and later through the more radical helm of Jeremy Corbyn, have been trying 
to find a new class position to enhance their electoral validity and credibility.  This, 
following two further electoral defeats in 2015 and 2017, is a journey which remains 
undefined and is thus currently open for future interpretation.  This lack of clarity has 
occurred because primarily since the election of Corbyn, the party with its ideological 
shift leftwards has been torn between embracing both Old and New Labour values.  
They have for instance reinforced Old Labour principles of promoting the economic 
interests of a communal working-class electorate, whilst also accepting that such 
communal class divisions are still considered as erroneous in modern-day Britain, 
where class structures are determined by New Labour’s post-Thatcherite, atomised 
categorisations.  Following on from such events, this seemed an especially conducive 
time to compare the Post New Labour brand which in these current, complex, 
political, class times, is still in flux, as is its relationship with social class to that of its 
clearly defined Old and New predecessors.  This is a research phenomenon and area 
which it appears has been starved of such polemic academic research of this kind. 
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The Labour Party in its current Post New Labour form though, according to the 
party’s representatives in North-West Cumbria, are struggling to understand the 
appropriate position for them to hold in regards their conception of class 
consciousness.  The party is currently trapped by their past behaviour over this matter, 
for in more simplistic communal class orientated times, there was little need for Old 
Labour to consider the relationship between politics, class, communications, and 
specific location any deeper than promoting the needs of their traditional core 
working-class support.  This established social class context not only shifted with the 
atomised Thatcherite revolution, but was developed afterwards by New Labour 
through their classless rhetoric.  This language of ‘classlessness’, by this means was a 
refined concept of atomised class individuality, through the works of Giddens (1987, 
1994, and 2000).  This refined class outlook had become a concept which drove a new 
model of politics; from traditional, simplistic, communal class politics towards a 
contemporary, individualistic, framework.  It would accordingly be appropriate to 
state that this study builds upon work of a range of political social theorists like 
Bernays, Giddens, Althusser, and Harvey, who have contributed a great deal to the 
development of political, class analysis in Britain, both on an historical and 
contemporary academic level. 
 
Even so, as regards examination of social class perception and subsequent political 
support, what works with one demographic may not work with another.  Urban and 
rural communities, as Lefebvre and Harvey point out, have traditionally had distinct 
demographics and political priorities.  Rural areas are normally more culturally 
conservative and hence less akin to Old Labour’s collectivised class-based values than 
the more refined atomised or classless perspective promoted by the party in the post-
Thatcherite era.  There was a clear paradox on a North-West Cumbrian level, as the 
data demonstrated that Labour representatives recognised that they as individuals, and 
the party in general, prioritise their communications effort more robustly in traditional 
urban areas at the expense of their rural equivalents.  This is in accordance with the 
Marxian spatial ethos that space, class, and political affinity are naturally interlinked.  
This also coincided with the traditional view that the party feels more comfortable 
campaigning in urban rather than rural areas.  This divide in the context of North-
West Cumbria is based upon urban and rural areas within Allerdale and Carlisle rather 
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than the two districts themselves which are in this regard, geographically mixed.  By 
this means, perhaps inevitably, interviewees allowed stereotypical traditional class 
norms to dictate their behaviour in regards campaigning in a core working-class urban 
area or as the case be, not in a non-core middle-class rural area. 
 
This perspective although relevant coincides with the widely-held conclusion that 
New Labour still had a clear impact on destroying such class-locale assumptions in 
North-West Cumbria.  This broadly developed because the prominence of the New 
Labour classless brand in contrast to Old Labour, led to an emerging network or 
atomised class support, like that asserted by Manuel Castells (2012), in non-traditional 
Labour supporting rural areas.  The rise of this more atomised class culture could have 
long-lasting localised consequences in areas such as North-West Cumbria, if not even 
nationally, as there is a sense that traditional class categorisations have disappeared.  
This invariably has led to a gradual dilution of its stereotypical relationship with 
respective political party affinity. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Such findings as reported and summarised, have several theoretical implications as 
hitherto briefly noted in Chapter IV.  The theoretical developments which describe the 
underpinned arguments in the literature have provided impetus for investigating the 
antecedents of the relationship between social class and political affiliation, 
specifically in relation to the Labour Party since the emergence of the New Labour 
brand.  The thesis made contributions in the social science academic research field in 
a number of ways as it enabled such a distinctive three-themed phenomenon to be 
outlined, analysed, and evaluated through the relevant content of a range of social 
science theorists and local Labour political representatives in North-West Cumbria.  
They, with their respective second-hand academic expertise and first-hand practical 
experience, brought a clarity to the phenomenon being researched.  This study thus 
overall has been successful in providing a distinctive form of phenomenological 
research.  This was achieved from a locational perspective, where North-West 
Cumbria was as an area, ideal for such research, as it offered the right mix of political, 
sociological, and geographic variation, a quality required to bring a sense of variety to 
the research phenomenon being investigated.  In addition, as well as offering a clear 
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balance of rural/urban classification, it was also a location which had been starved of 
any research of this kind. 
 
Although acknowledging such limitations, this research though does exhibit an 
effective comprehension of the contemporary relationship between the relevance of 
social class, communications, and location to support for the Labour Party.  
Measurement of the participants’ and theorist’s competencies, and knowledge and 
experience also represent a range of relevant research directions.  The study made 
contributions to the academic research field in a number of ways, most meaningful of 
which being the development of a theoretical model/framework under a new empirical 
research setting drawn from a range of extant theories encompassing a variety of 
linked themes.  These themes which determined the research phenomenon, offered a 
clear structure, for by applying such a broad correlation between both primary and 
secondary data, this study provided a solid foundation for future research avenues 
within this research field. 
 
The prime objective of this thesis then has been to establish the potential contribution 
of an emerging new political science of British politics that is more reﬂective about 
such core analytical assumptions.  A condition of so doing would be a far higher 
consciousness of, and greater reﬂexivity towards such analytical assumptions.  If this 
can be achieved, then future studies of this kind will be better placed to focus attention 
on the strategies most appropriate for the Labour Party to follow so as for them to 
fully comprehend the relevance that sociological divisions play not just in North-West 
Cumbria but in other areas across Britain.  The argument is stated simply, though its 
implications, if accepted, could lead to a more realistic dissection of complex 
contemporary class divisions and their subsequent relationship to political party 
affinity, be it Labour or indeed anyone else.  This theoretical framework could be 
expanded to other major political parties, particularly the Conservatives, and then 
when such findings are developed, the next step would be to compare and contrast 
them to those of the original perspectives outlined in this research on Labour.  This 
comparison could lead to a greater sense of class distinctiveness between the two 
potential governing parties in Britain. 
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A further distinctive feature of this thesis is its propensity to effectively measure in 
broad terms, Labour’s adaptability in relation to its ability to adjust to the generic 
social class shift from the communal structure which dominated the discourse of the 
Old Labour era towards the atomised perspective of the New Labour brand.  ‘By those 
tests, the party led by Tony Blair was far less a party of social reform even than that 
led by Harold Wilson.  New Labour deployed the buzzword of “modernisation” to 
good short-term electoral effect’ (Callaghan et al., 2003, p.80), but was principally 
atomised in their class thinking, which brought into question the relevance that the 
communications machine placed upon any ideological loyalty to the traditional ethos 
(Butler & Kavanagh (1997); Labour Party (1997)).  The New Labour classless brand, 
as acknowledged by Coulter (2014), and Bower (2016), would be forever 
differentiated from its Old Labour incarnation as it was borne out of this new post 
atomised era, an era which Post New Labour an evolving brand, is still endeavouring 
to characterise itself within. 
 
Such class, political convergence is a symptom of an ever-increasing fragmentation of 
the traditional social class framework in Britain.  An example being, where political 
party allegiance is far less rigid and as a result can be altered through other non-
political aspects, such as shifting locational areas from urban to rural, this in relation 
to this study was notably emphasised within the context of North-West Cumbria.  The 
New Labour brand and its shift from the communal class limitation of Old Labour to a 
modern atomised class perspective was effectual, for within North-West Cumbria the 
party became more palatable in once non-traditional supporting rural areas in both 
Allerdale and Carlisle.  This sense of gaining support in unforeseen areas, and away 
from the traditional spatial ethos, was purported specifically in this study, where, as 
numerous participants outlined that Labour during the New Labour era, both on a 
national level and within the localised confines of North-West Cumbria, became more 
popular in hitherto traditional Conservative rural areas.  The final outcome of this is a 
potential ideological and/or sociological dilution of an individual’s political party 
affinity. 
 
Such potential future research directions would though need to be centred within the 
core research objective at the heart of this research, that being in practical terms, 
analysing the tensions between different research methodologies and theoretical 
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frameworks, around the issue of class and political party affinity in modern Britain.  
At the heart of this in-depth research, there has been a focus on specific and unique 
research structures.  This was achieved by placing analysis within distinctive research 
objectives.  Firstly, through locale (primarily centring the research in North-West 
Cumbria).  Secondly, by area (analysis of two North-West Cumbrian districts, 
comparing more rural Allerdale with more urban Carlisle) and thirdly with academic 
theory (connecting such methodological analysis through a phenomenological 
research structure).  On a practical basis, such theoretical assertions of this kind have 
emerged with more robust evidence which has transformed the effect on knowledge 
and communication techniques within a confined localised environment.  In this 
regard, academic practitioners may gain an additional insight as well as a possible 
future direction in the academic body of knowledge which is rooted in any subsequent 
study set within a similar research framework.  The majority of the theoretical 
arguments achieved empirical validation through this study, which should be of 
interest to academic practitioners.  Since a person’s class and political party affiliation 
have been used in the literature as distinctive factors, the review highlighted that 
social science researchers address this issue through a variety of different contexts 
which inevitably will only strengthen future research in this academic field. 
 
In summary, interviewees reflected through a broad perspective, on the relevance that 
such class atomisation has played in regards support for the Labour Party, both on a 
national level and also within the localised confines of Allerdale and Carlisle.  The 
participants accepted that prior to Blair, the party consistently followed an ideological 
class structure that prioritised the concept that a communal-styled collectivist society 
should prevail over the rights of the atomised individual.  They though, accept that 
since Thatcher and the rise of the New Right atomised class agenda, such an 
individualistic ethos has replaced the once-dominant communal structure, which had 
led to a clear blurring in how the new modern voter, socially atomised, and consumer-
driven, determines his or her political affinity.  This gradual class convergence of the 
parties coincides with the gradual class convergence of general British society.  This is 
because, as broadly stated by Denzin & Lincoln (2000), and Bell (2006), and quoted 
by Kellner (2010), ‘the majority of Britons, apart from the numerically small extremes 
at either side of the wealth scale, use the same social services, have the same domestic 
and financial predicaments, buy relatively the same type of products, and fret over the 
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same political issues’.  It follows logically that post the emergence of the New Right 
they would see politicians of all parties through the same classless perspective, thus 
defining the clear atomised concept of contemporary political class culture (Giddens 
(2000); Garfield (2004)). 
 
The general conclusion to be drawn from these participant interviews is that in the era 
of communal Britain, the standard Labour supporter both within a national British 
context and via a particular geographic perspective of North-West Cumbria, belonged 
to a completely different political value base which at its root was defined by social 
class, to the stereotypical Conservative supporter.  In modern Britain, as Kellner 
(2010) asserts, ‘with the effects of a gradual social class convergence, those above 
stated differences have been notably blurred.  The differences in their respective 
stereotypical political values are still prevalent’, but the traditional social class 
divisions have over time been eroded by the contemporary, atomised brand culture. 
 
This less communal social structure is intertwined on an economic level where the 
economic emphasis is designed to benefit those of the Elite classes (Savage & Devine 
(2013)).  In regard to the distribution of power in advanced capitalist societies there is 
indeed very good reason to believe that the current direction will become ever-more 
atomised (Castells (2000, and 2012)), with as Miliband (1989) states, ‘a small number 
of people in the corporate world exercising effective network power over ever-larger 
conglomerates of economic resources.  There is similarly good reason to believe that 
this concentration of economic power through an entrenched atomised social structure 
will be paralleled in the political realm, both because economic and social power spills 
over into political life’ (Miliband, 1989, p.204), and also because of the further 
concentration of power in the elite class.  In relation to the Labour Party or New 
Labour, according to the research participants both nationally and in the context of 
North-West Cumbria, such a loose and atomised political class concept could, because 
of its lack of traditional class loyalty, lead to a further rapid decline in the relevance of 
the party in a broad social sense.  The brand being classless doubtless could provide 
greater opportunities to expand traditional support, but equally this could lead to 
strengthening a perception that the main political parties are merging on an ideological 
level. 
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It appears that for this to be analysed effectively in general terms through future 
research streams, Labour in its current Post New Labour pretext, must tackle the most 
arduous task of all, that being coming to terms with its contrasting political class 
positions which will enable them to gain electoral power.  New Labour, as the 
research participants alluded to, was historicist in the sense that it propagated a 
particular revolutionary atomised vision of Labour history.  This study has contributed 
to the literature by validating some of those themes in a comprehensive, analytical 
model.  The primary interview data, as Miller & Dingwall (1997), and Richards 
(2014) maintain, extensively contribute to an understanding which is enhanced by 
knowledge and experience. 
 
There are though outstanding questions about the study’s concrete long-term impact, 
as the concept of ‘social class’ is a vital aspect of society but its contemporary 
categorisations are in flux and hence hard to determine in a clear and condensed 
fashion.  Such class complexities, as confirmed by Rosen (2005), and Giddens (2006), 
have characterised the image of the British Labour Party with clear distinctive class 
concepts, Old Labour’s traditional class perspective and New Labour’s classless 
consumerism.  This brand culture, as commented by Wring (2004), and Pinfold 
(2015), defined a post-Thatcherite political, class culture in Britain since the late 
1970s which accordingly inspired New Labour to overcome traditional class barriers 
which had up to that point dominated the structure of British politics since the end of 
World War II.  In view of that, the reason for undertaking such a class-based study in 
relation to the historical and contemporary perspective of the Labour Party occurs 
largely on a broad national, theoretical basis, instead of a narrow, localised outlook.  
This is because ideological shifts within political parties and explicitly that of the 
Labour Party, and the packaging which accompanies a message or a brand of that sort, 
is a continual evolving process, which affects the nation as a whole, and effectively is 
developed on a generational basis. 
 
Such theoretical expansion could be further achieved by taking the form of 
questioning the relevance and subsequent impact that the contemporary atomised class 
has had in regards contemporary sociological and political discourse.  The argument 
being, if this culture continues, it could have long-term electoral consequences, as 
with no clear correlation between class and political party affinity, the outcomes of 
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future elections could be less predictable and hence harder to discern and subsequently 
analyse.  These complexities were deemed erroneous during the early post-war years 
where the communal class categorisations ordinarily complemented the standard 
political perspectives of party affinity in Britain (Savage (2015)). 
 
Even so, with the rise of the class atomisation ethos, and with it the promotion of an 
individualistic brand culture, a question clearly remains in respect to the future role of 
class to political party affinity, both explicitly in relation to the Labour Party and also 
within a wider local and national context. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix I 
 
The relevance of contemporary atomised social class structures to Labour support 
since the rise of the consumerist communications culture via a broad localised 
perspective is the foundation of this research study.  By the same token, to fully 
appreciate such a research perspective, an understanding of the broad contours of 
urban and rural geography as well as their relevance to the specific area of North-West 
Cumbria is required. 
 
Regionalisation: North-West Cumbria (Allerdale and Carlisle)  
 
Urban and Rural 
In the context of this study, a broad definition of urban and rural areas needs to be 
explored and outlined.  Rural areas are those that are absorbed within a principally 
rustic landscape, that being defined as areas mainly situated in the countryside or 
deepest suburbia, which usually have sparse populations.  This is contrasted with 
urban areas which are places located in either towns or cities and which by and large, 
are densely populated (Horton (2004); Woods (2005)).  ‘Despite the continued spread 
of towns and cities, the geographic landscape of Britain is still chiefly rural, as 
whichever classification is used, less than one-third of the land area is classified as 
urban but these areas comprise of at least 80 per cent of the population.  Rural/Urban 
classifications also allow differences to be identified between more and less sparse 
area types.  An urban area is a human settlement with high population density’ 
(Pateman (2011)).  Rural areas, in contrast, as noted by Atkinson & Moon (1994), and 
Agnew & Corbridge (1995), are often called ‘the country’, and ‘have low population 
density and large amounts of undeveloped land.  In general, a rural area or countryside 
like for instance the locales studied in this thesis within North-West Cumbria, is a 
geographic area that is located outside towns and cities, hence being the opposite of 
urban areas’ (ONS (2015)). 
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Below in a series of quoted passages, is a brief historical perspective of the urban and 
rural history of North-West Cumbria, and a summarised passage focussing on the 
specific context of the districts of Allerdale and Carlisle: 
 
Regionalisation in (North-West) Cumbria: An Historical Context 
Pateman (2011) notes, both in relation to North-West Cumbria, and the whole North-
West of England region generally; ‘from 2001 to 2011 the urban population grew 
faster than the rural’.  This increased the possibility that Labour would immediately 
focus on generating their core geographic urban vote at the expense of the rural areas 
where they normally are not as successful as their social class network is weaker 
(Castree & Gregory (1996); Howard (2011)).  ‘Where remoteness or sparsity can be 
shown, those who live in such rural areas are more prosperous than those who reside 
in urban areas across Britain’ (National Geographic Society (2016)).  Areas ‘that are 
rural but less sparse show the highest levels of household income, and the lowest 
levels of poverty of any area type’ (Pateman (2011)).  ‘The levels of people qualified 
to at least degree level or equivalent, following the cultural determinants of class 
through educational attainment or working in higher managerial or professional 
occupations, are higher than average in rural areas, but below average in urban areas’ 
(Savage & Devine (2013)).  Within ‘the most deprived group of areas, such as in 
North-West Cumbria, people born in urban areas are expected not to live longer than 
those in rural areas, although there are rare numerical exceptions like for instance, in 
the prosperous urban areas in comparison to the less prosperous rural areas the 
opposite is found’ (Pateman (2011)). 
 
It is important though to state the relevance of such stereotypical rural/urban 
perspectives with respect to a Cumbrian county context.  For that to be understood 
clearly, a brief illustration of the county’s social class relations within a recently 
generic historical context is required.  A productive way of elucidating the localised 
distinctiveness of Cumbria may lie within the shared geography and history of the 
territory and its impact on its specific character.  ‘Sparsity of population’, as noted by 
Drury (1961), and Nicholson (1963), and quoted by Edmonds (2014), ‘and 
detachment from any major city affects the whole area as it is uniquely a blend of mild 
urban and rural’.  In contemporary debates, it has customarily been interpreted as an 
opaque annex to the North-East or North-West of England executive regions (Defoe 
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(1974); Beckett (1982)).  The County Council was created in the local government 
reforms of 1972-1974, replacing the hitherto historic county areas of Cumberland and 
Westmorland.  Cumbria has, as stated by Redcliffe-Maud & Wood (1974), and Bryant 
(2003), with its small population of half a million, has consequently assimilated 
awkwardly into modern chronicles of economic regionalism and city-based devolution 
of political power. 
 
In Britain, conventional county frontiers are the main perspective of localised identity 
but the recent noted history of the area of Cumbria, and particularly of the North-West 
of Cumbria, demarcates a much more nuanced outlook.  Cumbria on a geo-political 
level, has largely been seen as a distant part of Britain.  This follows the dictum, as 
noted by Searle (1983), and Wallenfeldt (2014), and quoted by (Aughey (2007)), ‘that 
regions like the North-West of England and their respective specific areas like North-
West Cumbria, become more distinctive the farther they are from London.  Such a 
perception exists broadly speaking, because of its physical location with it being the 
most north-westerly county of England’. 
 
North-West Cumbria – A Geographic Perspective 
‘Allerdale’s neighbours include Carlisle and Eden District to the east, and to the south 
Copeland and South Lakeland.  The Borough is predominately rural in nature with an 
overall population density of 75 people per square kilometre compared to an average 
480/km² in the North-West of England’ (Allerdale (2012)).  This is ‘most noticeable 
in the north where settlements are small and scattered, while the main urban centres 
are located in the south.  Around two-thirds of the area’s population live within the 
main settlements, with the remaining one-third of people living in the dispersed areas.  
Allerdale is a Borough of contrasts, some areas, especially in and around 
Cockermouth are considered to be some of the least deprived areas in the country with 
a high quality of life.  This is compared to some neighbourhoods in the south of 
Workington and in Maryport which rank amongst some of the most disadvantaged 
parts of the country’ (Allerdale (2012)).  ‘The Carlisle area is the most populated 
district in Cumbria (104,500).  Council services are organised through the Carlisle 
district, with the city urban area providing the main centre both for the Carlisle 
locality and, to a degree, the County.  In terms of skills and education, Carlisle’s 
average levels of standards are equivalent with the average for the North-West region 
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and average levels of health and wellbeing are comparatively low across the district.  
There are also geographical concentrations across some of Carlisle’s urban wards 
where levels of educational achievement are low, and levels of unemployment are 
high.  Carlisle is thus seen as an underprivileged area as there are pockets of 
deprivation, and this proliferation is demanding to cope with’ (Cumbria (2012)). 
 
The Distinctive Nature of North-West Cumbria 
The Urban/Rural Spatial Context: North-West Cumbria – The Relevance of Class, 
Communications, and Industrial Isolation on Labour Support  
A geographic focus to the area and county being studied in this thesis is necessary, so 
a map of Cumbria (Figure II – Cumbria County), with a demarcation of its six districts 
and its specific urban and rural demarcations (Figure III – Cumbria: Urban & Rural 
Demographics) is provided.  This is supplemented with an extensive breakdown of the 
distinctive social and physical characteristics and how they are related to support for 
the Labour Party both in the context of the county itself and also specifically within 
the two North-Western districts of Allerdale and Carlisle. 
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Figure II: Cumbria County 
Visit Cumbria, (2015). ‘Map of Cumbria and the Lake District’, 
http://www.visitcumbria.com/map-of-cumbria/. 
236 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure III: Cumbria: Urban and Rural Demographics 
DEFRA, (2011). ‘Cumbria LEP OAs by rural/urban classification’, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270526/Cumbr
ia_LEP_full_class.jpg.  
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The thesis though solely examines the ‘North’ Cumbrian district of Carlisle against 
the ‘West’ Cumbrian district of Allerdale.  These two areas are not just linked 
geographically through a border boundary but are also connected politically as they 
both are chiefly traditional Labour supporting districts, albeit with a substantial 
number of traditional non-Labour voters as well (Winchester (1998)).  Cumbria, 
above all North-West Cumbria, is a county which is distinct within Britain as it has a 
small populace over a large geographic spatial area.  This arises largely, because it has 
a distinct mixture of urban and rural areas that have a mixture of industrial and 
agricultural employment sectors that affects their broad political perspective of Labour 
politics (Blowers (1993, and 1999)).  North-West Cumbria thus is composed of both 
urban and rural geographic structures which define its overarching political outlook 
especially in relation to support for the Labour Party (Constantine (2006)).  The 
specific area of North-West Cumbria comprises a range of small towns, which 
following the Marxist spatial construct (Althusser (1970); Lefebvre (1974); Harvey 
(2010)), are more rooted in the Old Labour communal class ethos.  Equally, the rural 
villages are more akin to the atomised, classless perspective predicated through the 
New Labour era. 
 
This is demonstrated within the context of North-West Cumbria where the district of 
Allerdale being by and large a rural industrial area, is consequently policy-wise, more 
suited to the post-Thatcherite atomised agenda.  This is demonstrated for instance in 
regards housing tenure, where the number of owner-occupied households in such 
areas are more common than in their urban equivalents like Carlisle.  They are for the 
most part, more likely to follow the privatised, atomised ethos (Bernays (1955)), 
developed first by Thatcher, and then by New Labour (Giddens (2000)), instead of the 
communal society-driven ethos which was the hallmark of the Old Labour era 
(Heffernan (2000)).  Carlisle, contrastingly, being a small city, and in general terms 
more susceptible to poverty, is focused within more of an Old Labour communal 
working-class tradition.  There is a similarity of social class classifications within both 
districts as both are chiefly traditional working-class within the urban heartland with a 
sizeable minority of middle-class mainly based in the rural outskirts (Cumbria 
(2012)).  Carlisle is mainly urban but the district is partly rural, while Allerdale is 
predominantly rural in nature but does have urban areas (Allerdale (2012)).  It would 
be practically illogical to contrast these two districts that make up North-West 
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Cumbria as being either urban or rural, when the dominant feature of both is that they 
are mixed geographic areas in this regard.  The urban areas in both districts could be 
described as ‘blue-collar’ industrialised areas in the Weberian vernacular (Dahrendorf 
(1959)), which lead to a natural communal ‘spatial’ class association with the Labour 
party, as it is those workers who make up their core support.  In contrast, as alluded to 
in the above descriptions of both districts, and through the Marxist socio-geographic 
spatial construct, their respective rural areas are areas where traditional Labour 
support has been harder to acquire (Allerdale (2012); Cumbria (2012)). 
 
North-West Cumbria, similarly, from a political communications perspective, with its 
spread of urban and rural areas is theoretically most connected to the concept of the 
atomised voter.  This is portrayed by the atomised social class structure in which 
unlike their Old Labour equivalent, New Labour and their consumerised, classless 
brand politics were so effective in attracting such voters to support them.  Traditional 
broad social class stereotypes like those purported by established historical theorists 
such as Marx and Weber are by and large, still prevalent.  It must also be stated 
though that the all-consuming, ever-changing concept of the atomised voter within the 
refined network political class structure, as stated initially by Bernays (1955), and 
later refined by Castells (2012), could also be relevant.  There is a diverse and 
contrasting communications structure in North-West Cumbria, with urban areas in 
general having considerably more efficient technological outlets.  This enables them 
to be less averse to the consumerised, cultural ethos promoted via the rise of the 
communications industry, than rural areas (Castells (2000); Griffiths (2007)). 
 
Cumbria, as the four figures below show, has a number of distinctive characteristics; 
its visceral size and topography, and its distributed population and geographic 
isolation.  North-West Cumbria is a predominantly rural part of the county but with 
specific urban pockets such as Carlisle and Workington (Pateman (2011)).  Following 
on from this, North-West Cumbria in particular, as noted by Breach (1978), and 
Constantine (2006), still has a unique sense of remoteness and a distinct cultural 
identity.  This factor gives the areas as outlined below, a uniquely geographic 
perspective in regards to Labour brand politics be it ‘Old’, ‘New’, or ‘Post New’. 
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The geographic inequalities within North-West Cumbria contribute to its sense of 
uniqueness and seclusion.  North-West Cumbrians manifestly saw their area as 
different and distinctive in regards political communications terms from the rest of 
Cumbria.  This was conveyed, as stressed by Wynne et al. (1993), and Herring (2005), 
through its physical remoteness and thus lack of communication with other parts of 
the county at large.  This though was not always the case as during the late 20th and 
early 21st Centuries, North-West Cumbria was an area of economic decline, a sub-
region of uneven economic development, but what distinguishes it from any other area 
in Britain is that it became dominated by the nuclear industry which had meaningful 
political effects (Bolter (1996); Welsh (2000)).  The new nuclear industry with its 
advanced technology represented a modern atomised ethos inserted into a traditional 
urban landscape replacing a once-dominant industrial base, rooted in the pre-war anvil 
manufacturing and agricultural industries (Blowers (2016)).  The result being that the 
anchoring of the nuclear industry in its current locations in North-West Cumbria has 
conferred a set of ‘nuclear oases’ (Blowers et al. (1991); Blowers (1999)).  The 
biggest communities or oases are situated in traditional (Old Labour brand) urban 
areas surrounded within wider (New Labour brand) rural locales (Blowers (1984); 
Bradley (1998)).  The idea of peripheral communities such as these opens up for 
consideration ‘the sociological nature and political implications of the relationship 
between environmental quality and social inequality’ (Blowers & Leroy, 1994, p.198). 
 
Such discourses ‘are ways of apprehending the world, shaping, defining, and 
constraining the way it is understood and informing the actions and choices we take’ 
(Hajer, 1995, p.44).  Williams (1980), similar to that as quoted by Bell & Newby 
(1971), ‘was aware of the changes already taking shape as a result of such changing 
discourses, “as a result of urban culture” and writing in the early 1950s, perceives that 
the developments at Windscale brought in people who do not “fit in” and who have 
urban values’ (Bell & Newby, 1971, p.146).  Soon these inhabitants, as ascertained by 
Blowers (1999), and McDougal (2017), had transformed both the landscape and the 
social relations in the area.  This was achieved by introducing a substantial and 
divergent industrial sector, promoting atomised, classless values which became the 
bedrock of the New Labour brand success, whose influence spread specifically 
throughout North-West Cumbria.  The prosperity derived from investment at 
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Sellafield is barely evident in the declining neighbouring small towns such as 
Workington and to a lesser extent Carlisle. 
 
This scale of geographic economic and employment inequality between urban and 
rural areas is demonstrated by figures (IV-VII) entitled, ‘Income Deprivation’ (IV), 
whose broad demographics set the pattern for the following three indicators: 
‘Employment’ (V), ‘Education, Skills, and Training’ (VI), and ‘Living Environment’ 
(VII).  They show a varied picture in regards the county of Cumbria in general and 
within the two main urban areas in North-West Cumbria, they being Workington in 
Allerdale and Carlisle City in Carlisle.  A further issue to consider, as noted by 
Hoggart (1990), and Caffyn & Dahlstrom (2005), is that many of the spatial methods, 
which are differentiated by a range of social and political analysis, refer to data 
sources that are merely ascertained through specific district geography.  In addition, to 
understand such a spatial context, the four maps underneath illustrate the rural-urban 
morphology of Cumbria based on the ONS classification. 
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Figure IV: Income Deprivation (2015). (Cumbria Intelligence Observatory) 
http://www.cumbriaobservatory.org.uk/elibrary/Content/Internet/536/675/1766/42310145546.
jpg.
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Figure V: Employment (2015). (Cumbria Intelligence Observatory) 
http://www.cumbriaobservatory.org.uk/elibrary/Content/Internet/536/675/1766/42310162335.
jpg. 
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Figure VI: Education, Skills, and Training (2015). (Cumbria Intelligence Observatory) 
http://www.cumbriaobservatory.org.uk/elibrary/Content/Internet/536/675/1766/4231015345.j
pg. 
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Figure VII: Living Environment (2015). (Cumbria Intelligence Observatory) 
http://www.cumbriaobservatory.org.uk/elibrary/Content/Internet/536/675/1766/4231016112.j
pg. 
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The exemplification of such economic disparities from a communal perspective within 
North-West Cumbria is taken as manifest because of the prominent employment status 
of Sellafield which in itself, dons a dominant status in the area at large.  This naturally 
leads to an uneven progression to these imbalanced power relations (Aubrey (1993); 
Blowers (2016)).  This has allowed for an unusual degree of geographic and wealth 
inequality mainly in relation to the areas in Allerdale which borders the nuclear power 
plant, but also to a lesser extent in more distant geographic areas such as Carlisle.  The 
town of Workington and large parts of Carlisle City for instance, are following the 
political perspective of the spatial ethos (Keeble (1995); Clark (2014)).  This is 
because they are generally economically deprived in relation to the four wealth 
indicators outlined in the above maps, and accordingly are more susceptible to the Old 
Labour brand. 
 
This inevitably leads to a much bigger inequality gap between such urban areas and 
their rural equivalents.  This perspective is outlined in the spatial analysis in North-
West Cumbria, such as in Keswick and Cockermouth in Allerdale, and in Dalston and 
Wetheral in Carlisle which, by being in general economically wealthier areas, have a 
more even and higher distribution in relation to the four indicators and thus are more 
susceptible to New Labour brand politics.  Despite the Sellafield influence, as stated 
by Blowers & Lowry (1993), and Keating & Loughlin (2004), the effects of over-
dependence on traditional industries is prevalent in North-West Cumbria.  Their 
subsequent decline during the Thatcherite 1980s, and with that the decline of the 
communal class system which was incorporated within that employment structure, 
was, and is commonly evident, particularly throughout urban North-West Cumbria, as 
to that of Britain in general.  By this means, it must also be stated that despite it 
bringing a sense of distinctiveness to North-West Cumbria, the issue of Sellafield on 
the whole, does not play a large role in contemporary Labour or Post New Labour 
support in the area.  Its presence was widely ignored by the research participants in 
regards to the relevance of social class support for Labour in the contemporary era, as 
it was seen as fairly minimal.  This is principally because the Post New Labour era is 
perceived as a retraction to some extent to Old Labour communal class politics which 
in this manner, has only continued to solidify Labour’s traditional support in the 
former locale, and at best only gradually improved their support in the latter. 
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Appendix II 
 
Below is a general summary account of the content noted by the research participants.  
This data although not used in the ‘Findings’ section as the content in itself, was 
deemed too general to be integrated within the particular research phenomenon being 
explored in Chapter V; it does still give a broad indication of the relevance of the 
primary data to the secondary themes and their respective interview questions.  The 
data is structured via the three research themes instead of the eight interview questions 
which comprise them, primarily because the broad content of the questions 
particularly in themes II, and III are merged and linked to denote relevant conclusions 
to the core findings in their respective theme, as outlined in the theoretical framework. 
 
General Interview Data 
 
Theme I - Class/Identity: Question 1 
1) What does the term ‘social class’ mean to you? 
In the thirty years immediately following World War II, the social class system in 
Britain, being communal in nature, was far more rigid (participant 1).  The result 
being that there were clear past distinctions in relation to class categorisation, for 
instance the old communal class system was simple to comprehend.  If a person did a 
manual job, such as a skilled apprenticeship or an unskilled labourer then they were 
deemed to be from a traditional blue-collar working-class background (participant 2).  
In contrast, the middle-classes in such a structure, were in the main, better educated 
and thus would be more likely to attain employment in the white-collar professions, 
such as law and medicine.  In terms of broad social status categorisations, ‘working-
class’ and ‘middle-class’ still tends to mean white-collar and blue-collar.  There is a 
greater status gradation for those who work on either the ground floor or the office 
floor, thus in general it primarily is defined by whether a person undertakes blue-
collar manual labour, or white-collar skilled work, be it professional or administrative 
(participant 4).  A middle-class person, would consequently be someone who had a 
level of education and employment which would be related to a higher level of income 
(participant 7). 
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In modern times though, social class has become more complex and atomised, which 
has led to the opportunity for higher educational attainment to become more 
widespread (participant 1).  There has been an increase in people progressing further 
educationally than their parents, and with that obtaining jobs in a higher income 
bracket, which naturally affects how they define social class not just in itself, but also 
in its relationship with wider social factors such as employment (participant 2).  This 
sense of contemporary class complexity was stated by participant 3, who claimed that 
the current definitions of the classes were not as clear as they were in past history.  It 
is more fluid, centred within a culture-driven state of mind rather than out-dated 
occupational stereotypes.  The issue of social class is thus very complex in modern 
Britain, it is being defined within much more atomised terms (participant 4). 
 
There is still though a class-orientated society in modern Britain, it is just much more 
nuanced and insidious and thus harder to comprehend and analyse (participant 8).  In 
this modern atomised class culture, there are a great deal more gradations (participant 
7), there is many ways in which people identify their specific class status, it is not 
simply defined by broad archaic terms such as being ‘working-class’, ‘middle-class’, 
and ‘upper-class’ (participant 9).  The traditional blue and white-collar divide is more 
blurred today because there are more opportunities for people to gain employment into 
traditional white-collar professions from traditional blue-collar backgrounds 
(participant 14).  The class structure is thus more complex because people can move 
into different classes because of their education and income.  This had led to more 
opportunities to switch classes or aspire to have a better education, or to earn a better 
salary; there is more mobility because of the atomised nature of the broad class 
structure.  Britain however is still a class-based society, the parameters have just 
become less simplistic (participant 15). 
 
The notion of classlessness still does not exist, there is, and always has been a social 
class system of some kind in Britain (participant 2), it is ingrained as generally being 
part of the nation’s culture (participant 15).  A ‘classless society is an almost utopian 
ideal which should be aimed for, but when there are such seismic levels of inequality, 
where children are living in poverty, any kind of classless future seems unattainable’ 
(participant 1).  It would thus be unrealistic in modern Britain ‘to declare anybody as 
“classless”, a person might want to declare themselves as “classless” if that is the sort 
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of life that they are trying to lead, but such a life would be to some extent, disjointed 
from society’, as its broad contours are very much still based on some form of class 
divisions (participant 3).  In ‘one sense there is such a thing as a “classless” society 
because people do not break down into these homogenous blocks, it is much more 
atomised, so it is more difficult to see any kind of commonality between people in 
these different situations’ (participant 4).  It ‘does not necessarily have a connection to 
what people ultimately achieve, what is certain is that at the lower end there is a 
massive set of impediments of one kind or another’, and they are more pronounced in 
the post-Thatcher era than during the Old Labour years, ‘so the notion of a classless 
society, is a fallacy’ (participant 7).  Social class categorisation is endemic within the 
British body-politic and unless institutions such as the House of Lords, and the 
Monarchy, which are still centred on class patronage, are eradicated from British 
society, then the concept of a classless society is unrealistic (participant 9).  It would 
thus be difficult to realistically promote a classless society on a broad societal level 
because such divisions be they communal or atomised, define a person’s economic, 
social, political, and cultural outlook (participant 14). 
 
Theme II - (Labour) Party: Questions 2-5 
2) Is there such a definition as ‘Old Labour’ and ‘New Labour’, or even ‘Post New 
Labour’? 
3) Do you consider Labour to be a class-based political party? 
4) What relevance do you think class plays on Labour’s support base? 
5) Do you believe that communication techniques are effective in contemporary 
political party campaigning? 
Old Labour ‘were more focussed on the needy, the most vulnerable in society’ 
(participant 2).  Old Labour is ‘where the Labour Party came from’, as it was created 
by the communal working-classes (participant 3).  The party in ‘those times promoted 
the broad class interests of the traditional working-class people, who prioritised 
improvements to social conditions, all centred within a strong economy’ (participant 
5).  From a class level Old Labour was also routed in and led by the trade unions 
(participant 6).  Its trade union roots were very clearly set within historical events 
through the twentieth century in terms of the overarching ambition to improve the 
lives of the communal working-classes (participant 7).  Old Labour ‘reflected the 
society that it was in, people just voted Tory or Labour according to their social class, 
249 | P a g e  
 
thus the working-classes believed that Labour was the only party that would advance 
their political interests’ (participant 15). 
 
In terms of changing the party, the shift from communal centric Old Labour to the 
classless focussed New Labour did not start with Blair, but with his predecessor, Neil 
Kinnock.  Kinnock was the first to recognise that the party had to move beyond Old 
Labour traditional class politics.  ‘The image of the party had to shift and change in 
some really fundamental ways, partly because they needed to be more televisual, as 
they needed to be more modern and credible to the wider electorate’ (participant 8).  
The image of Labour effectively portrayed by the Conservatives in the Thatcherite 
1980s, was of a party which was anti-aspiration at home, and anti-patriotic abroad.  
The party also suffering from bitter internal ideological divisions, and a leader in 
Kinnock who was not seen as particularly strong or trustworthy, thus lacked the 
coherence required to be seen as an alternative government to the formidable 
Thatcherite administration.  Kinnock was in the long run, unsuccessful, as he lost two 
general elections, John Smith followed him, and continued the modernisation process, 
as he realised the post-Thatcher atomised reality had to be embraced if the party was 
ever to gain power in the future (participant 7).  Kinnock though started the journey 
because he recognised that Labour in its original form was becoming less electable.  
Kinnock though never got to enjoy the electoral benefits, and it was not until Blair and 
the emergence of New Labour that electoral success arrived.  Kinnock though by 
making the required changes laid the electoral foundations for the future success of 
New Labour (participant 8). 
 
This shift was thus essentially an attempt to broaden the class appeal of the party, 
because after four consecutive election reverses, the Old Labour message of 
promoting the interests of a communal working-class electorate was not relevant in 
the Post-Thatcher era, where such constructs were deemed in practical terms, obsolete.  
Blair in recognising and supporting the policy priorities of the new atomised, 
consumer-driven, electorate, that kept Thatcher in power a decade earlier, realised that 
by promoting the core Thatcherite philosophy of low taxes and individual liberty, that 
such an electorate would be more attracted to switch to New Labour.  This allied with 
the loyalty of their traditional Old Labour voters which was entrenched because they 
would never desert the party for their traditional Conservative opponents, further 
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solidified New Labour’s electoral support base (participant 2).  New Labour thus 
endeavoured to attract people who considered themselves as being on the broad 
ideological left but had during the Thatcher years moved beyond old communal class 
restrictions where in such times they had benefitted both educationally and 
economically (participant 3).  The party expanded its social horizons and courted 
those generally perceived to be better educated and higher income earners, so as to 
make the party more universally appealing on an electoral level (participant 1). 
 
The concept of social class though became a matter the party found hard to discern on 
a political level.  The issue, particularly in its traditional collectivist sense, placed the 
party in an awkward position, as the realisation dawned to the membership and 
activists that if Labour were realistically ever to regain government office, they had to 
accept that the traditional class divisions between the white and blue-collar had 
become eradicated and replaced with much greater atomised divisions which were 
harder to define.  This followed the post-Thatcherite meritocratic rhetoric that anyone 
can succeed through diligence and dedication, so the whole concept of social class 
was seen somehow as old fashioned.  Labour political figures consequently shied 
away from the broad communal class categories in the post-Thatcher era, as such 
divisions were seen as outdated and irrelevant.  It ‘was classlessness in a sense, it was 
breaking down barriers of social status but where New Labour went wrong was that it 
tipped over into pretending that the economic classes did not exist anymore.  New 
Labour became a kind of moderate liberal party interested in identity-styled politics 
which made them almost indistinguishable from the Liberal Democrats, but every 
political party, no matter their ideological stripe, has to have a motivating force of 
legitimating myths, which gives it validity and legitimacy that people can recognise 
what it stands for’ (participant 4). 
 
They were appealing more to the political middle-ground.  New Labour recognised 
that the old collectivised relationship between class categorisation and political party 
affinity had been replaced with a more fragmented atomised structure, and it was 
within such a structure that the party endeavoured to be seen as electorally viable 
(participant 9).  It was more of an aspirational middle-class party.  They aimed to 
appeal to people in the Midlands, East Anglia, South-East, and South-West, rather 
than those in Scotland, Wales, the North-East, North-West, Yorkshire & Humberside, 
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and London, and so on a geographic level, they concentrated their efforts to appeal to 
such voters who in the 1980s, were termed ‘Soft Thatcherite Tories’ (participant 11).  
New Labour though, with their classless image, made such perceptions difficult to 
comprehend.  Society post-Thatcher had changed, people had more educational 
opportunities, so New Labour did reflect to some extent, the new atomised prosperity, 
but by promoting a classless philosophy they inevitably became politically weakened 
because in such a class centric Britain, be it communal or atomised, any party not 
reflecting such sociological divisions can be seen as unprincipled (participant 15). 
 
It was assumed that Post New Labour although hard to define, must relate to the party 
in its current guise; a broad medium between its past Old Labour and New Labour 
incarnations (participant 2).  Since the general election defeat of 2010, there is a 
confusion as to what, and who Post New Labour stand for on a class level (participant 
3).  Ed Miliband tried to recalibrate the party back to the communal left but not to 
become as far left as it once was; a combination of Old and New Labour values 
(participant 8).  The reason he failed to convince was because he tried to speak left to 
the party and moderate to the country and was thus deemed politically unprincipled 
(participant 12).  He did not outline a new vision, be it New Labour like Tony Blair or 
Old Labour such as Harold Wilson, he did not have the skill to stamp his own Post 
New Labour identity (participant 15).  The election of Jeremy Corbyn, generally 
considered to be on the ideological left of the party, as leader, will inevitably lead to 
Labour in their Post New Labour guise, to promote communal class centred policies 
(participant 11), such as income redistribution, and an increase in business taxation, an 
approach which is very different to the dominant atomised Thatcherite ethos 
(participant 7). 
 
Labour still garner most of their support out of a sense of class identity.  Its core 
support still ‘feels that it is the party that looks after ordinary working people’ 
(participant 4).  The traditional working-classes ‘see the Labour Party as their beacon’ 
(participant 13).  If there is no working-class element to the Labour Party image then 
the party is notably weakened, as it still is such a big part of its ethos.  This was 
demonstrated through a range of progressive policies which past Labour governments 
have enacted such as the minimum wage, and the living wage.  The Labour Party in 
that sense exists primarily to protect those in society that are economically most 
252 | P a g e  
 
vulnerable, and such people are still defined by the class position they occupy 
(participant 15). 
 
Its original purpose as hitherto noted, was to represent working-class people via their 
industrial representatives the trade unions, and their broad class interests in 
parliament.  It thus became the party of the working-class, as it is identified with 
broad working-class interests, but that class post-Thatcher has been eroded as a 
coherent political entity, the party in the New Labour era endeavoured to define a new 
class position which was relevant in the modern atomised era (participant 6).  The 
party consequently now is much less communal class-conscious than during the pre-
Thatcher Old Labour era, as the party in the new atomised age, shifted and shaped into 
a more classless party so as to ensure electoral success.  There was a strong class 
connection in the Old Labour era, and that began to be eroded during the New Labour 
years, but the party still represents a core facet, which by its nature is primarily class-
based.  It is still fundamentally centred within core communal class values which 
promotes the aspirations of the working-classes, but as well recognises that it also had 
a broader responsibility to support such an electorate by making themselves 
electorally more viable in modern Britain, where the issue of class post-Thatcher had 
become more complex.  The consequence being that such a class structure would 
mean that the party by promoting archaic traditional class perspectives would be in the 
main, deemed irrelevant to a much-dispersed electorate who see class and the 
relationship with political party affinity through more atomised terms, where the 
concept of the brand has replaced communal class divisions (participant 7). 
 
Communications techniques by their nature are quite striking in this atomised brand-
orientated age, which is dominated by the visuals of multimedia; the younger 
generation especially take note of such messages (participant 5).  A political party thus 
has to in the modern era, have a set of values and policies, and an approach, and tone, 
which has some resonance to these more brand-orientated political times.  They also 
have to have the disciplines that coincide with such a modern communications 
strategy so as to create a clear identity which promotes certain key strengths that will 
be attractive in the broadest possible sense.  In political terms, Labour given its 
history, also has to recognise that they must not appear ideologically threatening to 
potential swing-voters (participant 7).  In the New Labour era, the party had shifted 
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ideologically to the atomised Thatcherite agenda via promoting a new classless 
Britain, where old communal social class divisions were generally seen as irrelevant.  
They consequently were courting the swing-voters borne out of the Thatcher era, via a 
sophisticated communications strategy, which proved electorally successful 
(participant 2).  The New Labour brand was thus marketed effectively, their position 
on broad pragmatic terms, was, ‘if we want to have our values and we want to deliver 
on them, we will package ourselves up so that we’ll get elected and we can start 
changing things’ (participant 5).  They came across as slick and ideologically non-
threatening in the sense that they were not promoting any communal class-centric 
perspectives which were traditionally associated with the party during the Old Labour 
era (participant 6).  The party ‘seemed to have shaken off’ much of their old 
communal class limitations (participant 15). 
 
It ‘was the essence of the brand that they were putting across, this idea that it is not 
just for the traditional working-classes anymore, but it was for anybody, it was 
classless’ (participant 14).  The general election victories in 1997, 2001, and 2005, 
demonstrated that the hitherto noted electoral strategy of New Labour, that being the 
combination of the skilled working-classes, and small-business owners, in conjunction 
with their traditional blue-collar core electoral base, proved an effective electoral 
combination.  The Labour Party was aware post-Thatcher that to stay electorally 
viable they had to appeal to a wider class electorate, New Labour was the construct 
which both on a political and communications level, illustrated that such a shift had 
occurred (participant 7).  It ‘was very much selling it to people, emphasising that it 
was a very different Labour Party now’ (participant 8), one that embraced this more 
atomised class reality. 
 
Theme III - Geography (North-West Cumbria): Questions 6-8 
6) Does your sense of class play a significant role to how you live? 
7) How does your location affect your political viewpoint? 
8) Do you think that a change of location from Allerdale/Carlisle would affect your 
class or political perspective? 
Class perception both on an individual level and within a broad political perspective 
post-Thatcher, has morphed into a more classless perspective (participant 5).  
Working-class people largely, ‘tend to think “I’m very working-class”’, but when 
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such initial perceptions are explored they might think, ‘well actually no, you know 
maybe I am more middle-class”’, in this post-Thatcher atomised era, such class 
perceptions are harder to classify (participant 14).  An example of this is when the 
former Labour Party agent for Workington went electioneering and asked a 
constituent who they considered to be a past Labour supporter, if ‘you’ll be voting in 
the election for us’ and received a reply, ‘oh well I can’t now as I’ve bought my own 
house.  The question that should be asked is why a person has moved location, could it 
be because they would like to shift their perceived class perception’ (participant 4). 
 
Such class perceptions, be it communal or atomised, are broadly rooted in British 
societal culture, as classes have their own traditions and stereotypes which still makes 
the issue relevant in contemporary Britain (participant 15).  Although where a person 
is born and brought up can have a notable effect on what political party they may 
decide to join and feel a natural affiliation with, there is in these more complex class 
times a greater sense that hitherto traditional class, political allegiance have become to 
some degree, merged.  For instance, ‘Rotherham used to have one Tory and eighty 
Labour councillors, consequently to get anywhere in local politics in Rotherham being 
in Labour was essential.  There are similar very strong Tory areas where if a person 
wished to be active in local politics then they would have to join them’ (participant 1). 
 
This type of political merging can affect people if they are not ideologically aligned to 
a particular political philosophy, and thus their motivation is primarily to play some 
role in local politics.  Traditional political allegiance that existed in the communal 
class era between Labour and the Conservatives are in this post-Thatcher era, 
definitely blurring (participant 2).  There are political representatives in North-West 
Cumbria that have joined Labour to get elected in the ward where they live so as to 
satisfy their desires to be politically active in their local area, but the consequence of 
which being, that they are possibly pursuing in their local ward, policies that are 
contrary to their own or their party’s ideological perspective. 
 
There are people who will thus promote such a narrow perspective of political 
allegiance, this clearly demonstrates that ‘some people’ in post-Thatcher atomised 
Britain, ‘have a very different view of their role within local politics’ (participant 3).  
Such potential ideological convergence tends to blur political party allegiance at a 
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local level; for instance, if one party is hegemonic in one area there is a danger that the 
opposition party could become a catch-all people’s party in response so as to stay 
electorally viable by appealing to a broader class section of the electorate.  There are 
several Labour members, and even some Councillors in North-West Cumbria, who are 
primarily in the party because it allows for them the best opportunity to become active 
in local politics and as a consequence, serve their local area; their belief though in 
Labour values is at best, limited.  People thus join the party without actually believing 
in its core, class-centric values.  If a person moves to a specific place though, there 
would be pressure on them to conform to the culture of that specific place, and 
consequently socially conform to a stereotypical mind-set that defines such a 
community.  It would on a general level, probably reinforce each other though, so if a 
person is a Labour voter in an urban area and they are surrounded by many other 
Labour voters then that will also reinforce their opinion’ (participant 4).  If they move 
out to a small village and their neighbours and friends may be less inclined to vote 
Labour, ‘then they might find that their own attitudes’ are to some extent, questioned 
(participant 6). 
 
This is just a reflection that this whole notion of political allegiance has become less 
rigid and that is a reflection that British politics and its relationship with class 
perception, has post-Thatcher, become less class structured.  It ‘happens in 
parliamentary terms as well, for there is always the suspicion that Tony Blair could 
easily have been a Tory rather than a Labour politician’ (participant 7).  Some people 
certainly might naturally feel the need to hide their personal political convictions, be it 
nationally or locally, because they perceive it to be a potential burden in attracting a 
broad range of support.  In rural Allerdale therefore, an area which following 
traditional geographic stereotypes, is not particularly electorally profitable for Labour, 
candidates of a Labour mind-set may elect to stand on an independent basis, so as to 
dispel any stereotypical fears that they, being associated with the party and its 
socialistic traditions, could alone, cost them support. 
 
There is a definite possibility in North-West Cumbria in such a mixed urban-rural 
area, where there is both a clear divide of traditional and non-traditional Labour 
support, that prospective political representatives may become ‘Independents’ so as to 
disguise their real political party loyalties (participant 11).  There ‘was a Conservative 
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Councillor in North-West Cumbria who admitted openly, “I’m more in keeping with 
the Labour Party but I want to be a Councillor in the ward I live in”, which was a Tory 
area, so the only practical way of achieving their ambition was to join the 
Conservative Party.  In the end he decided to become an ‘Independent’ and eventually 
lost his seat, but he primarily just aspired to be a local political representative for his 
area, but he was not comfortable being in such a position’, as he had communal social 
class loyalties associated with Labour politics (participant 8).  In conclusion, many 
representatives aim only to serve their community; they are not interested in the 
broader political debate or have particularly strong ideological allegiances, they 
simply aim to be involved in local politics, and so they will thus join whatever party 
that will most help them achieve such an aim (participant 9). 
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POSTSCRIPT 
 
 
Post New Labour: The Corbyn Effect 
 
The analysis in this thesis has generally focussed upon the relevance of the past Old 
and New Labour brands in regards to the phenomenon being studied.  This, to some 
extent, fails to analyse the relevance that the current ‘Post New Labour’ brand plays 
over such factors, this occurs primarily because it is an evolving brand, and thus is 
naturally harder to define and evaluate in comparison to its two historical 
predecessors.  It is though important that this analysis is explored in its current context 
thus, in the form of a ‘Postscript’, so as to outline both a contemporary Labour 
perspective in its relationship with the research phenomenon, as well as offering 
potential future directions which may potentially arise that could determine its future 
direction. 
 
The interviews confirm, a view that social class in its historic communal sense, as 
portrayed by first Marx and later refined by Weber, prominent since the end of World 
War II, is thus simply not any longer the crux of political discourse.  Since the late 
1970s, it has plainly been surpassed universally as a relevant entity by the rise of the 
atomised ethos.  The communal, socialised society gave way to an atomised state that 
was regarded as ‘enabling’ the right of choice to the individual citizen.  Such major 
sociological and political changes were, as remarked by Giddens (2002), and Rosen 
(2005), to have equally seismic effects on the future image of the Labour Party as they 
realised that it had to adapt to such a new landscape or become as irrelevant as the 
collectivised class structure which had proceeded it.  The interviewees recognised that 
this style of politics, as noted by Evans (2013), and Veldman (2015), was the bedrock 
of the Thatcherite ideology derived by the New Right and was evolved by Tony Blair 
and New Labour’s Third Way classless brand ethos.  Such evolution as hitherto noted, 
involved creating an atomised communitarian structure, which was concerned with 
creating better communities through empowering the role of the atomised citizen, a 
position which proved electorally successful from 1997 until 2010. 
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In 2010, Ed Miliband became leader at a time when the party was at an ideological 
crossroads.  The discourse of key Labour elites at the time, particularly that of 
Miliband himself acknowledged the need to form a new Post New Labour narrative 
and electoral strategy.  New Labour had by following a post-Thatcherite atomised 
ethos, eventually lost its appeal.  They, by abandoning communal class politics, which 
defined their electoral successes in the Old Labour era, led to the party being seen as 
unprincipled, and as a consequence caused widespread disenchantment to their 
traditional working-class support, which historically were the bedrock of their 
supporter base.  Twenty years later, as Giugni (2014) stated, ‘all British parties seem 
to compete within the ideological and political bounds set by New Labour (and 
arguably by Thatcherism).  Inside Labour, no innovative paradigm has emerged from 
the 2010 removal from office, the New Labour era was over and a new chapter in the 
party’s history began in a post-New Labour framework’.  Despite his gradual shift 
away from New Labour’s post-Thatcherite ideals towards a more collectivist Old 
Labour agenda, Miliband in developing the Post New Labour brand, still shied away 
from promoting traditional class policies such as reducing wealth inequality, 
advocating defence cuts, and implementing tax rises for the financially more 
prosperous.  Post New Labour thus on a broad basis, whilst giving greater credence to 
traditional leftist policies of poverty and inequality, also acknowledged that the social 
structure of Britain had become atomised, and so in balance, offered a compromise 
between both Old and New Labour. 
 
Miliband’s ‘five years as Labour leader was an incremental move away from 
assessing the limitations of New Labour towards a new Post Labour narrative’ (Hasan 
& Macintyre, 2011, p.294).  Miliband was by and large supportive of such thinking 
and embraced the Post New Labour concept as a way of defining his leadership 
tenure.  His ‘inability to communicate to a mass audience and failure to target the 
beneficiaries of his policies’, limited such a perceived move to the left towards an Old 
Labour trajectory (Gray (2017)).  Such issues did not affect his more radical 
successor, for whether as Gray (2017) continues, ‘by serendipity or by design, Corbyn 
has brought together some of the most vital forces on the contemporary scene: the 
anti-capitalist radicalism of young people who are innocent of history, a bourgeois 
cult of personal authenticity and naked self-interest expressed as self-admiring virtue.  
Nothing could be more exotically modern than Corbyn’s hybrid populism’.  By 
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electing Corbyn, the party decided to continue with the promotion of the Post New 
Labour brand by emphasising a balance between Old Labour’s communal economic 
policies combined within New Labour’s atomised social structures.  The relative 
success of the party in the 2017 general election appears to suggest that such a 
decision could be in keeping with a notable part of the British electorate.  Corbyn 
showed, defying all the established pundits during the election, that he could build a 
conducive Post New Labour brand similar to that of Miliband, albeit on a more radical 
scale.  He voiced Old Labour communal style rhetoric of standing up ‘For the Many 
[and], Not the Few’ but within that, he carefully did not purport any communal class-
war discourse, such as using terms like ‘working-class’, and ‘middle-class’, as this 
type of old-fashioned class dialogue was clearly eradicated during the era of the New 
Labour brand (Labour Party (2017)). 
 
Labour in the 2017 election produced one of the most surprising performances in 
contemporary British political history.  The party at the election’s outset started out 
more than twenty points behind in the polls, but Jeremy Corbyn’s enthusiastic 
campaign dramatically reduced this Conservative lead within a few weeks.  Even 
more important than the moderate thirty seat gain, Labour much more considerably 
increased their vote share by nearly 10% up from their disappointing total achieved by 
Ed Miliband in 2015, Gordon Brown in 2010, and even by Tony Blair in 2005, the last 
time the party won an election.  Corbyn’s campaign was exceptionally effective in 
generating great interest within the youth vote who ordinarily would have a much 
lower voter turnout rate.  ‘Among 18-to-24-year olds’, according to a YouGov poll 
stated by SAEB (2017), ‘Corbyn enjoyed support of 71% compared to 15% for the 
Tories’.  The reason for this was Labour’s clear mix of Old and New Labour, that 
being to promote the economic interests of the working masses within an atomised 
social class structure devoid of anachronistic, communal attachments.  This youth 
surge, as Rye (2017) denotes, in Labour’s electoral support has been replicated in the 
party membership which may be an important base from which to build for the future. 
 
The success of Corbyn in enthusing the youth vote was mainly instigated by the 
party’s effective use of modern communication techniques.  This view is summarised 
by Van Loon (2017) who stated, ‘Labour has gained 1.3m fans/followers on 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, versus just 848,000 for the Conservatives.  
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Moreover, on Facebook, the largest platform for both parties, Labour has seen a 61% 
increase in followers since the election was called (from 540,000 to 868,000), 
compared to just 6% for the Conservatives (from 564,000 to 596,000).  Also, Labour 
talks more to its supporters on social media, with more than 30 posts a day in the last 
week across its social platforms combined (versus 10 to 20 posts a day for the 
Conservatives)’.  Labour thus attracted a greater amount of interest in regards user-
engagement across social media.  The party attracted a daily average of almost 
100,000 engagements in the final week of the election campaign, which was more 
than double the hits for the Conservatives.  The contradiction of Corbyn’s traditional, 
collectivised Old Labour message in regards policy is that his main surge was with the 
liberal middle-classes; white-collar metropolitan professionals, which was primarily 
fostered through the youth vote, who embrace a new social media reality that 
promotes an atomised focus through individual Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram 
accounts.  This atomised class surge has come at the expense of traditional Old 
Labour support, principally that of the former heavy, manual industries, where the use 
of social media is not so pronounced and the collectivised structure is still prominent, 
and hence their attraction to the Post New Labour Corbyn message has been much 
more limited (Allington (2017)). 
 
Corbyn effectively demonstrated during the campaign that the communal-styled 
socialist agenda was in accordance with the needs of large sections of the electorate.  
At the same time, he recognised that the old communal class divisions had been 
dismantled and replaced in this post-Thatcher, post-New Labour era, with a more 
atomised and classless structure which is harder to define and thus harder to categorise 
in clear political terms.  Corbyn’s election campaign had similarities in style if not in 
specific political substance, with Donald Trump’s populist presidential campaign in 
the United States, and the ‘Vote Leave’ campaign to remove Britain from the 
European Union the previous year.  Both of these to a large extent achieved their 
respective victories by successfully promoting an anti-political establishment 
perspective through engineering populist emotions and perceptions. 
 
There is though, a cultural contradiction to Corbyn’s surprise electoral appeal as 
although he is deemed as promoting old-fashioned, communal working-class interests, 
his success primarily occurred because he managed to gain the allegiance of a 
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substantial number of those who lived in what would be termed traditional middle-
class areas.  Labour’s success in taking long-standing Conservative constituencies 
such as Canterbury in Kent, and Kensington in West London could well be considered 
as a defining event in regards the Post New Labour brand’s broad class appeal.  The 
fact that Corbyn’s Post New Labour Party could win two of the safest Conservative 
seats in two of the richest constituencies in the country is testimony to the potentials 
of such an extraordinary shift.  The success of Corbyn’s Post New Labour brand is 
also the culmination of a social transformation which has transformed the party 
electorally over the past two decades.  Corbyn, although generating Old Labour 
domestic policies such as rail nationalisation and the scrapping of university tuition 
fees, has though solidified a potentially atomised supporter base for the party, begun 
by Tony Blair and New Labour (Gray (2017)). 
 
The rise of Corbyn has brought into sharp focus the notable ideological divisions 
between Labour and the Conservatives, who together, now account for more than 80% 
of the vote, an electoral phenomenon not seen for nearly fifty years.  The 
Conservatives post-Brexit, with their insistence on promoting a greater level of public-
sector cuts, are moving further to the ideological right.  Such a shift has left Corbyn’s 
Post New Labour brand being regarded as possibly more radical than it really is, as his 
policies on an ideological level did not markedly differ from those of his predecessor, 
Miliband.  ‘This political polarisation is a reflection of a growing polarisation between 
the classes in British society’ (SAEB (2017)).  The future for the Post New Labour 
brand under the continued leadership of Jeremy Corbyn is like Old Labour, to remain 
committed to reducing economic inequality, and improving the living conditions of 
the communal working-classes, while accepting the atomised social structure which 
was embedded in the Post-Thatcherite, New Labour age.  Rather than being pulled to 
the ideological right by the Conservative government, as such was the position of the 
New Labour brand, Jeremy Corbyn and the Post New Labour brand must be prepared 
to promote and renew their own brand identity if they are to achieve future success.  
This is achieved by promoting collectivist social policies whilst accepting that 
communal class structures have been forever fragmented and atomised (Allington 
(2017); Gray (2017)). 
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This view is outlined by Salisbury (2016), who argued that ‘a progressive anti-
establishment Labour Party must be proactive rather than reactive: this would mean 
reframing the terms of political and popular debate.  If Labour should learn one thing’ 
from the rise of Corbyn, ‘is that the centre-ground is crumbling: “the lesser of two 
evils” is no longer a viable political stance’.  Corbyn’s success, Rye (2017) alluded, 
has opened up an opportunity to realign politics on the left.  ‘A re-engagement of the 
Labour mainstream with the wider left would help to reinvigorate and refresh the 
party’s policies and approach by developing not only new appeals in terms of policy 
but also new ways of organising by building a deeper presence in communities and in 
so doing, reinventing the party for the future’.  Corbyn has also patently been 
triumphant in stimulating new support as well as reawakening old support that had 
become disenchanted with the atomised New Labour brand which were in their 
opinion, deemed not to be satisfying the communal class interests of their traditional 
working-class supporter base.  He, as Rye (2017) further commented, ‘has certainly 
been successful in drawing the wider left into his tent.  Then again, at present at least, 
much of this appears to be entirely based on his leadership rather than reflecting any 
common inclination to support the Labour Party.  Were he to step down, it is difficult 
to see how that broad alliance would hold together’.  Such sentiments if borne out or 
not in the near or long-term, could to some degree, act as a factor for future academic 
research in this particular field. 
 
Due to time commitments though there were notable constraints placed upon the 
study.  In regards the research interviews, they were undertaken from the summer of 
2015 until the early winter of 2016 when the Corbyn leadership was just beginning to 
take shape.  The subsequent Conceptual Analysis used such events as the basis for 
understanding where the party was heading in relation to the research phenomenon, 
spanning up to and including the 2017 general election.  The close time-proximity 
between that election and this thesis submission means on a practical level it is simply 
not feasible for this thesis to analyse effectively the Post New Labour brand beyond 
such a time period.  It would appear though that the possible future direction of the 
party under Corbyn’s leadership is still in flux in relation to the phenomenon outlined 
in this study, and is thus still hard to clearly define, hence any future post-doctoral 
research with the natural benefit of a greater historical context could be beneficial. 
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There was an assumption that Corbyn would promote a more traditional class 
discourse and by such means, reject any hint of classless New Labourism.  This fear 
that he would automatically retract to an Old Labour communal outlook was a 
common perception amongst the research participants, but it must also be stated that 
its relevance was limited in regards this study for two reasons.  Firstly, as hitherto 
noted, timing in relation to the research being undertaken condensed the relevance of 
the point, as Corbyn was only elected as party leader three-quarters of the way 
through the Interview process, and so for the first four interviews, the issue was not 
raised as he was considered at that time to have next to no chance of success.  
Secondly, as Corbyn’s first leadership election victory in September 2015 coincided 
with the practical research, it consequently led to the participants giving an assumed 
interpretation of his future intentions in regards how the Post New Labour brand under 
his leadership would take shape.  It was inevitable, as Corbyn was well known for his 
Old Labour traditional, class-based politics, that the participants’ views would be 
coloured by suppositions of this kind.  Before the 2015 general election there was not 
a great deal of ideological difference between the Conservatives and Labour; they, 
like that espoused by Giddens in the New Labour era, were not far apart, a stance 
which correlated with Miliband’s confusion over where he would place the party in 
connection with its long-standing divergent position to the issue of class.  Since the 
election of Corbyn as Labour leader, there has been a perception that, that gap on a 
broad level, has become immense (Seymour (2016)); Labour are now policy-wise, 
back with a clear Old Labour social class narrative which is clearly distinct from New 
Labour; a general shift which is noticeably electorally viable. 
